Truth

Erscheinungsjahr 1999
ISBN: 978-0-19-875250-9
Verlag: Oxford University Press

Buch, Englisch, 412 Seiten, Format (B × H): 134 mm x 202 mm, Gewicht: 473 g

The aim of the series is to bring together important recent writing in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available to the university student or the general reader. The editors of each volume contribute an introductory essay on the items chosen and on the questions with which they deal. A selective bibliography is appended as a guide to further reading.

This volume is designed to set out some of the central issues in the theory of truth. It begins with writings by F. H. Bradley, William James, Gottlob Frege, and Bertrand Russell, and continues wih the classical discussions from the middle of the century (including Wittgenstein, Quine, and Austin), ending with a selection of contemporary contributions, including essays from Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty. The collection draws together, for the first time, the debates between philosophers who favour 'robust' or 'substantive' theories of truth, and those other, 'deflationist' or minimalists, who deny that such theories can be given.

The editors provide a substantial introduction, in which they map out this terrain and locate writers from Frege to Wittgenstein and Davidson within it. They also describe how these debates relate to more technical issues, such as work on the Liar paradox and formal truth theories.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Blackburn, Simon

Simmons, Keith

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Introduction

- PART I: BACKGROUND `ROBUST' THEORIES

- 1: F. H. Bradley: On Truth and Copying

- 2: H. H. Joachim: The Nature of Truth

- 3: William James: Pragmatism's Conception of Truth

- 4: Bertrand Russell: William James's Conception of Truth

- PART II: EARLY MINIMALIST THEORIES

- 5: Gottlob Frege: The Thought: A Logical Enquiry

- 6: F. P. Ramsey: On Facts and Propositions

- 7: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Extracts

- 8: Alfred Tarski: The Semantic Conception of Truth

- 9: W. V. Quine: Philosophy of Logic

- PART III: THE EARLY MODERN DEBATE

- 10: J. L. Austin: Truth

- 11: P. F. Strawson: Truth

- 12: J. L. Austin: Unfair to Facts

- PART IV: MODERN MINIMALISM AND DOUBTS ABOUT IT

- 13: Crispin Wright: Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed

- 14: Paul Horwich: The Minimalist Conception of Truth

- 15: Michael Dummett: Of What Kind of Thing is Truth a Property?

- 16: Anil Gupta: A Critique of Deflationism

- 17: Donald Davidson: The Folly of Trying to Define Truth

- 18: Richard Rorty: Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth

- 19: Hartry Field: Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content

- Notes on the Contributors; Select Bibliography; Index

Über Autor(innen)

Simon Blackburn is Edna S. Koury Distinguished Professor, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His publications include Spreading the Word (OUP, 1984), The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (OUP, 1994), and Ruling Passions (OUP, 1998).

Keith Simmons is Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is author of Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument (CUP, 1993).