Avenhaus / Kyriakopoulos / Richard Verifying Treaty Compliance

Limiting Weapons of Mass Destruction and Monitoring Kyoto Protocol Provisions
1. Auflage 2007
ISBN: 978-3-540-33854-3
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Wasserzeichen (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 629 Seiten

This book presents an interdisciplinary collection of expert analyses and views of existing verification systems. It provides guidelines and advice for the improvement of those systems as well as for new challenges in the field.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Avenhaus, Rudolf

Kyriakopoulos, Nicholas

Richard, Michel

Stein, Gotthard

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;5
2;Foreword;7
3;Acknowledgement;9
4;Contents;10
5;Introduction;14
5.1;A new perspective;16
5.2;Organization of the material;19
5.3;Audience;21
6;I Conceptual Framework;24
6.1;Conceptual Framework;25
7;II Treaties and their Requirements;50
7.1;Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Treaties: An Ontology of Concepts and Characteristics;51
7.1.1;Non-Proliferation Treaty;53
7.1.2;Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,;53
7.1.3;Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their;53
7.1.4;Destruction;53
7.1.5;Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production;54
7.1.6;and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin;54
7.1.7;Weapons and on their Destruction;54
7.1.8;Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;54
7.1.9;Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production;54
7.1.10;and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction;54
7.1.11;(Ottawa Convention);54
7.1.12;INF and START Treaties;55
7.1.13;Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT);55
7.1.14;Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe;55
7.1.15;Treaty on Open Skies;55
7.1.16;Export Control Regimes;56
7.1.17;3.1 Elements of the veri.cation process;56
7.1.18;3.2 Legal experience and practices;57
7.1.19;4.1 Characteristic attributes of the veri.cation process;59
7.1.20;The object of veri.cation;59
7.1.21;The directness of the veri.cation;60
7.1.22;The control strategies;60
7.1.23;The type of reporting;61
7.1.24;The information used in the veri.cation;61
7.1.25;5.1 On-site inspections;62
7.1.26;5.2 Technical Monitoring systems;63
7.1.27;5.3 Veri.cation tools in safeguards;64
7.1.28;5.4 Preparatory technical work;65
7.2;International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Challenges in Implementation;71
7.2.1;all;73
7.2.2;4.1 State-declared information;75
7.2.3;4.2 Open source information;76
7.2.4;other;76
7.2.5;4.3 Other information;77
7.2.6;5.1 Environmental sampling;78
7.2.7;5.2 Equipment;79
7.2.8;6.1 Approaches, guidelines and procedures;81
7.2.9;6.2 Information technology;81
7.2.10;6.3 Training;82
7.2.11;6.4 Resources;83
7.2.12;only;84
7.3;Verification under the Chemical Weapons Convention;87
7.3.1;4.1 Schedule 1 chemicals and facilities;100
7.3.2;4.2 Schedule 2 chemicals and facilities;102
7.3.3;4.3 Schedule 3 chemicals and facilities;105
7.3.4;4.4 Other Chemical Production Facilities;106
7.3.5;4.5 Crosscutting issues in inspections in the chemical industry;107
7.3.6;Facility agreements;108
7.3.7;Sampling and analysis;108
7.3.8;Access;109
7.4;Biological Weapons Convention;117
7.4.1;1.1 Veri.cation mechanisms within the BWC;119
7.4.2;Article V mechanisms: Consultations;119
7.4.3;Article VI mechanisms;120
7.4.4;1.2 E.orts to strengthen the BWC;120
7.4.5;2.1 Antibodies as diagnostic reagents;125
7.4.6;Hybridoma Technology;125
