Self-Knowing Agents

Erscheinungsjahr 2010
ISBN: 978-0-19-959204-3
Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA

Buch, Englisch, 244 Seiten, Format (B × H): 216 mm x 145 mm, Gewicht: 327 g

Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. She considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions? Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone
working in the philosophy of mind and action.

Autoren/Hrsg.

O'Brien, Lucy

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Preface

Part I.
1: Introduction
2: Arguments for the No-Reference View of 'I'
3: Perceptual Models of First Person Reference
4: The Self-Reference Rule
5: The Agency Account
6: Agent's Awareness and Knowledge of Our Mental Actions

Part II
7: Introduction
8: What are Actions?
9: On Knowing One's Own Physical Actions
10: Bodily Awareness
11: Bodily Awareness and Self-Knowledge

Über Autor(innen)

Lucy O'Brien is a Reader in Philosophy at University College London