A First Course on Zero-Sum Repeated Games

2002
ISBN: 978-3-540-43028-5
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Buch, Englisch, Band 37, 204 Seiten, Paperback, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 347 g

Reihe: Mathématiques et Applications

The purpose of the book is to present the basic results in the theory of two-person zero-sum repeated games including stochastic games and repeated games with incomplete information. It underlines their relation through the operator approach and covers both asymptotic and uniform properties. The monograph is self-contained including presentation of incomplete information games, minmax theorems and approachability results. It is adressed to graduate students with no previous knowledge of the field.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Sorin, Sylvain

Fachgebiete

• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Numerik und Wissenschaftliches Rechnen Angewandte Mathematik, Mathematische Modelle
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Ökonometrie
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Numerik und Wissenschaftliches Rechnen Computeranwendungen in der Mathematik
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Wirtschaftsmathematik und -statistik
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Stochastik Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Mathematische Analysis Variationsrechnung

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction and Examples.- Games with Incomplete Information.- Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side.- Repeated Games with Lack of Information on Both Sides.- Stochastic Games.- Advances.- Minmax Theorems and Duality.- Approachability Theory.- Operators and Repeated Games.- Kuhn's Theorem for Repeated Games.