Daniels Safety of Computer Control Systems 1990 (SAFECOMP'90)

Proceedings of the IFAC/EWICS/SARS Symposium Gatwick, UK, 30 October - 2 November 1990
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-9835-1
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 185 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: IFAC Symposia Series

The market for safe, secure and reliable computer systems is expanding continuously and these Proceedings provide an opportunity to review the growth during the last decade and identify skills and technologies required for continued development in the area. The papers cover the experiences gained from specifying, creating, operating, and licensing computers in safety, security and reliability related applications. There are reviews of guidelines and industrial applications, with a section covering methods and tools used in designing, documenting, analysing, testing and assessing systems dependent on the SAFECOMP factors.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Daniels, B. K.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Safety of Computer Control Systems 1990 (SAFECOMP'90): Safety, Security and Reliability Related Computers;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;10
5;PREFACE;8
6;Part 1: MATHEMATICAL FORMALISMS;14
6.1;Chapter 1. A FORMAL MODEL FOR SAFETY-CRITICAL COMPUTING SYSTEMS;14
6.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;14
6.1.2;2. DEVELOPMENT MODEL;15
6.1.3;3. SPECIFICATION MODEL;15
6.1.4;4. EXAMPLE SYSTEM;18
6.1.5;5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS;19
6.2;Chapter 2. FORMAL APPROACH TO FAULTS IN SAFETY RELATED APPLICATIONS;20
6.2.1;INTRODUCTION;20
6.2.2;HIERERCHICAL VERIFICATION;20
6.2.3;FORMALIZATION OF FAULTY BEHAVIOURS;23
6.2.4;EXAMPLE;23
6.2.5;CONCLUSIONS;25
6.2.6;REFERENCES;25
6.3;Chapter 3. PROVABLY CORRECT SAFETY CRITICAL SOFTWARE;26
6.3.1;1 Introduction;26
6.3.2;2 Requirements Capture;27
6.3.3;3 Program Specification;28
6.3.4;4 Program Development;29
6.3.5;5 The compiler;29
6.3.6;6 Program dependability;30
6.3.7;7 ProCoS and the draft 00-55;30
6.3.8;8 Summary;30
6.3.9;Acknowledgements;30
6.3.10;References;30
7;Part 2: CORRECTNESS;32
7.1;Chapter 4. ASPECTS OF PROVING COMPILER CORRECTNESS;32
7.1.1;1 Introduction;32
7.1.2;2 Syntax;32
7.1.3;3 Transition Rules for Simple;33
7.1.4;4 The Transition system for AL;33
7.1.5;5 Transition Rules for TAL;34
7.1.6;6 Block Structured Sequences;34
7.1.7;7 Wellformedness;35
7.1.8;8 Translating TAL into AL;35
7.1.9;9 Computing the Program Remainder;35
7.1.10;10 Moving the instruction pointer;35
7.1.11;11 The Equivalence Theorem;36
7.1.12;12 Conclusions;37
7.1.13;References;37
7.2;Chapter 5. A CONCEPT OF A COMPUTER SYSTEM FOR THE EXECUTION OF SAFETY CRITICAL LICENSABLE SOFTWARE PROGRAMMED IN A HIGH LEVEL LANGUAGE;38
7.2.1;INTRODUCTION;38
7.2.2;SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT FOR PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLERS;39
7.2.3;SEQUENTIAL FUNCTION CHARTS;39
