The Philosophical Significance of Language
Buch, Englisch, 477 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 800 g
ISBN: 978-0-691-13683-7
Verlag: Princeton University Press
The two volumes of Philosophical Essays bring together the most important essays written by one of the world's foremost philosophers of language. Scott Soames has selected thirty-one essays spanning nearly three decades of thinking about linguistic meaning and the philosophical significance of language. A judicious collection of old and new, these volumes include sixteen essays published in the 1980s and 1990s, nine published since 2000, and six new essays. The essays in Volume 1 investigate what linguistic meaning is; how the meaning of a sentence is related to the use we make of it; what we should expect from empirical theories of the meaning of the languages we speak; and how a sound theoretical grasp of the intricate relationship between meaning and use can improve the interpretation of legal texts. The essays in Volume 2 illustrate the significance of linguistic concerns for a broad range of philosophical topics--including the relationship between language and thought; the objects of belief, assertion, and other propositional attitudes; the distinction between metaphysical and epistemic possibility; the nature of necessity, actuality, and possible worlds; the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori; truth, vagueness, and partial definition; and skepticism about meaning and mind. The two volumes of Philosophical Essays are essential for anyone working on the philosophy of language.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Analytische Philosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sprachphilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften Sprachphilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie
Weitere Infos & Material
The Origins of These Essays ix
Introduction 1
Part One: Reference, Propositions, and Propositional Attitudes 31
Essay One: Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content 33
Essay Two: Why Propositions Can't Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances 72
Essay Three: Belief and Mental Representation 81
Essay Four: Attitudes and Anaphora 111
Part Two: Modality 137
Essay Five: The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions 139
Essay Six: The Philosophical Significance of the Kripkean Necessary A Posteriori 165
Essay Seven: Knowledge of Manifest Natural Kinds 189
Essay Eight: Understanding Assertion 211
Essay Nine: Ambitious Two-Dimensionalism 243
Essay Ten: Actually 277
Part Three: Truth and Vagueness 301
Essay Eleven: What Is a Theory of Truth? 303
Essay Twelve: Understanding Deflationism 323
Essay Thirteen: Higher-Order Vagueness for Partially Defined Predicates 340
Essay Fourteen: The Possibility of Partial Definition 362
Part Four: Kripke, Wittgenstein, and Following a Rule 383
Essay Fifteen: Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox 385
Essay Sixteen: Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox 416
Index 457