7.4.7;Enzyme-linked Immunosorbent Assays (ELISA);126
7.4.8;2.2 Nucleic Acid Hybridization Techniques;128
7.4.9;2.3 The Polymerase Chain Reaction;130
7.4.10;2.4 Genetic pro.les of microorganisms using molecular typing;133
7.4.11;with nucleotide sequence information;133
7.4.12;2.5 Beyond genomics;134
7.5;Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Verification;145
7.5.1;3.4 Hydroacoustic monitoring;152
7.5.2;3.5 Infrasound monitoring;153
7.5.3;3.6 Radionuclide monitoring;153
7.5.4;3.7 Radionuclide laboratories;154
7.5.5;4.1 Overview;155
7.5.6;4.2 The global communication infrastructure;155
7.5.7;4.3 International Data analysis and products;155
7.5.8;4.4 Data fusion;156
7.5.9;4.5 Atmospheric transport modelling;156
7.5.10;4.6 National Data Centers;157
7.5.11;5.1 Introduction;158
7.5.12;5.2 Con.dence building measures;158
7.5.13;5.3 Consultation and clari.cation;158
7.5.14;5.4 On–site inspection;159
7.6;Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe;163
7.6.1;1.1 General information;163
7.6.2;1.2 What covers the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty?;165
7.6.3;The symmetrical limitation of the CAEST on an identical level on;166
7.6.4;both sides of the former iron curtain;166
7.6.5;Exchange of information on CAEST;166
7.6.6;Limitation and reduction of the armament stockpiles in Europe;168
7.6.7;Veri.cation;169
7.6.8;2.1 A persisting two-blocks logic;172
7.6.9;2.2 Unilateral withdrawal of the Baltic States;173
7.6.10;2.3 The Wall collapses, the threat disappears, but the;173
7.6.11;Treaty remains ;173
7.6.12;3.1 E.ects in the psychological domain;174
7.6.13;3.2 E.ects on volume of the armaments;174
7.6.14;3.3 The adaptation of the CFE Treaty;175
7.6.15;4.1 Updating the POET;177
7.6.16;4.2 Military tourism ;178
7.7;Developing the Climate Change Regime: The Role of Veri.cation;180
7.7.1;2.1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate;182
7.7.2;Change;182
7.7.3;2.2 The monitoring and reporting processes4;183
7.7.4;2.3 The review process;187
7.7.5;3.1 The Kyoto Protocol;189
7.7.6;3.2 The monitoring and reporting processes;190
7.7.7;3.3 The compliance system;191
7.7.8;Compliance theory;192
7.7.9;Evolution of the compliance system;192
7.7.10;Kyoto Protocol compliance system;194
7.7.11;3.4 Compliance system problems;196
7.7.12;Legal nature;196
7.7.13;Credibility;197
7.7.14;Problems with uncertainties;197
7.7.15;External Factors;198
7.7.16;Deeper Problems;199
7.7.17;Trade measures;200
7.7.18;4.1 Remote sensing systems;206
7.7.19;5.1 Future climate change regime proposals;209
7.7.20;A long-term target?;209
7.7.21;Types of target33;210
7.7.22;Alternatives to targets;211
7.7.23;Di.erentiation;212
7.7.24;Acknowledgements;215
8;III Field Experience;219
8.1;Experience and Challenges in Weapons of Mass Destruction Treaty Verification: A Comparative View;220
8.1.1;5.1 NPT comprehensive safeguards;224
8.1.2;5.2 Some factors in.uencing the operation;224
8.1.3;of the safeguards system;224
8.1.4;5.3 Major safeguards violations;226
8.1.5;Reprocessing or enrichment experiments at declared (i.e.;226
8.1.6;safeguarded) nuclear sites;226
8.1.7;Reprocessing or enrichment activities at undeclared sites;226
8.1.8;Obstruction of or refusal to cooperate with IAEA inspectors;227
8.1.9;5.4 Implications for safeguards e.ectiveness;227
8.1.10;additional protocol;228
8.1.11;5.5 Strengthening the safeguards system;228
8.1.12;5.6 Integrated safeguards;229
8.1.13;5.7 Detection of undeclared nuclear activities;229
8.1.14;Undeclared activities at declared sites;229
8.1.15;Undeclared nuclear sites;229
8.1.16;5.8 Further steps in strengthening safeguards;230
