Buch, Englisch, 288 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 453 g
Constitutivity and Revisability
Buch, Englisch, 288 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 453 g
ISBN: 978-1-032-37040-8
Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd
In this book, Stathis Psillos and Thodoris Dimitrakos explore the question: how is empirical, and in particular scientific, knowledge possible? Most philosophers have accepted that some restrictions must be placed on empirical knowledge in order for it to be possible. Yet considerable debate has revolved around the precise nature of such restrictions, above all how knowledge can be said to be a priori.
The book traces the development of the concept of the a priori in the philosophy of science, beginning with the Descartes-Newton controversy. The discussion then turns to Leibniz and Hume, Kant’s conception of synthetic a priori principles, and Mill’s radical empiricism, which sought to eliminate the a priori altogether. The book also examines later transformations of the debate, including the emergence of non-Euclidean geometries and their challenge to the Kantian view, Poincaré’s conventionalism, the development of the relativised a priori within logical positivism, and the Quine-Carnap debate over analyticity.
Building on these historical and philosophical discussions, the authors develop and defend a novel functional conception of the a priori - captured by the idea that "the a priori is as the a priori does" - according to which a priori principles are those that play a constitutive role in scientific theorising while remaining open to revision.
An engaging and wide-ranging philosophical investigation of the a priori, this book will be of great interest to students and researchers in philosophy of science, metaphysics, epistemology and the history of the philosophy of science.
Zielgruppe
Postgraduate and Undergraduate Advanced
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
Preface 1. Introduction 2. Constitutive Principles and Hypotheses in the Two Principia 3. Leibniz and Hume on Constitutive Principles 4. Kant’s Copernican Revolution: Necessity, Universality and Unrevisability 5. The Absolute Rejection I: Mill’s Radical Empiricism and Inductivism 6. The Emergence of Non-Euclidean Geometries 7. Conventions as a New Epistemic Category 8. Logical Positivism and the Emergence of the Relativized A Priori 9. The Absolute Rejection II: Quine versus Carnap 10. A Novel Functional Approach to A Priori. References Index




