SCEPTICISM & PERCEPTUAL JUSTIFICATION C

Erscheinungsjahr 2014
ISBN: 978-0-19-965834-3
Verlag: ACADEMIC

Buch, Englisch, 372 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 722 g

One of the hardest problems in the history of Western philosophy has been to explain whether and how experience can provide knowledge (or even justification for belief) about the objective world outside the experiencer's mind. A prominent brand of scepticism has precisely denied that experience can provide such knowledge. How, for instance (these sceptics ask) can I know that my experiences are not produced in me by a powerful demon (or, in a modern twist on that traditional Cartesian scenario, by a supercomputer)? This volume, originating from the research project on Basic Knowledge recently concluded at the Northern Institute of Philosophy, presents new essays on scepticism about the senses written by some of the most prominent contemporary epistemologists. They approach the sceptical challenge by discussing such topics as the conditions for perceptual justification, the existence of a non-evidential kind of warrant and the extent of one's evidence, the epistemology of inference, the relations between justification, probability and certainty, the relevance of subjective appearances to the epistemology of perception, the role that broadly pragmatic considerations play in epistemic justification, the contents of perception, and the function of attention. In all these cases, the papers show how philosophical progress on foundational issues can improve our understanding of and possibly afford a solution to a historically prominent problem like scepticism.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Zardini, Dodd &

Dodd, Dylan

Zardini, Elia

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Introduction

- 1: Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini: Scepticism and Perceptual Justification: Introduction

- Prelude: Past Scepticism in the Light of Present Epistemology

- 2: Ernest Sosa: Descartes's Epistemology

- I. The Immediacy of the Senses

- 3: Elia Zardini: Confirming the Less Likely, Discovering the Unknown

- 4: Brian Weatherson: Probability and Scepticism

- 5: Jonathan Vogel: E and ¬H

- 6: José L. Zalabardo: Inference and Scepticism

- 7: Alan Millar: Perceptual Knowledge and Background Beliefs

- 8: Susanna Siegel and Nico Silins: Consciousness, Attention, and Justification

- II. The Dependency of the Senses

- 9: Aidan McGlynn: On Epistemic Alchemy

- 10: Duncan Pritchard: Entitlement and the Groundlessness of Our Believing

- 11: Crispin Wright: On Epistemic Entitlement (II): Welfare State Epistemology

- 12: Annalisa Coliva: Moderatism, Transmission Failures, Closure and Humean Skepticism

- III. The Evidence of the Senses

- 13: Alex Byrne: McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism etc.

- 14: Roger White: What Is My Evidence that Here Is a Hand?

- 15: Martin Smith: The Arbitrariness of Belief

- 16: Dylan Dodd: How to Motivate Scepticism

- Index

Über Autor(innen)

Dylan Dodd has held postdoctoral fellowships at Syracuse University and the Universities of St Andrews and Aberdeen. He is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Alaska, Anchorage.

Elia Zardini has held postdoctoral fellowships at the Universities of St Andrews, Aberdeen and at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. He is currently a Marie Curie Intra-European Fellow at the University of Barcelona and an Associate Fellow at the University of Aberdeen.