Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality

Erscheinungsjahr 2003
ISBN: 978-0-19-925736-2
Verlag: OUP Oxford

Buch, Englisch, 328 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 658 g

Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally.
Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. The also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. Because these questions cut across philosophy of mind and ethics, the collection will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates in both these fields.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Stroud, Sarah

Tappolet, Christine

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Angewandte Ethik & Soziale Verantwortung
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Introduction

- 1: Michael Smith: Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion

- 2: Richard Holton: How is Strength of Will Possible?

- 3: Philip Pettit: Akrasia, Collective and Individual

- 4: Christine Tappolet: Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic Action

- 5: Sarah Stroud: Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement

- 6: Sergio Tenenbaum: Accidie, Evaluation, and Motivation

- 7: Gary Watson: The Work of the Will

- 8: Ralph Wedgwood: Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly

- 9: Duncan MacIntosh: Prudence and the Temporal Structure of Practical Reasons

- 10: Joseph Heath: Practical Irrationality and the Structure of Decision Theory

- 11: Ronald de Sousa: Paradoxical Emotion: On sui generis Emotional Irrationality

Über Autor(innen)

Stroud, Sarah (Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Canada) / Tappolet, Christine (Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, Canada)