Wittgenstein and Pragmatism

On Certainty in the Light of Peirce and James
1. Auflage 2016
ISBN: 978-1-349-92799-9
Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan

Buch, Englisch, 311 Seiten, Previously published in hardcover, Format (B × H): 148 mm x 210 mm, Gewicht: 426 g

Reihe: History of Analytic Philosophy

This book investigates the conflicts concerning pragmatism in

Wittgenstein’s work On Certainty, through a comparison with the

pragmatist tradition as expressed by its founding fathers Charles S. Peirce

and William James. It also describes Wittgenstein’s first encounters with

pragmatism in the 1930s and shows the relevance of Frank Ramsey in the

development of his thought. Offering a balanced, critical and theoretical

examination the author discusses issues such as doubt, certainty, common

sense, forms of life, action and the pragmatic maxim. While highlighting

the objective convergences and divergences between the two approaches,

the volume makes links to ongoing debates on relativism, foundationalism,

scepticism and objectivity. It will be of interest to anyone searching for new

perspectives on Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Boncompagni, Anna

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Pragmatismus
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie Westliche Philosophie: 20./21. Jahrhundert

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Foreword

Acknowledgments

List of AbbreviationsIntroduction. ‘A kind of Weltanschauung’Part I – Before On CertaintyChapter 1. Pragmatism in Wittgenstein before On Certainty

1.1 Preliminary remarks

1.2 ‘Die pragmatistiche Auffassung von Wahr und Falsch’ 1.3 Wittgenstein and Ramsey

1.4 Wittgenstein reader of James

1.5 Wittgenstein reader of Peirce?

1.6 Other references to pragmatism before On Certainty

1.7 Concluding remarksPart II – On CertaintyChapter 2. Reasonable doubts and unshakable certainties

2.1 Preliminary remarks

2.2 Doubt

2.3 Skepticism and fallibilism

2.4 Wittgenstein’s ‘hinges’

2.5 Peirce’s ‘indubitables’ and ‘regulative assumptions’

2.6 Concluding remarks

Chapter 3. Common sense and Weltbild

3.1 Preliminary remarks

3.2 Peirce’s critical common sensism and James’ ‘mother-tongue of thought’

3.3 Wittgenstein’s Weltbild

3.4 Outlines for a comparison

3.5 Concluding remarks

Chapter 4. Action and the pragmatic maxim

4.1 Preliminary remarks

4.2 The pragmatic maxim

4.3 Perception and conduct, truth and belief

4.4 Meaning and consequences: the ‘Pragmatist Week’

4.5 Meaning and understanding

4.6 ‘Im Anfang war die Tat’

4.7 Action and its surroundings

4.8 Concluding remarksPart III – Broadening the PerspectiveChapter 5. From ground to background

5.1 Preliminary remarks

5.2 Forms of life in Wittgenstein’s writings

5.3 Secondary literature: relativism and other issues

5.4 A human objectivity

5.5 Background and foreground

5.6 Concluding remarksChapter 6. Between method and Weltanschauung

6.1 Preliminary remarks

6.2 ‘The good in pragmatism’

6.3 Beyond method

6.4 Synoptic presentation and Weltanschauung

6.5 The river and the river-bed

6.6. Science and philosophy

6.7 Concluding remarks

Conclusion. ‘I’ll teach you differences’

Bibliography

Index

Über Autor(innen)

Anna Boncompagni (University of California, Irvine) works mainly on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and on pragmatism, and is also interested in phenomenology, the history of analytic philosophy, and the philosophy of psychiatry. Her previous publications include “Elucidating Forms of Life: The Evolution of a Philosophical Tool”, Nordic Wittgenstein Review (2015) and Wittgenstein: Lo Sguardo e il Limite (2012).