Croley Regulation and Public Interests

The Possibility of Good Regulatory Government
Course Book
ISBN: 978-1-4008-2814-2
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 392 Seiten

Not since the 1960s have U.S. politicians, Republican or Democrat, campaigned on platforms defending big government, much less the use of regulation to help solve social ills. And since the late 1970s, "deregulation" has become perhaps the most ubiquitous political catchword of all. This book takes on the critics of government regulation. Providing the first major alternative to conventional arguments grounded in public choice theory, it demonstrates that regulatory government can, and on important occasions does, advance general interests.

Unlike previous accounts, Regulation and Public Interests takes agencies' decision-making rules rather than legislative incentives as a central determinant of regulatory outcomes. Drawing from both political science and law, Steven Croley argues that such rules, together with agencies' larger decision-making environments, enhance agency autonomy. Agency personnel inclined to undertake regulatory initiatives that generate large but diffuse benefits (while imposing smaller but more concentrated costs) can use decision-making rules to develop socially beneficial regulations even over the objections of Congress and influential interest groups. This book thus provides a qualified defense of regulatory government. Its illustrative case studies include the development of tobacco rulemaking by the Food and Drug Administration, ozone and particulate matter rules by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Forest Service's "roadless" policy for national forests, and regulatory initiatives by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Croley, Steven P.

Fachgebiete

• Rechtswissenschaften Öffentliches Recht Verwaltungsrecht Verwaltungspraxis

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction: An Uneasy Commitment to Regulatory Government 1

PART I: THE CYNICAL VIEW OF REGULATORY
GOVERNMENT, AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 7

Chapter One; The Basic Project 9

Chapter Two: The Cynical View of Regulation 14

Chapter Three: Is Regulatory Capture Inevitable? 26

Chapter Four: Alternative Visions of Regulatory Government 53

PART II: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY STATE 77

Chapter Five: Opening the Black Box: Regulatory Decisionmaking in Legal Context 81

Chapter Six: Regulatory Government as Administrative Government 102

Chapter Seven: Participation in Administrative Decisionmaking 118

Chapter Eight: The Administrative-Process Approach Expanded: A More Developed Picture 134

PART III: PUBLIC INTERESTED REGULATION 157

Chapter Nine: The Environmental Protection Agency's Ozone and Particulate Matter Rules 163

Chapter Ten: The Food and Drug Administration's Tobacco Initiative 180

Chapter Eleven: The Forest Service's Roadless Policy for National Forests 196

Chapter Twelve: Socially Beneficial Administrative Decisionmaking: Additional Evidence 213

PART IV: PUBLIC CHOICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 237

Chapter Thirteen: The Public Choice Theory Revisited 241

Chapter Fourteen: The Promise of an Administrative-Process Orientation 258

Chapter Fifteen: Regulatory Rents, Regulatory Failures, and Other Objections 284

Conclusion: The Regulatory State and Social Welfare 304

Notes 307

Index 365

Über Autor(innen)

Steven P. Croley is professor of law at the University of Michigan Law School. He earned a J.D. from Yale Law School and a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University.