Equilibrium and Rationality

Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules
Erscheinungsjahr 2011
ISBN: 978-0-521-59352-6
Verlag: Cambridge University Press

Buch, Englisch, 249 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 562 g

Reihe: Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory

This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In synthesizing decision theory and game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Weirich, Paul

Fachgebiete

• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Wirtschaftsmathematik und -statistik
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Operations Research Spieltheorie
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Ökonometrie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophische Logik, Argumentationstheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Preface; 1. Games and solutions; 2. Idealizations; 3. Equilibrium; 4. Reasons and incentives; 5. Strategic equilibrium; 6. Finding equilibria; 7. Applications; 8. Other standards for solutions; References; Index.