Liebe Besucherinnen und Besucher,
aufgrund unseres Sommerfestes sind wir am 03. September 2026 bis 14 Uhr erreichbar. Am 04. September 2026 sind wir wieder wie gewohnt für Sie da. Vielen Dank für Ihr Verständnis.
Ihr Team von Sack Fachmedien
Aggarwal / Harks / Kapoor Game Theory for Networks
Erscheinungsjahr 2026
ISBN: 978-3-032-12915-4
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
13th EAI International Conference, GameNets 2025, Cambridge, UK, March 17–18, 2025, Proceedings
E-Book, Englisch, 195 Seiten
Reihe: Springer Nature Proceedings Computer Science
ISBN: 978-3-032-12915-4
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 13th EAI International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2025, held in Cambridge, UK, during March 17-18, 2025.
The 11 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 28 submissions. They are organized in the following topical sections: Games and Markets; Mechanisms and Games; and Applications of Game Theory.
Zielgruppe
Research
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
.- Games and Markets
.- Markets for intermittent service using intermittent spectrum.
.- A Hypergraph Evolutionary Game Theoretic Cournot Model for Networked Markets.
.- On Stability and Learning of Competitive Equilibrium in Generalized Fisher Market Models: A Variational Inequality Approach.
.- Deception in Oligopoly Games via Adaptive Nash Seeking Systems.
.- Mechanisms and Games
.- Effects of Emotion — Strategy persistence mechanism on the dynamic evolution of cooperation.
.- Balancing rationality and social influence: Alpha-rational Nash equilibrium in games with herding.
.- Incentive Mechanisms with Sequential Voluntary Participation.
.- Interval Scheduling Games.
.- Coordination Mechanisms with Rank-Based Utilities.
.- Applications of Game Theory
.- Diffusion Control of Wildland Fire via a Cooperative Game-Theoretic Model.
.- Retaliation Game for Mitigating Selfish Mining Attacks in Blockchain Networks.