8.1.17;Enhancing the IAEA’s technical capabilities;230
8.1.18;Increased sharing of information;231
8.1.19;Constraining the spread of proliferation-sensitive nuclear;231
8.1.20;technology;231
8.1.21;6.1 Routine inspections;232
8.1.22;6.2 Challenge inspections;232
8.1.23;7.1 International Monitoring System;233
8.1.24;7.2 On-Site Inspections;234
8.1.25;7.3 E.ectiveness of CTBT veri.cation;234
8.1.26;8.1 Detection of undeclared activities;235
8.1.27;8.2 The problem of non-state actors;236
8.1.28;8.3 How to focus veri.cation e.ort to best e.ect;237
8.1.29;8.4 Transparency of the veri.cation system;237
8.1.30;8.5 Compliance issues;238
8.1.31;undeclared;239
8.1.32;9.1 Centrality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear;239
8.1.33;Weapons;239
8.1.34;9.2 E.ectiveness of veri.cation;240
8.1.35;9.3 Multilateral and national collaboration;240
8.2;A Concrete Experience: The Iraq Case;242
8.2.1;2.1 The United Nations Security Council mandate;243
8.2.2;2.2 The implementation mode and achievements;244
8.2.3;2.3 93 +2 and the Additional Protocol;245
8.2.4;2.4 Relevance to other veri.cation regimes;246
8.2.5;3.1 Setting up a team;247
8.2.6;Size and composition;247
8.2.7;Time scale and its implications;248
8.2.8;3.2 Field activities;249
8.2.9;3.3 Sources of information and its adequate processing;249
8.2.10;Declarations;250
8.2.11;Original Iraqi documents;250
8.2.12;Field operations results;251
8.2.13;Member State information;251
8.2.14;Other independent Agency collection means;252
8.2.15;Information handling;253
8.2.16;4.1 Patterns of behaviour;254
8.2.17;4.2 The coherent picture of Iraq’s nuclear programme;256
8.2.18;4.3 What is the meaning of ’coherent picture’?;256
8.2.19;4.4 The power of all-sources advanced analysis;258
8.2.20;5.1 When the international community is almost blind;259
8.2.21;Imagery and its limitation;260
8.2.22;Export-Import information analysis;260
8.2.23;Outreach;261
8.2.24;5.2 In the spotlight: inspections under world scrutiny;262
8.2.25;Impatience and distortions of the modern communication world;262
8.2.26;The knowledge management challenge;263
8.3;Beyond Iraq: The New Challenges to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime;265
8.3.1;2.1 Awareness of an arms control and non proliferation policy;268
8.3.2;2.2 The milestone of the NPT as the birth of veri.cation;269
8.3.3;2.3 Thirty years of progress in nuclear disarmament,;270
8.3.4;arms control and non-proliferation;270
8.3.5;2.4 Early nineties: multilateral arm control disarmament;271
8.3.6;and non-proliferation;271
8.3.7;2.5 Iraq: the non proliferation regime challenged;273
8.3.8;and strengthened;273
8.3.9;1992: A milestone for compliance monitoring and veri.cation;273
8.3.10;Value of the Iraqi and North Korean experience;274
8.3.11;3.1 Dawn of the century: Resuming the challenges;275
8.3.12;3.2 Prospects: A blurred vision of the future;277
8.3.13;3.3 Current situation: Overview of concerns;277
8.3.14;Iraq: no longer a proliferation threat, but?;277
8.3.15;North Korea: The present threat?;278
8.3.16;Iran: the threat for years to come?;279
8.3.17;Pakistan and the proliferation bazaar ;284
8.3.18;Other compliance problems: Korea, Brazil, Egypt;284
8.3.19;The threat of nuclear terrorism;285
8.3.20;4.1 New tools for nuclear security? Why and for what?;285
8.3.21;Addressing the proliferation of the nuclear weapons and the;285
8.3.22;nuclear disarmament;285
8.3.23;Addressing the tra.c of sensitive technologies;286
8.3.24;Addressing the Security of nuclear and radioactive materials;286
8.3.25;Addressing the proliferation of means of delivery;286
