Roth / Sotomayor / Chesher | Two-Sided Matching | Buch | 978-0-521-43788-2 | www.sack.de

Buch, Englisch, Band 18, 279 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 459 g

Reihe: Econometric Society Monographs

Roth / Sotomayor / Chesher

Two-Sided Matching

A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis
Erscheinungsjahr 2003
ISBN: 978-0-521-43788-2
Verlag: Cambridge University Press

A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis

Buch, Englisch, Band 18, 279 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 459 g

Reihe: Econometric Society Monographs

ISBN: 978-0-521-43788-2
Verlag: Cambridge University Press


Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets. The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann

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Weitere Infos & Material


Foreword Robert Auman; Acknowledgment; 1. Introduction; Part I. One-To-One Matching: the Marriage Model: 2. Stable matchings; 3. The structure of the set of stable matchings; 4. Strategic questions; Part II. Many-To-One Matching: Models in which Firms May Employ Many Workers: 5. The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns; 6. Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences; Part III. Models of One-To-One Matching with Money as a Continuous Variable: 7. A simple model of one seller and many buyers; 8. The assignment game; 9. The generalization of the assignment model; Part IV. Epilogue: 10. Open questions and research directions; Bibliography; Indexes.



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