Buch, Englisch, 186 Seiten, Paperback, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 272 g
Buch, Englisch, 186 Seiten, Paperback, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 272 g
ISBN: 978-1-5099-4030-1
Verlag: HART PUB
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1. Introduction
I. Removing the Blindfold
II. Scope of the Argument
III. Recovering Montesquieu
2. The Adjudication of Constitutional Rights
I. Constitutional Rights and Ordinary Legal Rights
II. Proportionality in Practice
III. Proportionality in the US?
IV. Absolute and Prima Facie Rights
V. Rights, Proportionality and Utilitarianism
VI. Rights as Interests
VII. Moral and Empirical Reasoning
VIII. Other Adjudicative Methods
IX. Conclusion
3. Are Rights Trumps?
I. The Shielded-Interest Theory
II. The Filtered-Preference Theory
III. Constitutional Rights and Statistics
IV. Revision of the Filtered-Preference Theory
4. Judicial Capacity and Empirical Research
I. Empirical Research and the Origins of Proportionality
II. Empirical Evidence in the US Supreme Court
III. Adjudicative Facts and Legislative Facts
IV. Finding Legislative Facts
V. The Courts and Social Science
VI. Case Studies
VII. Conclusion
5. Comparative Analysis of Institutional Capacities
I. The Basic Structure of Judicial Reasoning
II. The Basic Structure of Legislative Reasoning
III. Capacity for Empirical Reasoning
IV. Capacity for Moral Reasoning
V. The Tyranny of the Majority?
VI. Capacity to Protect Minorities
VII. An Historical Perspective
VIII. Conclusion
6. The Problem of Entrenchment
I. Legal Change and the Rule of Law
II. Rawls and the Perpetual Constitution
III. The Rarity of Constitutional Amendment
IV. The Legislative-Judicial Method of Reversing Nullification
Decisions
V. Conclusion
7. Judicial Review and Constitutional Design
I. The American and Kelsenian Models
II. Designing a Constitutional Court
III. Council of Revision
IV. Does the Legislature Need a Check?
V. Deference
VI. Conclusion