8.3.26;4.2 How advanced technologies can contribute to;287
8.3.27;tackle the threats?;287
8.3.28;4.3 A focus on nuclear fuel cycle and materials [37];288
8.3.29;4.4 An European Union security prospective;289
8.3.30;5.1 Compliance;289
8.3.31;5.2 Verifying compliance / the needed authority [42];290
8.3.32;5.3 Verifying compliance / the needed resources;290
8.3.33;5.4 Enforcing compliance / a renewed role of the;291
8.3.34;UN Security Council;291
8.3.35;by promoting universal adherence;293
8.3.36;veri.cation system based on the best technological;293
8.3.37;means;293
8.3.38;political and technical;293
8.3.39;enforcement of international law;;2939;IV Formal Models of Verification298
9.1;Formal Models of Verification;299
9.1.1;1 Introduction;299
9.1.2;2 A conceptual model: To sign or not to sign?;300
9.1.3;3 Structural models: Randomized unannounced inspections;306
9.1.3.1;3.1 Meeting timeliness goals;307
9.1.3.2;3.2 Minimizing time to detection;310
9.1.4;4 An operational model: Strati.ed random sampling;314
9.1.4.1;4.1 One class of data;314
9.1.4.2;4.2 Several classes of data;316
10;V Systems and Linkages - Crosscutting;324
10.1;Civil Reconnaissance Satellites: Opportunities and Challenges;325
10.1.1;The Non-Proliferation Treaty;327
10.1.2;A, C;327
10.1.3;B;327
10.1.4;A.;329
10.1.5;B;329
10.1.6;C.;329
10.1.7;D.;329
10.1.8;E.;329
10.1.9;A missile test complex;329
10.1.10;C, D, E;330
10.1.11;A;331
10.1.12;A’;331
10.1.13;A;331
10.1.14;B.;331
10.2;Change Detection: The Potential for Nuclear Safeguards;337
10.2.1;2.1 Data Pre-Processing;338
10.2.2;Geometric Correction:;338
10.2.3;Atmospheric Correction:;339
10.2.4;2.2 Change Detection Techniques;339
10.2.5;2.3 Pixel-based change detection;340
10.2.6;2.4 Object-based change detection and analysis;341
10.3;Aspects of Networking: Experience from Global Monitoring for Security and Stability;351
10.3.1;2.1 Organization of GMOSS;352
10.3.2;2.2 Progress after one year;354
10.3.3;3.1 Perceptions of security;355
10.3.4;3.2 EU Security Strategy;355
10.3.5;3.3 Comparison of the EU and US strategy on proliferation;356
10.3.6;3.4 Responding to crises;356
10.3.7;3.5 Gaming;357
10.3.8;3.6 Focus for the second year of GMOSS;358
10.3.9;4.1 Feature recognition;359
10.3.10;Identifying changes;362
10.4;Environmental Sample Analysis;368
10.4.1;3.1 Early applications;370
10.4.2;3.2 UNSCOM/UNMOVIC;371
10.4.3;3.3 From Program 93+2 to the Additional Protocol to the NPT;372
10.4.4;3.4 CTBT;373
10.4.5;3.5 Future opportunities;374
10.4.6;3.6 Examples for non-radioactive tracers;374
10.4.7;4.1 Radioactive particles;375
10.4.8;4.2 Radioactive noble gases;377
10.4.9;5.1 Introduction;378
10.4.10;5.2 Atmospheric transport processes and characteristic time scales;379
10.4.11;5.3 Methods for global atmospheric transport modelling;380
10.4.12;v.;380
10.4.13;v;380
10.4.14;5.4 Methods for atmospheric chemistry modelling;381
10.4.15;5.5 Downscaling;382
10.4.16;5.6 Use of radionuclides as tracers to test atmospheric transport;382
10.4.17;5.7 Determining optimal station placement and procedures;383
10.4.18;5.8 Source localisation;384
10.5;Tracing the Origin of Diverted or Stolen Nuclear Material through Nuclear Forensic Investigations;389
10.5.1;3.1 Classical Forensic Investigations;391
10.5.2;3.2 Nuclear Forensic Investigations;393
10.5.3;Radiometric Methods;394
10.5.4;Mass Spectrometric Methods;396
10.5.5;Microstructural techniques;398
10.5.6;Recent Developments;400
10.5.7;4.1 Reference Data;402
10.5.8;4.2 Reactor type determination (Pu production);402
10.5.9;Acknowledgement;405
11;VI Information Collection and Analysis;409
