Buch, Englisch, 502 Seiten, Format (B × H): 178 mm x 255 mm, Gewicht: 1057 g
A dilemma in the philosophy of life
Buch, Englisch, 502 Seiten, Format (B × H): 178 mm x 255 mm, Gewicht: 1057 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-927690-5
Verlag: Oxford University Press
One of the main original aims of philosophy was to give us guidance about how to live our lives. The ancient Greeks typically assumed that a life led in accordance with reason, a rational life, would also be the happiest or most fulfilling. Ingmar Persson's book resumes this project, which has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy. But his conclusions are very different; by exploring the irrationality of our attitudes to time, our identity, and our responsibility, Persson shows that the aim of living rationally conflicts not only with the aim of leading the most fulfilling life, but also with the moral aim of promoting the maximization and just distribution of fulfilment for all. Persson also argues that neither the aim of living rationally nor any of the fulfilment aims can be rejected as less rational than any other. We thus face a dilemma of either having to enter a retreat of reason, insulated from everyday attitudes, or making reason retreat from its aspiration to be the sole controller of our attitudes.
The Retreat of Reason explores three areas in which there is a conflict between the rational life and a life dedicated to maximization of fulfilment. Persson contends that living rationally requires us to give up, first, our temporal biases; secondly, our bias towards ourselves; and, thirdly, our responsibility to the extent that it involves the notion of desert and desert-entailing notions. But giving up these attitudes is so overwhelmingly hard that the effort to do so not only makes our own lives less fulfilling, but also obstructs our efficient pursuit of the moral aim of promoting a maximum of justly distributed fulfilment.
Ingmar Persson brings back to philosophy the ambition of offering a broad vision of the human condition. The Retreat of Reason challenges and disturbs some of our most fundamental ideas about ourselves.
Zielgruppe
Scholars and students of philosophy, particularly in ethical theory, the philosophy of mind, and metaphysics
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Metaphysik, Ontologie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophische Logik, Argumentationstheorie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Angewandte Ethik & Soziale Verantwortung
Weitere Infos & Material
- Introduction
- I. The nature of para-cognitive attitudes
- 1: Pain as a sensory quality
- 2: Pleasure as a sensory quality
- 3: Beyond hedonism
- 4: An analysis of desire
- 5: The concept of emotion
- 6: A typology of emotion
- II. Reason and value
- 7: Introduction: subjectivism and objectivism
- 8: The structure of reasons: internalism
- 9: An objective requirement?
- 10: The desire relativity of value
- 11: The rationality of para-cognitive attitudes
- 12: Weakness of will
- 13: Representational mechanisms
- III. Rationality and temporal neutrality
- 14: The nature of a temporal bias
- 15: The irrationality of the bias towards the near
- 16: The irrationality of the bias towards the future
- 17: The dilemma as regards temporal neutrality
- IV. Rationality and personal neutrality
- 18: Introduction: the bias towards oneself
- 19: Self and body
- 20: Psychological theories of our identity
- 21: Somatist theories of our identity
- 22: The identity of material bodies
- 23: The rational insignificance of identity and continuity
- 24: Self-concern and self-approval
- 25: Concern for and approval of others
- 26: Prudence: maximization or idealism?
- 27: The requirement of personal neutrality
- 28: Moral individualism: autonomy and agreement
- 29: The dilemma as regards personal neutrality
- V. Rationality and responsibility
- 30: Introduction
- 31: Predictability and freedom
- 32: Compatibilist freedom of action
- 33: Compatibilist freedom of will
- 34: Responsibility and desert
- 35: The deontological element of responsibility
- 36: The emotive genesis of desert
- 37: The dilemma as regards responsibility
- Conclusion
- Appendix: On being out of touch
