Ad Infinitum

New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism
Erscheinungsjahr 2014
ISBN: 978-0-19-960959-8
Verlag: Oxford University Press

Buch, Englisch, 272 Seiten, Format (B × H): 162 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 554 g

Infinitism is an ancient view in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification, according to which there are no foundational reasons for belief. The view has never been popular, and is often associated with skepticism, but after languishing for centuries it has recently begun a resurgence. Ad Infinitum presents new work on the topic by leading epistemologists. They shed new light on infinitism's distinctive strengths and weaknesses, and address questions, new and old, about its account of justification, reasoning, epistemic responsibility, disagreement, and trust, among other important issues. The volume clarifies the relationship between infinitism and other epistemological views, such as skepticism, coherentism, foundationalism and contextualism, and it offers novel perspectives on the metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics of regresses and reasons.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Turri, John

Klein, Peter D.

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Introduction

- 1: Scott F. Aikin: Knowing Better, Cognitive Command, and Epistemic Infinitism

- 2: Michael Bergmann: Klein and the Regress Argument

- 3: Andrew D. Cling: Reasons Require Reasons

- 4: Richard Fumerton: Infinitism

- 5: Michael Huemer: Virtue and Vice Among the Infinite

- 6: Peter D. Klein: Reasons, Reasoning and Knowledge: A Proposed Rapprochement between Infinitism and Foundationalism

- 7: Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Infinitist Justification and Proper Basing

- 8: Ram Neta: Klein's Case for Infinitism

- 9: Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson: Can an Infinite Regress Justify Everything?

- 10: Michael Rescorla: Can Perception Halt the Regress of Justifications?

- 11: Ernest Sosa: Infinitism

- 12: John Turri: Creative Reasoning

- 13: Michael Williams: Avoiding the Regress

- 14: Linda Zagzebski: First Person and Third Person Reasons and the Regress Problem

Über Autor(innen)

John Turri specializes in epistemology, cognitive science, philosophy of language, and experimental philosophy and currently holds an Early Research Award from the Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Innovation.

Peter Klein has written on many topics in epistemology over the years: scepticism, the nature of knowledge (especially the Gettier Problem), and the epistemic regress problem.