Political Determinants of Corporate Governance

Political Context, Corporate Impact
Erscheinungsjahr 2002
ISBN: 978-0-19-924074-6
Verlag: OUP Oxford

Buch, Englisch, 244 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 534 g

Before a nation can produce, it must achieve social peace. That social peace has been reached in different nations by differing means, some of which have then been embedded in business firms, in corporate ownership patterns, and in corporate governance structures.

The large publicly held, diffusely owned firm dominates business in the United States despite its infirmities, namely the frequently fragile relations between stockholders and managers. But in other economically advanced nations, ownership is not diffuse but concentrated. It is concentrated in no small measure because the delicate threads that tie managers to shareholders in the public firm fray easily in common political environments, such as those in the continental European social democracies.

Social democracies press managers to stabilize employment, to forego some profit-maximizing risks with the firm, and to use up capital in place rather than to downsize when markets no longer are aligned with the firm's production capabilities. Since managers must have discretion in the public firm, how they use that discretion is crucial to stockholders, and social democratic pressures induce managers to stray farther than otherwise from their shareholders' profit-maximizing goals. Moreover, the means that align managers with diffuse stockholders in the United States-incentive compensation, hostile takeovers, and strong shareholder-wealth maximization norms-are weaker and sometimes denigrated in continental social democracies.
Hence, public firms there have higher managerial agency costs, and large-block shareholding has persisted as shareholders' best remaining way to control those costs.

Social democracies may enhance total social welfare, but if they do, they do so with fewer public firms than less socially responsive nations. The author therefore uncovers not only a political explanation for ownership concentration in Europe, but also a crucial political prerequisite to the rise of the public firm in the United States, namely the weakness of social democratic pressures on the American business firm.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Roe, Mark J.

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sozialphilosophie, Politische Philosophie
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Stochastik Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Methodenlehre
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Stochastik Mathematische Statistik
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Theorie, Politische Philosophie
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Management Unternehmensorganisation & Entwicklungsstrategien
• Geisteswissenschaften Geschichtswissenschaft Geschichtswissenschaft Allgemein Geschichtswissenschaft: Theorie und Methoden

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Introduction

- Part I: Political Conflict and the Corporation

- 1: Peace as Predicate

- 2: The Wealthy West's Differing Corporate Governance Structures

- 3: A General Theory

- Part II: Social Conflict and the Institutions of Corporate Governance

- 4: Social Democracies and Agency Costs: Raising the Stakes

- 5: Reducing Shareholders' Power to Control Managers

- Part III: Left-Right Politics and Ownership Separation: Data

- 6: Data and Confirmation

- Part IV: Nation by Nation

- 7: France

- 8: Germany

- 9: Italy

- 10: Japan

- 11: Sweden

- 12: United Kingdom

- 13: United States

- 14: Extending the Sample?

- Part V: The Direction of Causality

- 15: Alternative Formulations of the Thesis

- 16: Backlash

- 17: Contract as Metaphor

- 18: Rents

- 19: Rents and Politics

- 20: Rents and Ownership Concentration

- 21: Political Change in Continental Europe

- 22: Alternative Formulations: Data

- Part VI: The Quality of Corporate Law Argument and its Limits

- 23: Corporate Law as the Foundation for Securities Markets: The Theory

- 24: Its Limits: Theory

- 25: Its Limits: Data

- 26: The Quality of Corporate Law and its Limits

- Part VII: Unifying the Political Theories

- 27: Populism and Socialism in Corporate Governance

- Conclusion

Über Autor(innen)

Mark J. Roe is Berg Professor Law at the Harvard Law School. He has previously held positions at Columbia University School of Law; University of Pennsylvania School of Law; and Rutgers University School of Law. His publications include Corporate Reorganization and Bankruptcy: Legal and Financial Materials (Foundation Press, 2000) and Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton University Press, 1994).