Moral Relativism and Pluralism

Erscheinungsjahr 2023
ISBN: 978-1-00-904430-1
Verlag: Cambridge University Press

Buch, Englisch, 75 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 122 g

Reihe: Elements in Ethics

The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. The argument for this view features a comparison between traditions that highly value relationship and community and traditions that highly value personal autonomy of the individual and rights. It is held that moralities are best understood as emerging from human culture in response to the need to promote and regulate interpersonal cooperation and internal motivational coherence in the individual. The argument ends in the conclusion that there is a bounded plurality of true and most justified moralities that accomplish these functions. The normative implications of this form of metaethical relativism are explored, with specific focus on female genital cutting and abortion.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Wong, David B

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Why are people so exercised about moral relativism?; 2. How should theses about moral relativism be framed?; 3. Relationship and community, autonomy and rights; 4. Epistemic reasons to delve further into the conflict between relationship-centered and rights-centered moralities; 5. An ethical argument for extended inquiry into rivals to one's own ethical views; 6. Overcoming stereotypes of relationship-centered moralities; 7. Complicating the contrast between relationship and autonomy -centered moralities; 8. The underdiscussed question of what morality is; 9. A naturalistic approach to understanding why human beings have moralities; 10. Putting together moral ambivalence and a naturalistic conception of morality; 11. Constraints on the range of viable moralities; 12. The social construction of morality: by the individual or group?; 13. When people differ in their moral beliefs about an issue, when do they actually disagree?; 14. Why we have different beliefs in metaethics; 15. How moral reasons enter into the truth conditions of moral judgments help shape our moral motivations; 16. Summary of the argument for a pluralistic form of metaethical moral relativism; 17. Confused reasoning that is sometimes attributed to those who believe in normative moral relativism; 18. An argument for normative moral relativism that is contingent upon the acceptance of certain values and the adoption of metaethical moral relativism; 19. Why normative moral relativism cannot be a simple matter of letting others be; 20. What is female genital cutting?; 21. Accommodation and the fraught issue of abortion; 22. Undermining stereotypes of the other side; 23. Fostering pluralistic encounters; 24. Summary of normative moral relativism.