Beckmann / Padmanabhan / Padmanabhan. Institutions and Sustainability

Political Economy of Agriculture and the Environment - Essays in Honour of Konrad Hagedorn
1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-1-4020-9690-7
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 388 Seiten

From the first vague idea to use Konrad Hagedorn's 60th birthday as an inspi- tion for taking stock of his vibrant academic contributions, this joint book project has been a great pleasure for us in many ways. Pursuing Hagedorn's intellectual development, we have tried to reflect on the core questions of humanity according to Ernst Bloch 'Who are we?', 'Where do we come from?' and 'Where are we heading?' In this way, and without knowing it, Konrad Hagedorn initiated a c- lective action process he would have very much enjoyed ... if he had been allowed to take part in it. But it was our aim and constant motivation to surprise him with this collection of essays in his honour. Konrad Hagedorn was reared as the youngest child of a peasant family on a small farm in the remote moorland of East Frisia, Germany. During his childhood in the poverty-ridden years after the Second World War, he faced a life where humans were heavily dependent on using nature around them for their livelihoods; meanwhile, he learned about the fragility of the environment. As a boy, he - tended a one-room schoolhouse, where his great intellectual talents were first r- ognised and used for co-teaching his schoolmates. These early teaching expe- ences might have laid the foundations for his later becoming a dedicated lecturer and mentor.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Beckmann, Volker