11.1;The Information Infrastructure of a Treaty Monitoring System;410
11.1.1;4.1 A networking framework;417
11.1.2;4.2 Some common topologies;418
11.1.3;4.3 The role of the Internet;422
11.2;The International Level;433
11.2.1;2.1 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements:;434
11.2.2;INFCIRC/153 Requirements;434
11.2.3;2.2 Strengthening of IAEA Safeguards;435
11.2.4;2.3 The Additional Protocol: INFCIRC/540 Requirements;435
11.2.5;2.4 Integrated Safeguards;437
11.2.6;3.1 Information on States-as-a-Whole and Its Evaluation;438
11.2.7;3.2 Proliferation Indicators and the Physical Model;441
11.2.8;3.3 Tra.cking in Nuclear Material;442
11.2.9;4.1 Types of Information;444
11.2.10;4.2 Collecting Information;445
11.2.11;4.3 Analysis and Presentation of Open Source Information;447
11.3;Open Source Information Collection, Processing and Applications;452
11.3.1;2.1 Accessibility;454
11.3.2;2.2 Features of today’s open-source information collection;455
11.3.3;and processing;455
11.3.4;3.1 Data Collection;457
11.3.5;3.2 Data Validation;457
11.3.6;3.3 Satellite Imagery;458
11.3.7;3.4 Multi-lingual Information Collection;459
11.3.8;4.1 Nuclear Non-Proliferation;459
11.3.9;4.2 Export Control of Goods and Technologies;460
11.3.10;4.3 Nuclear Pro.les and Studies;461
11.3.11;5.1 Data Collection Keywords;462
11.3.12;5.2 Data Indexing;463
11.3.13;5.3 Document Augmentation;463
11.3.14;5.4 Dealing with other languages;464
11.3.15;5.5 Research at JRC-IPSC;464
11.3.16;Data Collection - EMM;465
11.3.17;Language Engineering;465
11.3.18;Data Indexing: Topic Trees;467
11.3.19;Integration of data from multiple sources;467
11.3.20;NUMAS Geo-Database;468
11.3.21;6.1 Monitoring who accesses the information;470
11.3.22;6.2 Future Research;471
11.3.23;6.3 Final Considerations;471
11.3.24;Acknowledgment;472
11.4;The National Level;474
11.4.1;open and con.dential;476
11.4.2;information.;476
11.4.3;2.1 National information supporting multinational treaties;477
11.4.4;implementation;477
11.4.5;2.2 The age of veri.cation and monitoring: global security calls;479
11.4.6;for more information;479
11.4.7;2.3 Are the strengthened safeguards strengthen enough?;479
11.4.8;More information needed;479
11.4.9;3.1 The motivation for an independent national evaluation;481
11.4.10;of information relative to security issues;481
11.4.11;3.2 The particularity of France’s status regarding nuclear issues;482
11.4.12;A political particularity;483
11.4.13;A technical speci.city;483
11.4.14;3.3 Data collection and analysis process;484
11.4.15;Type of collected information;484
11.4.16;origin of data:;485
11.4.17;nature of the data;485
11.4.18;3.4 Analysis and assessment methodology;486
11.4.19;Validation & Assessment principles;486
11.4.20;credibility;486
11.4.21;coherence;486
11.4.22;Credibility:;486
11.4.23;Coherence:;486
11.4.24;Validation & Assessment framework;487
11.4.25;3.5 Importance of analysis and assessment;490
11.4.26;Open sources data analysis;490
11.4.27;from the classic media:;490
11.4.28;News from scienti.c media:;491
11.4.29;Data from Non Governmental Organizations (NGO):;491
11.4.30;Data from technical sources:;491
11.4.31;Expertise;491
11.4.32;Cross-correlation and data fusion;492
11.4.33;3.6 Evaluation and Assessment process: national organisation;492
11.4.34;National organisation;492
11.4.35;Who bene.ts from the analysis and evaluation of collected;493
11.4.36;information?;493
11.4.37;The con.dentiality issue;494
11.4.38;3.7 Some examples;495
12;VII Emerging Verification Technologies;500
12.1;Advanced Sensor Technologies;501
12.2;Monitoring Reactors with Cubic Meter Scale Antineutrino Detectors;517
