Buch, Englisch, 328 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 145 mm x 222 mm, Gewicht: 595 g
Volume 6
Buch, Englisch, 328 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 145 mm x 222 mm, Gewicht: 595 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-960637-5
Verlag: OUP Oxford
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.
Zielgruppe
Scholars and advanced students of philosophy.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
- Introduction
- 1: Sharon Street: Mind-Independence Without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can't Have It Both Ways
- 2: Allan Gibbard: How Much Realism? Evolved Thinkers and Normative Concepts
- 3: David Sobel: Parfit's Case against Subjectivism
- 4: Chris Heathwood: Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare
- 5: Sarah McGrath: Moral Knowledge and Experience
- 6: Matt Bedke: Passing the Deontic Buck
- 7: Richard Joyce: The Accidental Error Theorist
- 8: Jonas Olson: Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism
- 9: Campbell Brown: A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism
- 10: Paul Katsafanas: Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency
- 11: Julia Markovits: Why be An Internalist about Reasons?
- 12: Ralph Wedgwood: Instrumental Rationality
- Index