Padmanabhan., Martina

Padmanabhan, Martina

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;5
2;Contents;8
3;List of Contributors;15
4;1 Institutions and Sustainability: Introduction and Overview;17
4.1;1.1 Introduction;17
4.2;1.2 Konrad Hagedorn’s Contributions to Institutional Analysis;18
4.3;1.2.1 The politics of agricultural and environmental relations;18
4.4;1.2.2 Developing institutions to govern sustainability;20
4.5;1.2.3 Managing common pool resources;22
4.6;1.2.4 The future of institutional analysis;24
4.7;1.3 The Contributed Papers;26
4.8;1.3.1 Political economy of economic development and agricultural policy;26
4.9;1.3.2 Institutions, governance and sustainability;29
4.10;1.3 3 Property rights, collective action and natural resources;31
4.11;1.3.4 Challenges to institutional analysis towards sustainability;33
4.12;1.4 Looking Ahead Towards Sustainable Futures;35
4.13;References;35
5;Part I Political Economy of Economic Development and Agricultural Policy;41
5.1;2 The Political Economy of Agricultural Reform in Transition Countries;42
5.1.1;2.1 Introduction;42
5.1.2;2.2 Why Did the Communist Party Reform in China, but not in the Soviet Union?;45
5.1.3;2.3 Causes of Differences in Grassroots Support;46
5.1.4;2.4 Experimentation and Reforms;49
5.1.5;2.5 Why Were Agricultural Reforms Implemented Gradually in China, but Simultaneously in Many CEE and the CIS States?;50
5.1.6;2.6 What Are the Causes for the Differences in Land and Farm Reform Strategies?;52
5.1.7;2.7 Concluding Comments;54
5.1.8;References;55
5.2;3 Make Law, Not War? On the Political Economy of Violence and Appropriation;57
5.2.1;3.1 Hobbes and the Political Economy of Violence;57
5.2.2;3.2 The Economics of Violence: How Order Emerges from Predation;59
5.2.3;3.3 The Anthropology of Violence;63
5.2.4;3.4 Ethnographies of Violence and Order;65
5.2.5;3.5 Conclusion;71
5.2.6;Acknowledgments;72
5.2.7;References;72
5.3;4 A Marathon Rather than a Sprint: The Reform of the Farmers’ Pension System in Germany and its Impacts;75
5.3.1;4.1 Introduction;75
5.3.2;4.2 Reform in the 1980s: Proposals and Resistance;77
5.3.3;4.2.1 The first attempt at reform;77
5.3.4;4.2.2 Redefinition of the reform problem (1984–1987);78
5.3.5;4.2.3 The second attempt at reform (1987–1990);79
5.3.6;4.3 The Agricultural Social Security Reform Law (ASRG);80
5.3.7;4.3.1 The decision-making process and its rationale;80
5.3.8;4.3.2 Goals and main features of the reform law;81
5.3.9;4.4 Effects of the Reform;85
5.3.10;4.4.1 Effect on social security;85
5.3.11;4.4.2 Stabilisation effects on costs and contributions;88
5.3.12;4.4.3 Distribution effects;91
5.3.13;4.5 Reform Evaluation and Perspectives;92
5.3.14;References;93
5.4;5 Complex Policy Choices Regarding Agricultural Externalities: Efficiency, Equity and Acceptability;96
5.4.1;5.1 Introduction;97
5.4.2;5.2 Types of Agricultural Externalities;98
5.4.3;5.3 Complications Arising from Thresholds in the Economic Effects of Externalities;100
5.4.4;5.3.1 A Paretian relevant externality;101
5.4.5;5.3.2 An infra-marginal externality which is Paretian relevant for policy and which complicates social decisions;101
5.4.6;5.3.3 Some externalities are Paretian irrelevant;104
5.4.7;5.3.4 Further complications;105
5.4.8;5.4 Adverse Selection as an Unfavourable Externality and Possible Threshold Effects;105
5.4.9;5.5 Environmental Externalities and Sustainability;107
5.4.10;5.6 Equity, Efficiency and Agricultural Externalities;108
5.4.11;5.7 Transaction Costs Involved in Public Regulation of Externalities;111
5.4.12;5.8 The Political Acceptability of Economic Policies;113
5.4.13;5.9 Property Rights in Agricultural Genetic Material and Externalities;115
5.4.14;5.10 Concluding Comments;117
5.4.15;Acknowledgements;118
5.4.16;References;118
6;Part II Institutions, Governance and Sustainability;120
6.1;6 Multi-level Governance and Natural Resource Management: The Challenges of Complexity, Diversity, and Uncertainty;121
6.1.1;6.1 Introduction;121
6.1.2;6.2 Current Conceptions of Natural Resource Systems;122
6.1.3;6.3 Complexity and Uncertainty in Adaptive Systems;124
6.1.4;6.4 Implications for the Approach to Management;126
6.1.5;6.5 Implications for the Design of Institutional Arrangements;126
6.1.6;6.6 A Closer Look at Institutional Options;132
6.1.7;6.7 Concluding Remarks: Institutional Diversity and Methodological Diversity;135
6.1.8;Acknowledgments;136
6.1.9;References;136
6.2;7 Constraints on Rural Governance in the European Union: A Role for Co- operative Associations?;139
6.2.1;7.1 Introduction;139
6.2.2;7.2 The Multi-Level Governance Concept;141
6.2.3;7.3 Theoretical Foundations 7.3.1 The Samuelsonian preference-shirking5 dilemma;143
6.2.4;7.3.2 Tiebout’s spatial economy and the shopping tour metaphor;143
6.2.5;7.3.3 Voice and loyalty as direct articulations of preferences;144
6.2.6;7.3.4 Some preliminary conclusions;146
6.2.7;7.4 Structural Problems of Rural Areas in the EU-27;146
6.2.8;7.4.1 Population density;146
6.2.9;7.4.2 Unemployment and rural migration;147
6.2.10;7.4.3 Weak service sectors and lower household income;147
6.2.11;7.4.4 Lower educational standards;148
6.2.12;7.4.5 Budget crises, ageing and low tax revenues;148
6.2.13;7.4.6 Lack of authority to levy taxes;148
6.2.14;7.4.7 Disparities between metropolitan and rural areas;149
6.2.15;7.5 Empowerment: Strengthening Self-Organizing Capacities of Rural Communities, but How?;151
6.2.16;7.6 Governance Without Government in Rural Areas 7.6.1 Foundations;153
6.2.17;7.6.2 A stylized historical model: collective rural entrepreneurship;155
6.2.18;7.6.3 Democratic governance and membership as surrogates for competitive pricing;157
6.2.19;7.6.4 The rise and decline of co-operative associations;158
