Althunayan Dealing with the Fragmented International Legal Environment

WTO, International Tax and Internal Tax Regulations
1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-3-642-04678-0
Verlag: Springer
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 253 Seiten

Taxes are sometimes so fundamental to domestic systems that they are almost impossible to change, as when the tax system is part of a nation's majority religion or is linked to another value deeply rooted in local communities, such as housing or farming. There is a danger in the WTO, a Geneva-based entity, making decisions for people living in distant locations with regard to tax issues related to their local needs and wants. The Saudi Arabian tax system exemplifies the tension between religion, tax and trade, because tax has a role in the country's religion and is an essential part of its laws. Therefore, there is a need for maintaining a delicate balance between local needs and international commitments with respect to taxation. This book aims to show directions in which legal order can be preserved as much as possible from within each country, and yet not imposed upon them, and which will help build a peaceful bridge between local and international factors that are important to shaping the global order.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Althunayan, Turki

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;190784_1_En_BookFrontmatter_OnlinePDF;1
2;190784_1_En_1_Part_OnlinePDF;15
3;190784_1_En_1_Chapter_OnlinePDF;17
3.1;1: Differentiation Between Direct and Indirect Taxes;17
3.1.1;Background;17
3.1.2;The Distinction Theoretically;18
3.1.3;The Issue;19
3.1.4;Other Factors;23
3.1.5;Direct and Indirect Taxes: Basic Meaning;25
3.1.6;Tax Definition;25
3.1.7;Direct and Indirect Taxes: MeaningsThe US Constitution creates ``two classes: one `direct´ taxes required to ;26
3.1.7.1;General Differentiations;27
3.1.7.2;Directness;28
3.1.7.3;Choices;28
3.1.7.4;Transparency;29
3.1.7.5;Fairness;29
3.1.7.6;Tax Incidence;31
3.1.8;Scholars´ Views on the Differentiation;33
3.1.8.1;Institutional Views;33
3.1.9;Concluding Observations;35
3.1.10;References;36
4;190784_1_En_2_Chapter_OnlinePDF;38
4.1;Chapter 2: The Cases;38
4.1.1;Actual Problems: The Cases;38
4.1.1.1;The GATT Cases;39
4.1.1.1.1;Belgium Family Allowance;40
4.1.1.1.2;The Domestic International Sales Corporation;41
4.1.1.1.3;Foreign Sales Corporation;46
4.1.1.1.4;The Extraterritorial Income Exclusion;48
4.1.1.2;Observations;49
4.1.2;Potential Hypothetical Problems;50
4.1.3;Summary and Analysis;55
4.1.4;References;57
5;190784_1_En_3_Chapter_OnlinePDF;59
5.1;3: Tax and Religion: Saudi Arabia Tax System;59
5.1.1;The Dilemma;59
5.1.2;The Legal Texts;61
5.1.3;Saudi Arabian Tax System;62
5.1.4;The Conflict with the WTO;67
5.1.5;Possible Solutions;69
5.1.5.1;Ignoring International Practice;69
5.1.5.2;WTO Exception Articles;70
5.1.5.2.1;Public Morals;71
5.1.5.2.2;Necessary;75
5.1.5.3;Saudi Arabia and Public Morals;76
5.1.5.4;Ignoring Zakat Alternative;76
5.1.6;Conclusion;78
5.1.7;References;78
6;190784_1_En_2_Part_OnlinePDF;80
7;190784_1_En_4_Chapter_OnlinePDF;82
7.1;4: Literature Review;82
7.1.1;The Exclusion Approach;83
7.1.2;Partial Tax Inclusion Approach;89
7.1.3;International Tax Organization Approach;92
7.1.4;Undetermined Approaches;96
7.1.4.1;Treating Tax Issues Through Trade Regimes;96
7.1.4.2;(How) Should Trade Agreements Deal with Income Tax Issues?;99
7.1.4.3;Income Tax Discrimination Against International Commerce;101
7.1.5;Concluding Remark;103
7.1.6;References;103
8;190784_1_En_5_Chapter_OnlinePDF;105
8.1;5: Sovereignty;105
8.1.1;Sovereignty Basic Meaning;105
8.1.1.1;Why Is It Important to Study the Issue of Sovereignty?;106
8.1.1.2;The Meaning of ``Sovereignty´´;107
8.1.1.3;Sovereignty Applications;108
8.1.1.4;Existence of Sovereignty;110
8.1.1.5;Sovereignty and Tax;110
8.1.1.6;Is Sovereignty an Acceptable Excuse?;112
8.1.2;The EU Income Taxation Integration Experience;113
8.1.2.1;The Role of the ECJ;114
8.1.2.2;The Cases;115
8.1.2.3;Opening Pandora´s Box;117
8.1.2.4;Warren and Graetz;117
8.1.2.5;Lessons Learned;119
8.1.3;History of the Interaction Between International Trade and Tax;120
8.1.4;Observations;148
8.1.5;References;148
9;190784_1_En_6_Chapter_OnlinePDF;153
9.1;6: WTO Agreements;153
9.1.1;I. The GATT;153
9.1.1.1;Introduction;153
9.1.1.2;The Vienna Convention;154
9.1.1.3;GATT Text;155
9.1.1.4;Most Favored NationSee Lansing and Rose (1984, p.329); Snyder (1948, p.10). Mintz (2001). See O´Brien (1;155
9.1.1.4.1;Article I: Most-Favored-Nation Treatment;155
9.1.1.4.1.1;Meaning and Purpose;156
9.1.1.4.1.2;``Charges´´;156
9.1.1.4.1.3;``In connection´´;156
9.1.1.4.1.4;``With respect to the method of levying such duties and charges´´;157
9.1.1.4.1.5;``With respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation´´;157
9.1.1.4.1.6;``And with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of article iii´´;157
9.1.1.4.1.7;``Any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined ;157
9.1.1.5;Further MFN Difficulties;158
9.1.1.6;National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation;160
9.1.1.6.1;Analyzing the Legal Text;160
9.1.1.6.2;Purpose;161
9.1.1.6.3;Internal Taxation and Direct Taxation;163
9.1.1.6.4;The Article Wording;168
9.1.1.6.4.1;``Internal taxation and other internal charges´´;168
9.1.1.6.4.2;``And laws, regulations and requirements´´;168
9.1.1.6.4.3;``Affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase´´;168
9.1.1.6.4.4;``Should not be applied to imported or domestic products´´;169
9.1.1.6.4.5;``So as to afford protection to domestic production´´;170
9.1.1.7;Article III:2;170
9.1.1.8;Determining What Constitutes a Violation;174
9.1.1.8.1;Article III:4;174
9.1.1.9;Concluding Remarks;176
9.1.2;II. GATS and Tax;176
9.1.2.1;Introduction;176
9.1.2.2;Scope;177
9.1.2.3;Significance;178
9.1.2.4;Modes of Supplies;179
9.1.2.5;Obligations;182
9.1.2.5.1;Transparency;182
9.1.2.5.2;Specific Commitments;183
9.1.2.6;GATS and Tax;184
9.1.2.6.1;Tax Negotiations in the GATS Treaty;185
9.1.2.7;The Dilemma;185
9.1.2.8;The US Resistance;186
9.1.2.9;The Final Agreement;188
9.1.2.10;Relevant Legal Texts;188
9.1.2.10.1;Most Favoured Nation;188
9.1.2.10.2;National Treatment;190
9.1.2.10.3;Article XIV: General Exceptions;192
9.1.2.10.4;The Chapeau;192
9.1.2.10.5;Measures Permitting Violation;196
9.1.2.10.6;Article XXII;199
9.1.3;Subsidies;201
9.1.3.1;Introduction;201
9.1.3.2;SCM General;202
9.1.3.3;Subsidies Categories;203
9.1.3.3.1;Specification;204
9.1.3.3.2;Prohibited Subsidies;204
9.1.3.3.3;Actionable Subsidies;205
9.1.3.3.4;Non-actionable Subsidies;205
9.1.3.4;Tax and Subsidies;206
9.1.3.4.1;Article 3;206
9.1.3.4.2;Footnote 59;207
9.1.3.4.3;Tax Deferral;208
9.1.3.4.4;Transfer Pricing Issues;208
9.1.3.4.5;Tax Disputes;208
9.1.3.4.6;Foreign Source Income;209
9.1.3.4.7;Footnote Status;210
9.1.3.5;Identifying the ``Bad´´ Tax;211
9.1.3.6;Conclusion;215
9.1.4;References;216
10;190784_1_En_3_Part_OnlinePDF;219
11;190784_1_En_7_Chapter_OnlinePDF;220
11.1;7: The Tax Agreement Option;220
11.1.1;Introduction;220
11.1.2;Tax Agreement Features;221
11.1.3;Multilateral Tax Treaty´s Previous Suggestions;223
11.1.4;Tax Convention Models;225
11.1.5;Why Have Tax Treaties Not Been Combined Previously?;226
11.1.6;Changed Circumstances;228
11.1.7;WTO Suitability;231
11.1.8;Subjects for Inclusion;235
11.1.9;WTO Tax Department;237
11.1.10;Possible Counterarguments;238
11.1.11;The WTO Is Not Purely Legal Organization;239
11.1.12;The WTO Is Not a Purely Multilateral System;242
11.1.13;Political Concerns;243
11.1.13.1;Developed Countries;243
11.1.13.2;Developing Countries;244
11.1.14;Soft Law Compliance;246
11.1.14.1;Success of the Proposal;246
11.1.14.2;Soft Law Effectiveness;247
11.1.15;Compliance Under Trade Law;250
11.1.16;Government Procurement Agreement Experience;253
11.1.17;Summary;255
11.1.18;References;256
12;190784_1_En_8_Chapter_OnlinePDF;260
12.1;Chapter 8: Conclusions;260
12.1.1;References;262