Epistemological Disjunctivism

Erscheinungsjahr 2012
ISBN: 978-0-19-955791-2
Verlag: Oxford University Press(UK)

Buch, Englisch, 182 Seiten, Format (B × H): 145 mm x 222 mm, Gewicht: 368 g

Duncan Pritchard offers an original defence of epistemological disjunctivism. This is an account of perceptual knowledge which contends that such knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief that enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. In particular, in a case of paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that p, the subject's rational support for believing that p is that she sees that p, where this rational support is both reflectively accessible and factive (i.e., it entails p). Such an account of perceptual knowledge poses a radical challenge to contemporary epistemology, since by the lights of standard views in epistemology this proposal is simply incoherent. Pritchard's aim in Epistemological Disjunctivism is to show that this proposal is theoretically viable (i.e., that it does not succumb to the problems that it appears to face), and also to demonstrate that this is an account of perceptual knowledge which we would want to endorse if it were available on account of its tremendous theoretical potential. In particular, he argues that epistemological disjunctivism offers a way through the impasse between epistemic externalism and internalism, and also provides the foundation for a distinctive response to the problem of radical scepticism.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Pritchard, Duncan

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophie: Allgemeines, Methoden
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Acknowledgements

- Introduction

- Part One: Epistemological Disjunctivism in Outline

- 1: Epistemological Disjunctivism: A First Pass

- 2: Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivism

- 3: Three Prima Facie Problems for Epistemological Disjunctivism

- 4: Metaphysical and Epistemological Disjunctivism

- 5: Seeing That P and Knowing That P

- 6: Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Epistemic Externalism/Internalism Distinction

- 7: Resolving the Access Problem

- Notes to Part One

- Part Two: Favouring versus Discriminating Epistemic Support

- Introductory Remarks

- 1: The Relevant Alternatives Account of Perceptual Knowledge

- 2: Relevant Alternatives and Closure

- 3: Three Epistemic Principles: Discrimination, Evidential Transmission and Favouring

- 4: Favouring and Discriminating Epistemic Support

- 5: Diagnosis

- 6: A Two-Tiered Relevant Alternatives Theory

- 7: Favouring versus Discriminating Epistemic Support and Epistemological Disjunctivism

- Notes to Part Two

- Part Three: Radical Scepticism

- Introductory Remarks

- 1: Radical Scepticism

- 2: Mooreanism

- 3: Contemporary Neo-Mooreanism

- 4: A Simpleminded Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism

- 5: Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism

- 6: Overriding versus Undercutting Anti-Sceptical Strategies

- 7: Radical Scepticism and Quietism

- 8: Knowing and Saying That One Knows

- 9: Concluding Remarks

- Notes to Part Three

- Bibliography

- Index

Über Autor(innen)

Duncan Pritchard is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. His main research area is epistemology, and he has published widely in this field, including the books Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and The Nature and Value of Knowledge (with A. Haddock & A. Millar, Oxford University Press, 2010). He is editor-in-chief of the journals Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy (Oxford University Press) and (with D. Machuca) International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (Brill). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize. In 2011 he was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh.