Brown / Eckholm By Bread Alone

1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-1-4832-7925-1
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 286 Seiten, Web PDF

By Bread Alone is an interdisciplinary analysis of the global food situation and food production prospects. It examines the problems posed by the new international order, as well as the policy alternatives open to mankind. It also discusses the role of the United States, the world's breadbasket, in addressing the food crisis, particularly in shaping the 'rules of the game' for access to raw materials, for expanding production, and for establishing global reserves. Comprised of 17 chapters, this book begins with an overview of the changing face of food shortage, together with the history and geography of malnutrition. The evolution of agriculture and famine in human history are considered, along with the impact of population growth and rising affluence on food supply. Subsequent chapters explore how the world's food systems are being undermined by ecological events such as climate change, deforestation, and eutrophication of lakes and streams; the growing problem of food insecurity; and the global politics of food scarcity. The next section deals with four basic resources relevant to food supply: land, water, energy, and fertilizer. Finally, policy recommendations aimed at addressing the global food problem are given. This monograph will be of interest to politicians and policymakers.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Brown, Lester R.

Eckholm, Erik P.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Corruption: A Study in Political Economy;4
3;Copyright page;5
4;Table of Contents;8
5;Dedication;6
6;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;12
7;Part 1: Introduction;14
7.1;CHAPTER 1. CORRUPTION AS A PROBLEM IN POLITICAL ECONOMY;16
7.1.1;1. CORRUPTION AND THE MIXED ECONOMY;16
7.1.2;2. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS AND FUNCTIONAL BRIBERY;21
7.1.3;3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT;25
8;Part 2: Legislative Corruption;30
8.1;CHAPTER 2. CORRUPTION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: THE COST OF INFLUENCE IN AN INDIVIDUALISTIC LEGISLATURE;32
8.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;32
8.1.2;2. CORRUPTION IN A PERFECT DEMOCRATIC STATE;34
8.1.3;3. POLITICIANS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION;37
8.1.4;4. THE STRUCTURE OF INTEREST GROUP ORGANIZATION;42
8.1.5;5. CONCLUSIONS;44
8.1.6;APPENDIX 2.1. AN EXAMPLE THAT GENERATES THE UTILITY SURFACES IN FIGURE 2.1;46
8.1.7;APPENDIX 2.2. COMPETITIVE BRIBERY IN AN INDIVIDUALISTIC LEGISLATURE;48
8.2;CHAPTER 3. INTEREST GROUP ACTIVITY AND THE LEGISLATURE: CORRUPTION, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, AND LOBBYING;50
8.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;50
8.2.2;2. IGNORANCE, APATHY, AND THE ROLE OF WEALTH;51
8.2.3;3. MONOPOLY POWER AND LEGISLATIVE CORRUPTION;62
8.2.4;4. INTEREST GROUP RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATION;69
8.2.5;5. CONCLUSIONS;72
8.3;CHAPTER 4. BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS;76
8.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;76
8.3.2;2. LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION;77
8.3.3;3. HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION;84
8.3.4;4. TRADING FAVORS FOR VOTES;91
8.3.5;5. POLITICAL SYSTEMS WITHOUT A SEPARATION OF POWERS;97
8.3.6;6. CONCLUSIONS: THE PUBLIC POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL PAYOFFS;98
8.3.7;APPENDIX. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRATIC OUTPUT AND "RED TAPE";100
9;Part 3: Bureaucratie Corruption;102
9.1;CHAPTER 5. LINING UP AND PAYING OFF;104
9.1.1;1. LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION: AN OVERVIEW;104
9.1.2;2. THE EFFICIENCY OF BRIBERY;107
9.1.3;3. SINGLE LINES AND PRIORITY QUEUES;112
9.1.4;4. CORRUPTION AND THE RISK OF DETECTION;119
9.1.5;5. CONCLUSIONS;125
9.1.6;APPENDIX;126
9.2;CHAPTER 6. MONOPOLISTIC BUREAUCRACY;128
9.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;128
9.2.2;2. A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS;130
9.2.3;3. FORMAL MODELS;140
9.2.4;4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS;151
9.3;CHAPTER 7. COMPETITIVE BUREAUCRACY: CORRUPTION IN REGULATORY AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS;156
9.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;156
9.3.2;2. THE BASIC MODEL;158
9.3.3;3. SUPPLY AND DEMAND FUNCTIONS;159
9.3.4;4. THE CORRUPT MARKET;164
9.3.5;5. CONCLUSIONS;167
9.3.6;APPENDIX;169
9.4;CHAPTER 8. COMPETITIVE BUREAUCRACY: VAGUENESS, COERCION, AND MARKET STRUCTURE;172
9.4.1;1. INTRODUCTION;172
9.4.2;2. CHOOSING THOSE WHO QUALIFY;174
9.4.3;3. COERCIVE PROGRAMS;178
9.4.4;4. CUSTOMERS WITH MONOPOLY POWER;182
9.4.5;5. CONCLUSIONS;185
9.5;CHAPTER 9. BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE AND CORRUPTION;186
9.5.1;1. INTRODUCTION: FOUR MODELS OF BUREAUCRACY;186
9.5.2;2. THE FRAGMENTED AND SEQUENTIAL MODELS;189
9.5.3;3. THE HIERARCHICAL MODEL;192
9.5.4;4. CHOOSING THE LEAST CORRUPT FORM OF BUREAUCRACY;199
9.5.5;5. DISORGANIZED BUREAUCRACIES;202
9.5.6;6. CONCLUSIONS;205
9.6;CHAPTER 10. CORRUPTION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR;208
9.6.1;1. INTRODUCTION;208
9.6.2;2. PRIVATE FIRM ORGANIZATION AND CORRUPTION;210
9.6.3;3. THE CORRUPTION OF CORPORATE BOARDS AND TOP MANAGERS;216
9.6.4;4. MARKET FAILURE AS A CAUSE OF CORRUPTION;219
9.6.5;5. CONCLUSIONS: CORRUPT INCENTIVES IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS;226
10;Part 4: Conclusion;230
10.1;CHAPTER 11. CONCLUSIONS: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND MORALITY;232
10.1.1;1. CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY;232
10.1.2;2. LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION;239
10.1.3;3. MORALITY, CORRUPTION, AND ECONOMIC THEORY;249
11;BIBLIOGRAPHY;256
12;AUTHOR INDEX;268
13;SUBJECT INDEX;272