Arvan Rightness as Fairness

A Moral and Political Theory
1. Auflage 2016
ISBN: 978-1-137-54181-9
Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 271 Seiten

Rightness as Fairness provides a uniquely fruitful method of 'principled fair negotiation' for resolving applied moral and political issues that requires merging principled debate with real-world negotiation.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Arvan, Marcus

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Cover;1
2;Half-Title;2
3;Title;3
4;Copyright;4
5;Dedication;5
6;Contents;6
7;Acknowledgments;10
8;Introduction;11
9;1 Ethics for the Twenty-First Century;19
9.1;1 Distinguishing truth from seeming truth;20
9.2;2 Seven principles of theory selection;23
9.2.1;2.1 Firm Foundations;24
9.2.2;2.2 Internal Coherence;27
9.2.3;2.3 External Coherence;28
9.2.4;2.4 Explanatory Power;30
9.2.5;2.5 Unity;31
9.2.6;2.6 Parsimony;31
9.2.7;2.7 Fruitfulness;33
9.3;3 The case for instrumentalism;34
9.3.1;3.1 The firmest foundation;34
9.3.2;3.2 The promise of parsimony, unity, explanatory power, and fruitfulness;37
9.3.3;3.3 Advantages over alternatives;40
9.3.3.1;3.3.1 Advantages over intuitionism;40
9.3.3.2;3.3.2 Advantages over reflective equilibrium;41
9.3.3.3;3.3.3 Advantages over moral language analysis;42
9.3.3.4;3.3.4 Advantages over constitutivism;43
9.3.3.5;3.3.5 Advantages over second- and third-personalism;43
9.3.3.6;3.3.6 Advantages over Sterba’s dialecticalism;44
9.3.3.7;3.3.7 Conclusion;45
9.4;4 Disarming initial concerns;46
9.4.1;4.1 The wrong kinds of reasons?;46
9.4.2;4.2 Not a firm foundation?;46
9.4.3;4.3 Unconvincing and artificial?;47
9.4.4;4.4 Three promissory notes;48
9.4.4.1;4.4.1 Not the wrong kinds of reasons?;48
9.4.4.2;4.4.2 Firm foundations after all?;50
9.4.4.3;4.4.3 Intuitive and convincing?;50
9.5;5 Conclusion;51
10;2 The Problem of Possible Future Selves;52
10.1;1 Our capacities to care about our past and future;54
10.2;2 The problem of possible future selves;57
10.2.1;2.1 Possible futures;61
10.2.2;2.2 Possible psychologies;63
10.2.3;2.3 Possible choices;66
10.2.4;2.4 A very real problem;74
10.3;3 Morality as the solution?;75
10.4;4 Is the problem too contingent?;77
10.5;5 Two nonsolutions;81
10.5.1;5.1 Nonsolution 1: probable futures;81
10.5.2;5.2 Nonsolution 2: diachronic motivational consistency;82
10.6;6 Conclusion: an unsolved problem;84
11;3 The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative;85
11.1;1 Interests in diachronic cooperation;89
11.2;2 Three types of interests;95
11.2.1;2.1 Involuntary interests;96
11.2.2;2.2 Semivoluntary interests;98
11.2.3;2.3 Voluntary interests;100
11.3;3 The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative;101
11.4;4 Just conscience?;120
11.5;5 An intuitive solution to the problem of possible future selves?;121
11.6;6 Conclusion;125
12;4 Three Unified Formulations;126
12.1;1 The Humanity and Sentience Formulation;128
12.1.1;1.1 Possible other-human-regarding interests;131
12.1.2;1.2 Possible nonhuman-animal-regarding interests;134
12.1.3;1.3 Possible sentient-being-regarding interests;136
12.1.4;1.4 Derivation of the Humanity and Sentience Formulation;137
12.2;2 The Kingdom of Human and Sentient Ends Formulation;138
12.3;3 Advantages over Kantian ethics;140
12.3.1;3.1 Firmer foundations;141
12.3.2;3.2 Greater internal coherence;143
12.3.3;3.3 Greater external coherence;143
12.3.4;3.4 Greater explanatory power, unity, and parsimony;147
12.3.5;3.5 Greater fruitfulness;147
12.4;4 Conclusion;148
13;5 The Moral Original Position;150
13.1;1 Rawls’ Original Position;151
13.1.1;1.1 Rawls’ Kantian rationale;152
13.1.2;1.2 Rawls’ reflective equilibrium rationale;153
13.1.3;1.3 Rawls’ public reason rationale;154
13.2;2 Some common critiques;154
13.2.1;2.1 Kantian critiques;154
13.2.2;2.2 Reflective equilibrium critiques;155
13.2.3;2.3 Public reason critiques;155
13.3;3 The case for a Moral Original Position;156
13.4;4 Corroborating the critiques;159
13.4.1;4.1 Corroborating Kantian critiques;159
13.4.2;4.2 Corroborating reflective equilibrium critiques;160
13.4.3;4.3 Corroborating public reason critiques;161
13.5;5 Conclusion;161
14;6 Rightness as Fairness;163
14.1;1 Derivation of Four Principles of Fairness;165
14.1.1;1.1 The Principle of Negative Fairness;165
14.1.2;1.2 The Principle of Positive Fairness;176
14.1.3;1.3 The Principle of Fair Negotiation;178
14.1.4;1.4 The Principle of Virtues of Fairness;186
14.2;2 Rightness as Fairness: a unified standard of right and wrong;188
14.3;3 Rightness as Fairness in practice: principled fair negotiation;194
14.3.1;3.1 Kant’s four cases;196
14.3.2;3.2 How numbers should count: trolleys, torture, and organ donors;198
14.3.3;3.3 World poverty;204
14.3.4;3.4 Distribution of scarce medical resources;206
14.3.5;3.5 The ethical treatment of animals;208
14.4;4 Conclusion;210
15;7 Libertarian Egalitarian Communitarianism;212
15.1;1 Libertarianism, Egalitarianism, and Communitarianism;213
15.1.1;1.1 Libertarianism: attractions and critiques;213
15.1.2;1.2 Egalitarianism: attractions and critiques;214
15.1.3;1.3 Communitarianism: attractions and critiques;215
15.2;2 The case for Libertarian Egalitarian Communitarianism;216
15.3;3 Additional advantages;222
15.3.1;3.1 (Qualified) fair negotiation over divisiveness;222
15.3.2;3.2 Resolving the scope and requirements of justice;224
15.3.3;3.3 Resolving the ideal-nonideal theory distinction;226
15.4;4 Conclusion;227
16;8 Evaluating Rightness as Fairness;228
16.1;1 Firmer foundations;228
16.2;2 Greater internal coherence;230
16.3;3 Greater external coherence;232
16.4;4 Greater explanatory power;234
16.5;5 Greater unity;236
16.6;6 Greater parsimony;236
16.7;7 Greater fruitfulness;237
16.8;8 Conclusion;239
17;E1;240
18;Notes;241
19;Bibliography;254
20;Index;270