6.2.20;7.7 Conclusions;161
6.2.21;References;162
6.3;8 Making Environmental Administration More Effective: A Contribution from New Institutional Economics;165
6.3.1;8.1 Introduction;165
6.3.2;8.2 A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing MDAs;166
6.3.3;8.2.1 Mission and functions;167
6.3.4;8.2.2 Characteristics of MDAs;168
6.3.5;8.3 Functions and Activities of Environmental MDAs;171
6.3.6;8.4 Designing Environmental MDAs: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics;173
6.3.7;8.5 Analyzing the Governance Structures of Environmental MDAs;175
6.3.8;8.5.1 Level of integration;175
6.3.9;8.5.2 Level of autonomy;177
6.3.10;8.5.3 Level of centralization/decentralization;179
6.3.11;8.5.4 Interaction with private sector and civil society;182
6.3.12;8.6. Discussion and Conclusions;183
6.3.13;References;184
6.4;9 Public Good Markets: The Possible Role of Hybrid Governance Structures in Institutions for Sustainability;186
6.4.1;9.1 Introduction;186
6.4.2;9.2 The Market Concept Revisited;187
6.4.3;9.3 Hybrid Governance Structures;191
6.4.4;9.4 Extension to Public Good Markets;193
6.4.5;9.5 Conclusion;199
6.4.6;References;199
7;Part III Property Rights, Collective Action and Natural Resources;203
7.1;10 A Century of Institutions and Ecology in East Africa’s Rangelands: Linking Institutional Robustness with the Ecological Resilience of Kenya’s Maasailand;204
7.1.1;10.1 Introduction;204
7.1.2;10.2 The Ecological Side of an SES;207
7.1.3;10.3 Governance of the SES Prior to 1890: A Probable Balance;209
7.1.4;10.4 Governance of the SES During the Colonial Era: Institutions and Ecology in Jeopardy;212
7.1.5;Introduction of Group and Individual Ranches 10.5 Governing the SES in the Post- Colonial Period: The;216
7.1.6;10.6 Discussion;220
7.1.7;10.7 Conclusion;223
7.1.8;Acknowledgments;225
7.1.9;References;225
7.2;11 The Downgrading Effect of Abuse of Power on Trust and Collective Action in Bulgaria’s Irrigation Sector;231
7.2.1;11.1 Introduction;231
7.2.2;11.2 Downward Cascade Between Opportunistic Behavior and Trust;233
7.2.3;11.3 Methods and Research Site;235
7.2.4;11.4 Incongruity of Rules, Information Asymmetry and Abuse of Power;237
7.2.5;11.4.1 Incongruity of formal and effective rules in the irrigation sector;239
7.2.6;11.4.2 Abuse of power in the irrigation sector;242
7.2.7;11.5 Decreasing Trust and Reputation;244
7.2.8;11.5.1 Distrust in formal actors;244
7.2.9;11.5.2 Bad reputation;245
7.2.10;11.6 Conclusions;247
7.2.11;References;249
7.3;12 Payment for Environmental Services: Interactions with Property Rights and Collective Action;251
7.3.1;12.1 Introduction;251
7.3.2;12.2 Environmental Services, Land Use and Smallholder Farmers;254
7.3.3;12.3 A Framework of Function and Welfare Effects of PES;257
7.3.4;12.4. Institutions and the Function of PES Mechanisms 12.4.1 Property rights and PES;260
7.3.5;12.4.2 Collective action and PES;263
7.3.6;12.4.3 PES and the potential for poverty reduction;265
7.3.7;12.5 Characterization of Environmental Services;267
7.3.8;12.6 Conclusions;269
7.3.9;Acknowledgments;271
7.3.10;References;271
7.4;13 An Institutional Economics Analysis of Land Use Contracting: The Case of the Netherlands;274
7.4.1;13.1 Introduction;274
7.4.2;13.2 Land Lease Contracts in the Netherlands;276
7.4.3;13.3 Contract Choice for Land Leasing;282
7.4.4;13.3.1 Specific investments;284
7.4.5;13.3.2 Uncertainty and incompleteness;284
7.4.6;13.3.3 Frequency;286
7.4.7;13.4 Empirical Model and Data;287
7.4.8;13.5. Results;290
7.4.9;13.6 Summary and Conclusions;294
7.4.10;References;296
8;Part IV Challenges of Institutional Analysis for Sustainability;298
8.1;14 Sustainability, Institutions and Behavior;299
8.1.1;14.1 Introduction;299
8.1.2;14.2 The Sustainability Problem;301
8.1.3;14.2.1 Weak and strong sustainability;301
8.1.4;14.2.2 Separation or integration?;302
8.1.5;14.3 Institutions and Rationality;305
8.1.6;14.3.1 There is not only selfishness;305
8.1.7;14.3.2 Interpretations based on maximization of individual utility;307
8.1.8;14.3.3 The institutions-as-rationality-contexts (IRC) hypothesis;308
8.1.9;14.3.4 Empirical support for the institutions-as-rationality-contexts ( IRC) hypothesis;309
8.1.10;14.4 Resource Regimes for Sustainability;312
8.1.11;14.5 Conclusion;315
8.1.12;Acknowledgments;316
8.1.13;References;316
8.2;15 Institutional Change and Ecological Economics: The Role of Mental Models and Sufficient Reason;321
8.2.1;15.1 Introduction;321
8.2.2;15.2 Cognition Within Institutional Economics and Its Relevance for Ecological Economics;324
8.2.3;15.3 Cognition, Mental Models and Sufficient Reason;326
8.2.4;15.4 Mental Models and Sufficient Reason: What is Different?;330
8.2.5;15. 5 Methodological Implications: Investigating Mental Models and Sufficient Reason;334
8.2.6;15.6 Conclusions;340
8.2.7;Acknowledgments;341
8.2.8;References;342
8.3;16 Analysing Institutions: What Method to Apply?;346
8.3.1;16.1 Introduction;346
8.3.2;16.2 The Tool-Set of Empirical Institutional Economics;348
8.3.3;16.2.1 Case study analysis;348
8.3.4;16.2.2 Econometric analysis;349
8.3.5;16.2.3 Experimental economics;350
8.3.6;16.2.4 Agent-based modelling;351
8.3.7;16.3 Levels of Analysis and Research Questions in Institutional Economics;353
8.3.8;16.3.1 Levels of social analysis;353
8.3.9;16.3.2 Research questions in institutional analysis;355
8.3.10;16.4 Critical Issues in Selecting Methods of Institutional Analysis;358
8.3.11;16.4.1 The question of time;358
8.3.12;16.4.2 Observability, measurability and data availability;362
8.3.13;16.4.3 The role of actors and human behaviour;366
8.3.14;16.5 Conclusions;368
8.3.15;Acknowledgments;371
8.3.16;References;371
9;Index;377