Life in Four Dimensions

A Defence of the Block Universe Theory
Erscheinungsjahr 2026
ISBN: 978-0-19-887585-7
Verlag: Oxford University Press

Buch, Englisch, 240 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 160 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 508 g

There is a widespread idea that we experience our world as if it is other than a block world; as if, instead, our world is dynamical and time passes in a robustly A-theoretic manner. In light of this, some argue that there is good reason to think that our world is robustly dynamical, for the best explanation of our having these various experiences is that we are experiencing time as it really is, in itself, as dynamical. Thus, there is a kind of inference to the best explanation from the nature of our experience, broadly construed, to the conclusion that our world is not a block. This book takes up the challenge of responding to this argument in its various guises, where these guises reflect the different ways that we might be said to experience time (whether in terms of our attitudes, our beliefs, our temporal preferences, or our perceptual experiences). By appealing to new empirical work undertaken at the Centre for Time in Sydney, it is argued that for a whole range of ways that we experience our world temporally, including attitudinally, preference-wise, belief-wise, and perception-wise, we experience the world just as it is: as a block world. There is, at the end of the day, no pressure to conclude that our world is dynamical via the nature of any of our experiences of the world.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Miller, Kristie

Über Autor(innen)

Kristie Miller is Challis Professor of Philosophy and the Joint Director of the Interdisciplinary Centre for Time at the University of Sydney. She works in metaphysics, particularly on the nature of time, temporal experience, time biases, and personal identity. She is known for defending the block theory of time against its competitors views. Her recent work includes empirical investigation of the ways that people experience and think about time, the structure of their temporal preferences and their normative judgements about those preferences. Her latest grant focusses on mental time travel in non-human animals, and will involve empirical work with chimpanzees.