Reason, Bias, and Inquiry

The Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology
Erscheinungsjahr 2022
ISBN: 978-0-19-763691-6
Verlag: Oxford University Press

Buch, Englisch, 384 Seiten, Format (B × H): 147 mm x 226 mm, Gewicht: 635 g

Philosophers and psychologists routinely explore questions surrounding reasoning, inquiry, and bias, though typically in disciplinary isolation. What is the source of our intellectual errors? When can we trust information others tell us?

This volume brings together researchers from across the two disciplines to present ideas and insights for addressing the challenges of knowing well in a complicated world in four parts: how to best describe the conceptual and empirical terrain of reason and bias; how reasoning and bias influence basic perception of the physical world; how to assess knowledge and expertise in ourselves and others; and how people approach reasoning and knowledge among and about groups. Together, the chapters show
what philosophers and psychologists can do together when they shine light on the challenges of reaching the truth and avoiding errors.

Reason, Bias, and Inquiry is a multidisciplinary meditation for readers who are awash in information but are uncertain how to manage it to make informed decisions.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Ballantyne, Nathan

Dunning, David

Weitere Mitwirkende

Ballantyne, Nathan

Dunning, David

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Ethnologie | Volkskunde Ethnologie Kultur- und Sozialethnologie: Allgemeines
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie
• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Sozialpsychologie

Über Autor(innen)

Nathan Ballantyne is a philosopher researching questions on improving human inquiry. His work explores themes such as expertise, biases, and epistemic humility. His writing has appeared in Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Quarterly, and the Journal of Positive Psychology. His book Knowing Our Limits was published by Oxford University Press in 2019. He is Executive Editor of the
Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

David Dunning is a social psychologist focusing primarily on the psychology underlying human misbelief. His most cited work, supported by the National Institute of Mental Health, the National Science Foundation, and the John Templeton Foundation, shows that people hold flattering self-opinions that cannot be justified from objective evidence. He has served as president of both the Society of Experimental Social Psychology and the Society for the Science of
Motivation.