Blair / Kaserman Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control

1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-6109-6
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 224 Seiten, Web PDF

Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control focuses on the processes, methodologies, and approaches involved in the law and economics of vertical integration and control. The publication first elaborates on transaction costs, fixed proportions and contractual alternatives, and variable proportions and contractual alternatives. Discussions focus on sales revenue royalties, ownership integration, output royalties, important product-specific services, successive monopoly, advantages and limitations of internal transfers, and transaction cost determinants. The text then examines vertical integration under uncertainty and vertical integration without contractual alternatives. The book ponders on legal treatment of ownership integration and per se illegal contractual controls. Topics include tying arrangements, public policy assessment, resale price maintenance, vertical integration and the Sherman Act, market foreclosure doctrine, and the 1982 Merger Guidelines. The text also takes a look at contractual controls that are not illegal per se, alternative legal rules, and antitrust policy. The publication is a dependable reference for researchers interested in the law and economics of vertical integration and control.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Blair, Roger D.

Kaserman, David L.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;8
5;Acknowledgments;12
6;Chapter 1. Introduction;14
6.1;Background;14
6.2;Purpose of Present Study;18
6.3;Standard for Analysis;19
7;PART I: Economics of Vertical Control;22
7.1;Chapter 2. Transaction Costs;24
7.1.1;The Incentive to Integrate;26
7.1.2;The Welfare Effects;30
7.1.3;Transaction Cost Determinants;31
7.1.4;Advantages and Limitations of Internal Transfers;36
7.1.5;Contractual Alternatives;38
7.2;Chapter 3. Fixed Proportions and Contractual Alternatives;41
7.2.1;No Incentive for Vertical Control;42
7.2.2;Successive Monopoly;44
7.2.3;Important Product-Specific Services;49
7.2.4;Entry Barriers;55
7.3;Chapter 4. Variable Proportions and Contractual Alternatives;61
7.3.1;Ownership Integration;61
7.3.2;Tying Arrangements;65
7.3.3;Output Royalties;71
7.3.4;Sales Revenue Royalties;76
7.3.5;Lump-Sum Entry Fees;82
7.3.6;Vertical Controls: Problems in Practice;90
7.3.7;Conclusion;95
7.4;Chapter 5. Vertical Integration under Uncertainty;96
7.4.1;Early Studies;97
7.4.2;More Recent Studies;98
7.4.3;Random Demand;106
7.4.4;Random Input Prices;116
7.5;Chapter 6. Vertical Integration without Contractual Alternatives;123
7.5.1;Regulation and Vertical Integration;123
7.5.2;Monopsony and Vertical Integration;127
7.5.3;Price Discrimination and Vertical Integration;133
7.5.4;Vertical Integration and Downstream Disequilibrium;137
7.5.5;Appendix: A Formal Analysis of Vertical Integration and Downstream Disequilibrium;144
8;PART II: Legal Analysis of Vertical Control;150
8.1;Chapter 7. Legal Treatment of Ownership Integration;152
8.1.1;Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act;153
8.1.2;Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 1968;158
8.1.3;Market Foreclosure Doctrine;160
8.1.4;The 1982 Merger Guidelines;164
8.1.5;Concluding Remarks;166
8.2;Chapter 8. Per Se Illegal Contractual Controls;167
8.2.1;Fixing Maximum-Resale Prices;167
8.2.2;Resale Price Maintenance;170
8.2.3;Tying Arrangements;175
8.2.4;Public Policy Assessment;179
8.3;Chapter 9. Contractual Controls That Are Not Illegal Per Se;182
8.3.1;Introduction;182
8.3.2;Presumptively Legal Controls;182
8.3.3;Exclusive Dealing and Requirements Contracts;184
8.3.4;Territorial Restraints;194
8.3.5;Concluding Remarks;199
9;Part III: Public Policy Analysis;200
9.1;Chapter 10. Conclusion;202
9.1.1;Alternative Legal Rules;202
9.1.2;Appropriate Antitrust Policy;205
9.1.3;Areas for Future Research;206
9.1.4;Epilogue;209
10;Bibliography;210
11;Index;218