Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets

Proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Experimental Economics, Bielefeld, West Germany, September 21-25, 1986
1. Auflage 1988
ISBN: 978-3-540-50036-0
Verlag: Springer

Buch, Englisch, Band 314, 368 Seiten, Format (B × H): 170 mm x 244 mm, Gewicht: 655 g

Reihe: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

The book reports on recent experimental research on
expectations and decision making in bargaining, markets,
auctions, or coalition formation situations. The investi-
gated topics deliver building stones for a bounded rational
theory as an approach to explain behavior and interpersonal
interactions in economic and social relationships.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Tietz, Reinhard

Albers, Wulf

Selten, Reinhard

Inhaltsverzeichnis

I. Experimental Economics.- Experimental Economics: Ways to Model Bounded Rational Bargaining Behavior — Introductory Remarks to the Fourth Conference on Experimental Economics.- Experimental Economics: A Psychological Perspective.- II. Unilateral Decisions.- Normative and Individual Strategies in Social Dilemmata.- Learning to Make Good Predictions in Time Series.- A Preliminary Analysis of a Large-Scale Experimental Investigation into Consumption under Uncertainty.- Mental Representation in Multistage Decision Making.- III. Bilateral Decisions.- Stability and Outcome Tradeoffs in Asymmetric Dilemmas: Conditions Promoting the Discovery of Alternating Solutions.- The Influence of Social Orientation and Generalized Expectancies on Decision Making in Iterated Experimental Games.- Ultimatum Bargaining for a Shrinking Cake — An Experimental Analysis.- Bounded Rational Strategies in Sequential Bargaining: An Experiment and a Learning by Evolution Strategy.- Semi-Normative Properties of Bounded Rational Bargaining Theories.- Modeling Mediator Behavior in Experimental Games.- IV. Auctions and Markets.- Dual Ceteris Paribus Comparisons: Some Initial Thoughts on Laboratory Isolation of Equilibrium Forces in Auction Markets.- Learning in Common Value Auctions.- Inflation and Expectations in Experimental Markets.- Modeling Investment Behavior in an Experimental Market.- V. Coalition Formation.- Order of Strength and Exhaustivity as Additional Hypotheses in Theories for 3-Person Characteristic Function Games.- The Effects of Justice Norms in a Bargaining Situation.- Modeling Coalition Formation in Inessential Probabilistic Games.- Sequential Games of Status: A Replication.- Equal Share Analysis for Location Games.- Limits of Rational Behavior in Cooperatively Played Normal FormGames.- Revealed Aspirations and Reciprocal Loyalty in Apex Games.- VI. Bibliography.- Selected Bibliography of the Participant’s Contributions to Experimental Economics.- Author Index.