Human Rights and Human Well-Being

1. Auflage 2010
ISBN: 978-0-19-517348-2
Verlag: Oxford University Press

Buch, Englisch, 432 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 801 g

Reihe: Oxford Political Philosophy

This book provides: a new consequentialist theory of moral and legal improvement; a new resolution to the so-called naturalistic fallacy; a list of robust, inalienable, human rights; a new argument against moral relativism
Talbott develops a new consequentialist rationale for rights against legal paternalism
The author offers insight on issues at the center of contemporary human rights debates, such as same sex marriage, assisted suicide, rights against paternalism, and rights to social insurance

In the last half of the twentieth century, legalized segregation ended in the southern United States, apartheid ended in South Africa, women in many parts of the world came to be recognized as having equal rights with men, persons with disabilities came to be recognized as having rights to develop and exercise their human capabilities, colonial peoples' rights of self-determination were recognized, and rights of gays and lesbians have begun to be recognized. It is hard not to see these developments as examples of real moral progress. But what is moral progress?

In this book, William Talbott offers a surprising answer to that question. He proposes a consequentialist meta-theoretical principle of moral and legal progress, the "main principle", to explain why these changes are examples of moral and legal progress. On Talbott's account, improvements to our moral or legal practices are changes that, when evaluated as a practice, contribute to equitably promoting well-being. Talbott uses the main principle to explain why almost all the substantive moral norms and principles used in moral or legal reasoning have exceptions and why it is almost inevitable that, no matter how much we improve them, there will always be more exceptions. This explanation enables Talbott to propose a new, non-skeptical understanding of what has been called the "naturalistic fallacy".

Talbott uses the main principle to complete the project begun in his 2005 book of identifying the human rights that should be universal-that is, legally guaranteed in all human societies. Talbott identifies a list of fourteen robust, inalienable human rights.

Talbott contrasts his consequentialist (though not utilitarian) account with many of the most influential nonconsequentialist accounts of morality and justice in the philosophical literature, including those of Ronald Dworkin, Jurgen Habermas, Martha Nussbaum, Phillip Pettit, John Rawls, T.M. Scanlon, Amartya Sen, and Judith Thomson.

Zielgruppe

Faculty and graduate students in moral and political philosophy (especially philosophy of human rights), political theory, and philosophy of law.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Talbott, William J

Fachgebiete

• Rechtswissenschaften Recht, Rechtswissenschaft Allgemein Rechtsphilosophie, Rechtsethik
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie
• Rechtswissenschaften Internationales Recht und Europarecht Internationales Recht Internationale Menschen- und Minderheitenrechte, Kinderrechte
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sozialphilosophie, Politische Philosophie
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Kultur Menschenrechte, Bürgerrechte
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Theorie, Politische Philosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Rechtsphilosophie, Rechtsethik

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1.: The Consequentialist Project for Human Rights
2.: Exceptions to Libertarian Natural Rights
3.: The Main Principle
4.: What is Well-Being? What is Equity?
5.: The Two Deepest Mysteries in Moral Philosophy
6.: Security Rights
7.: Epistemological Foundations for the Priority of Autonomy Rights
8.: The Millian Epistemological Argument for Autonomy Rights
9.: Property Rights, Contract Rights, and Other Economic Rights
10.: Democratic Rights
11.: Equity Rights
12.: The Most Reliable Judgment Standard for Weak Paternalism
13.: Liberty Rights and Privacy Rights
14.: Clarifications and Responses to Objections
15.: Conclusion
References
Notes

Über Autor(innen)

Talbott, William J
William J. Talbott is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Washington, where he has been teaching since 1989. He has published articles in moral and political philosophy, especially the philosophy of human rights, philosophy of law, epistemology, and rational choice theory. This is the second of two volumes on human rights. The first was Which Rights Should Be Universal? (OUP, 2005).

William Talbott, Professor of Philosophy, University of Washington

William J. Talbott is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Washington, where he has been teaching since 1989. He has published articles in moral and political philosophy, especially the philosophy of human rights, philosophy of law, epistemology, and rational choice theory. This is the second of two volumes on human rights. The first was Which Rights Should Be Universal? (OUP, 2005).