12.2.1;2.1 Production of Antineutrinos in Reactor Cores;518
12.2.2;Measurement Scenarios;519
12.2.3;2.2 Detection of Reactor Antineutrinos;520
12.2.4;3.1 Results;523
12.2.5;Antineutrino Count Rate and Detection E.ciencies;523
12.2.6;Operational Considerations;524
12.3;Digital Verification Techniques in the Nuclear Safeguards System: Status and Perspectives;527
12.3.1;Sensors and Data Generators;530
12.3.2;Data Collection System;530
12.3.3;Network Interfacing Equipment;531
12.3.4;Commercial-O.-The-Shelf (COTS) Components;531
12.3.5;Approval for Routine Inspection Use;531
12.3.6;Featuring Digital Safeguards Instrumentation;532
12.3.7;Optical Surveillance;533
12.3.8;Radiation Monitoring;535
12.3.9;Electronic Sealing;537
12.4;Emerging Veri.cation Technologies;542
12.5;A Sustainable Approach for Developing Treaty Enforcement Instrumentation;553
12.5.1;3.1 IAEA;556
12.5.2;3.2 Member States Support Programs;557
12.5.3;3.3 Commercial Entities and Research and Development;559
12.5.4;Institutions;559
12.5.5;Large Companies;559
12.5.6;Mid-sized Companies;560
12.5.7;Small Companies;561
12.5.8;Research and Development Institutions;561
13;VIII Perspectives and Conclusions;566
13.1;Continuity and Change in International Verification Regimes;567
13.2;Improving Veri.cation: Trends and Perspectives for Research;581
13.2.1;2.1 Bulk handling facilities;582
13.2.2;2.2 Increasing inventories of nuclear materials;583
13.2.3;2.3 New technologies, new generation of reactors and fuel cycles;583
13.2.4;2.4 Detection of undeclared activities;583
13.2.5;2.5 Terrorism and illicit tra.cking;584
13.2.6;2.6 Dual use materials, proliferation of technology;584
13.2.7;2.7 Proliferation resistance;584
13.2.8;2.8 Veri.cation of excess material and Fissile Material;585
13.2.9;Cut-o. Treaty (FMCT);585
13.2.10;3.1 Bulk handling facilities;585
13.2.11;3.2 Increasing inventories of nuclear materials/ spent fuel;586
13.2.12;management;586
13.2.13;3.3 New nuclear technologies, new generation of reactors;587
13.2.14;and fuel cycles;587
13.2.15;3.4 Detection of undeclared activities;588
13.2.16;Open Source information - satellite imagery;588
13.2.17;Open source information - electronic searching;588
13.2.18;Environmental sampling;590
13.2.19;Wide-area environmental monitoring;591
13.2.20;3.5 Terrorism and illicit tra.cking;591
13.2.21;3.6 Dual use materials, proliferation of technology;592
13.2.22;3.7 Proliferation resistance;593
13.2.23;3.8 Veri.cation of excess material and Fissile Material;593
13.2.24;Cut- o. Treaty (FMCT);593
14;Concluding Remarks;596
15;List of Authors;611
15.1;Altmann, J ¨ urgen;611
15.2;Avenhaus, Rudolf;611
15.3;Baute, Jacques G.;611
15.4;Bernstein, Adam;611
15.5;Bril, Louis-Victor;611
15.6;Bowden, Nathaniel;611
15.7;Canty, Morton;611
15.8;Carlson, John;612
15.9;Chartier, Bernard;612
15.10;Cooley, Jill N.;612
15.11;Daoudi, Mohamed;612
15.12;Feichter, Johann;612
15.13;Gon¸ calves, Jo˜ ao G.M.;612
15.14;H¨ ackel, Erwin;612
15.15;Jasani, Bhupendra;612
15.16;Kalinowski, Martin B.;612
15.17;Kyriakopoulos, Nicholas;612
15.18;MacFaul, Larry;613
15.19;Mayer, Klaus;613
15.20;Nixdor., Kathryn;613
15.21;Niemeyer, Irmgard;613
15.22;Nikkinen, Mika;613
15.23;Nussbaum, Sven;613
15.24;Poucet, Andre;613
15.25;Ray, Ian;613
15.26;Richard, Michel;613
15.27;Richter, Bernd;614
15.28;Rosenstock, Wolfgang;614
15.29;Schenkel, Roland;614
15.30;Schlosser, Clemens;614
15.31;Schriefer, Dirk;614
15.32;Shepherd, Iain;614
15.33;Stein, Gotthard;614
15.34;Stein, Marius;614
15.35;Trapp, Ralf;614
15.36;Wallenius, Maria;614
15.37;Zwilling, Marc;615
16;Index;616