Cherry The Normativity of the Natural

Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing
1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-90-481-2301-8
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 16, 230 Seiten

Reihe: Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture

Western philosophy has long nurtured the hope to resolve moral controversies through reason; thereby to secure moral direction and human meaning without the need for a defining encounter with God or the transcendent. The expectation is for a moral rationality that is universal and able adequately to frame and guide the moral life. Moral and cultural unity was sought though philosophical reflection on human nature and the basic goods of a properly nurtured and virtuous life-that is, through appeal to what has come to be called the natural law. The natural law addresses permissible moral choice through objective understandings of human nature and human goods. Persons are obligated to act in ways that are compatible with creating and integrating the basic human goods into their lives and the lives of others. Such goods provide the basis for practical reasoning about virtuous choices and immediate reasons for action. The goal is the making of rational choices in the pursuit of a virtuous, flourishing, human life. Natural law theorists have argued extensively against human cloning, abortion, and same-gender marriage. Yet, whose assumptions regarding human nature should guide our understanding of the basic goods that mark the full flourishing human life? Moreover, why should nature, even human nature, be thought of as a moral boundary beyond which one must not trespass? Persons may wish actively to direct human evolution, utilizing the tools of both imagination and biotechnology. Perhaps nature is simply a challenge to be addressed, overcome, and set aside. This volume is a critical exploration of natural law theory.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Cherry, Mark J.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Acknowledgements;6
2;Contents;7
3;Contributors;9
4;The Normativity of the Natural: Can Philosophers Pull Morality Out of the Magic Hat of Human Nature?;11
4.1;1 Introduction;11
4.2;2 Thomistic Foundations: Natural Law Theory, Synderesis, and Practical Reason;13
4.3;3 Human Goods and Human Flourishing: Revitalizing a Fallen Moral Culture;16
4.4;4 The Malleability of Human Nature and the Morality of the Natural;17
4.5;5 Conclusion;19
4.6;Notes;21
4.7;Bibliography;22
5;Part I Thomistic Foundations: Natural Law Theory, Synderesis and Practical Reason;24
5.1;Human Nature and Its Limits;25
5.1.1;1 Our Animal Nature;26
5.1.2;2 Our Practical Identity;28
5.1.3;3 Human Nature and Enhancement;30
5.1.4;Notes;37
5.1.5;Bibliography;38
5.2;Synderesis, Law, and Virtue;40
5.2.1;1 Nature, Habit, and Virtue;41
5.2.2;2 The Seeds of Acquired Virtue;42
5.2.3;3 Natural Knowledge as the Source of Natural Desire;45
5.2.4;4 The Rule of Reason;47
5.2.5;5 Synderesis, Law, and Virtue;49
5.2.6;6 Natural Law and Virtue;50
5.2.7;Notes;51
5.2.8;Bibliography;51
5.3;Human Nature and Moral Goodness;52
5.3.1;1 Human Nature is Not Itself the Moral Criterion;52
5.3.2;2 Human Nature;53
5.3.3;3 Human Nature and Free Choice;54
5.3.4;4 Basic Practical Principles;56
5.3.5;5 From Practical Principles to the Basic Moral Principle;58
5.3.6;6 Human Nature and Divine Grace;59
5.3.7;Note;61
5.3.8;Bibliography;61
5.4;Natural Law for Teaching Ethics: An Essential Tool and Not a Seamless Web;62
5.4.1;1 Why Learn and Teach Natural Law Today?;62
5.4.2;2 Lee and Tollefsen on Natural Law;68
5.4.3;Notes;79
5.4.4;Bibliography;81
6;Part II Human Goods and Human Flourishing: Revitalizing a Fallen Moral Culture;82
6.1;Quid Ipse Sis Nosse Desisti;83
6.1.1;1 Scientific Rationalism;84
6.1.1.1;1.1 Scientific Rationalism: Human Nature in Dennettian and Boethian Perspective;86
6.1.2;2 Misologistic Nihilism;91
6.1.2.1;2.1 Misologistic Nihilism: BoethiusÌs Burden and ReasonÌs Recovery;91
6.1.2.2;2.2 Camus, Sartre, and Percy: Contemporary Heralds of Misologistic Nihilism;94
6.1.3;Notes;100
6.1.4;Bibliography;104
6.2;Preparation for the Cure;106
6.2.1;1 Introduction;106
6.2.2;2 Human Nature;107
6.2.3;3 More About "Something More";109
6.2.4;Bibliography;111
6.3;Diagnosing Cultural Progress and Decline;112
6.3.1;1 Introduction: Changing the Focus;112
6.3.2;2 Approximating a Normative Account of Historical Process;113
6.3.3;3 A Fourth Approximation;118
6.3.4;4 A Fifth Approximation;120
6.3.5;5 Promises Kept?;122
6.3.6;Notes;124
6.3.7;Bibliography;126
6.3.8;Appendix;127
7;Part III The Malleability of Human Nature;128
7.1;Reflections on Secular Foundationalism and Our Human Future;129
7.1.1;Notes;140
7.1.2;Bibliography;141
7.2;Nature as Second Nature: Plasticity and Habit;142
7.2.1;Notes;151
7.2.2;Bibliography;153
7.3;The Posthumanist Challenge to a Partly Naturalized Virtue Ethics;155
7.3.1;1 Partly Naturalized Virtue Ethics;156
7.3.2;2 From Transhumanist Enhancement to the Posthumanist Challenge;159
7.3.3;3 Potential Responses to the Posthumanist Challenge;165
7.3.4;4 The Need for a Political Theory of the Virtues: A Navigational Approach;167
7.3.5;Notes;172
7.3.6;Bibliography;172
8;Part IV The Challenge of Deriving an Ought from an Is;175
8.1;Can Moral Norms Be Derived from Nature? The Incompatibility of Natural Scientific Investigation and Moral Norm Generation;176
8.1.1;1 Can We Derive Moral Norms from Nature?;176
8.1.1.1;1.1 Can We Discover the Good?;177
8.1.1.2;1.2 Natural Science as ÏBest-BetÓ for Moral Norms;180
8.1.1.3;1.3 Open Question Argument Reconsidered;181
8.1.2;2 Can We Learn to Be Moral by Following NatureÌs Lead?;184
8.1.2.1;2.1 The Problem with Generating Moral Norms from Natural Examples;184
8.1.2.2;2.2 Assuming that What Is Natural Is for the Best Is a Misunderstanding of Biological Processes;185
8.1.2.3;2.3 Less than Entirely Scientific Moral Arguments from Nature;189
8.1.2.4;2.4 At a Minimum, Does Nature Present Ethical Boundaries?;193
8.1.3;3 Conclusion;193
8.1.4;Notes;194
8.1.5;Bibliography;196
8.2;Moral Acquaintances and Natural Facts in the Darwinian Age;198
8.2.1;1 Introduction;198
8.2.2;2 Ancient Origins of Natural Law: Function without a Deity;201
8.2.3;3 Utility Monsters and other Trivia;205
8.2.4;4 The Origin of the Ethical Species;205
8.2.5;5 Essentialism, Moral Acquaintances and Natural Facts;207
8.2.6;6 Moving from an Is to an Ought;208
8.2.7;7 The Importance of Contingent Facts;210
8.2.8;8 Conclusion;217
8.2.9;Notes;218
8.2.10;Bibliography;219
9;Index;221