Bonica / Sen The Judicial Tug of War

How Lawyers, Politicians, and Ideological Incentives Shape the American Judiciary
Erscheinungsjahr 2020
ISBN: 978-1-108-89912-3
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 0 Seiten

Reihe: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

Why have conservatives decried 'activist judges'? And why have liberals - and America's powerful legal establishment - emphasized qualifications and experience over ideology? This transformative text tackles these questions with a new framework for thinking about the nation's courts, 'the judicial tug of war', which not only explains current political clashes over America's courts, but also powerfully predicts the composition of courts moving forward. As the text demonstrates through novel quantitative analyses, a greater ideological rift between politicians and legal elites leads politicians to adopt measures that put ideology and politics front and center - for example, judicial elections. On the other hand, ideological closeness between politicians and the legal establishment leads legal elites to have significant influence on the selection of judges. Ultimately, the judicial tug of war makes one point clear: for good or bad, politics are critical to how judges are selected and whose interests they ultimately represent.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Bonica, Adam

Sen, Maya

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Regierungspolitik Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik
• Rechtswissenschaften Öffentliches Recht
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Demokratie
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Wirtschaftspolitik, politische Ökonomie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Introduction; Part I. The Legal Profession and the 'Captured Judiciary': 2. The 'American Aristocracy'; 3. The Bar, Self Regulation, and Judicial Capture; Part II. Political Actors and the Incentive to Politicize: 4. Politicians, their Interests, and the Judicial Tug of War; 5. Politicization in the Federal Courts; 6. Politicization in the States; Part III. Ramifications of the Judicial Tug of War: 7. Politics of Judicial Reform; 8. Polarization and Conflict; 9. Conclusion; Bibliography; Index.

Über Autor(innen)

Bonica, Adam
Adam Bonica is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University.

Sen, Maya
Maya Sen is Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.