Welfare, Incentives, and Taxation

Erscheinungsjahr 2006
ISBN: 978-0-19-829521-1
Verlag: OUP Oxford

Buch, Englisch, 584 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 1027 g

Nobel Prize-winning economist James Mirrlees is one of the world's leading figures in welfare, development, and public sector economics. This volume brings together for the first time published and unpublished but seminal work in these key areas, and will be a very useful source for anyone looking for a comprehensive picture of Mirrlees' contribution to the subject.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Mirrlees, James

Fachgebiete

• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Öffentliche Finanzwirtschaft, Besteuerung
• Geisteswissenschaften Geschichtswissenschaft Geschichtliche Themen Wirtschaftsgeschichte
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Arbeitsmarkt
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Wirtschaftswissenschaften Wirtschaftsgeschichte
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Mikroökonomie
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Wirtschaftswachstum
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Gesundheitsökonomie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Part I: Welfare Economics

- 1: Information and Incentives: The Economics of Carrots and Sticks

- 2: Notes on Welfare Economics, Information, and Uncertainty

- 3: The Desirability of Natural Resource Depletion

- 4: The Economic Uses of Utilitarianism

- 5: Welfare Economics and Economies of Scale

- Part II: Tax Theory

- 6: An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

- 7: On Producer Taxation

- 8: The Optimum Town

- 9: Population Policy and the Taxation of Family Size

- 10: Optimal Tax Theory: A Synthesis

- 11: The Theory of Optimal Taxation

- 12: Migration and Optimal Income Taxes

- 13: Taxing Uncertain Incomes

- Part III: Public Expenditure

- 14: Arguments for Public Expenditure

- 15: Optimal Taxation and Government Finance

- Part IV: Contract Theory

- 16: The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization

- 17: The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I

- Part V: Growth Theory

- 18: The Dynamic Nonsubstitution Theorem

- 19: Agreeable Plans

- 20: Fairly Good Plans

- 21: Optimum Saving with Economies of Scale

- Part VI: Development Economics

- 22: A Pure Theory of Underdeveloped Economies

- 23: Project Appraisal and Planning Twenty Years On: Appendix

Über Autor(innen)

James A. Mirrlees is Professor of Political Economy at the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Trinity College. He was previously Edgeworth Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford (1968-95). In 1996 he won the Nobel Prize for Economics for fundamental contributions to the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information. His research interests are optimal income taxation; policy implications of imperfect rationality; and principal/agent situations with multidimensional choice variables.