7.2.4;THE SYSTEM CONCEPT;40
7.2.5;IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS;41
7.2.6;PROGRAMMING ENVIRONMENT;42
7.2.7;CONCLUSION;42
7.2.8;REFERENCES;42
7.3;Chapter 6. MODELING AND VERIFYING SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE IN PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC;44
7.3.1;I. BOOLEAN MODELLING OF SYSTEMS;44
7.3.2;II. A NEW METHOD FOR ANALYZING PROPOSITIONAL FORMULAS;45
7.3.4;CONCLUSION;49
7.3.5;REFERENCES;49
7.4;Chapter 7. LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A PROBABILISTIC THEORY OF SOFTWARE CORRECTNESS;50
7.4.1;INTRODUCTION;50
7.4.2;LOGICAL PROBABILITY;50
7.4.3;FOUNDATIONS OF SOFTWARE DEPENDABILITY;52
7.4.4;SOFTWARE REDUNDANCY;53
7.4.5;FAILURE PROBABILITY OF l-OUT-OF-2 SYSTEMS;53
7.4.6;PROBABILITY OF CORRECTNESS: REDUNDANT SYSTEMS;54
7.4.7;PROGRAMMING EXPERIMENTS AND URN MODELS;55
7.4.8;REFERENCES;55
8;Part 3: ISSUES OF SECURITY;56
8.1;Chapter 8. METHODS OF PROTECTION AGAINST COMPUTER VIRUSES;56
8.1.1;1 INTRODUCTION;56
8.1.2;2 DEFINITION OF A COMPUTER VIRUS;56
8.1.3;3 BASIC FUNCTIONAL BLOCKS OF A COMPUTER VIRUS;56
8.1.4;4 CLASSIFICATION OF COMPUTER VIRUSES;57
8.1.5;5 METHODS OF PROTECTION AGAINST VIRUSES;57
8.1.6;6 FIGHTING AGAINST VIRUSES UNDER PC DOS;57
8.1.7;7 VIRUS RESISTANCE AT THE OPERATING SYSTEM LEVEL;59
8.1.8;8 PASSIVE PROTECTION;59
8.1.9;9 ACTIVE PROTECTION;60
8.1.10;10 CONCLUSIONS;61
8.1.11;Acknowledgements;61
8.1.12;References;61
8.2;Chapter 9. THE NEED FOR A STANDARD METHOD FOR COMPUTER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS;62
8.2.1;INTRODUCTION;62
8.2.2;PROBLEMS WITH REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION;62
8.2.3;STANDARDS AND "CASELAW";64
8.2.4;A METHOD FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS;64
8.2.5;THE NEED FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSTS;65
8.2.6;SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS;65
8.2.7;REFERENCES;66
8.3;Chapter 10. THE TESTING OF REAL-TIME EMBEDDED SOFTWARE BY DYNAMIC ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES;68
8.3.1;INTRODUCTION;68
8.3.2;DYNAMIC ANALYSIS;68
8.3.3;EMBEDDED SYSTEMS : PROBLEM AREAS AND SOLUTIONS;69
8.3.4;USEFUL TOOLS;71
8.3.5;CONCLUSION;71
8.3.6;REFERENCES;71
8.4;Chapter 11. THE ELEKTRA TESTBED: ARCHITECTURE OF A REAL-TIME TEST ENVIRONMENT FOR HIGH SAFETY AND RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS;72
8.4.1;THE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE OF "ELEKTRA";72
8.4.2;TESTING IN THE CONTEXT OF "DEPENDABILITY";72
8.4.3;THE ELEKTRA TEST STRATEGY AND ENVIRONMENT;74
8.4.4;THE TEST TOOL "ACHILLES";74
8.4.5;THE TEST TOOL PAMIR;75
8.4.6;CONCLUSIONS;76
8.4.7;REFERENCES;77
9;Part 4: SOFTWARE METRICS;80
9.1;Chapter 12. SOFTWARE COVERAGE METRICS AND OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY;80
9.1.1;INTRODUCTION;80
9.1.2;RELATION BETWEEN COVERAGE METRICS AND RELIABILITY;80
9.1.3;FITTING THE MODEL;80
9.1.4;AN EXAMPLE;81
9.1.5;CONCLUSION;82
9.1.6;ACKNOWLEDGEMENT;82
9.1.7;REFERENCES;82
9.2;Chapter 13. QUALITY MEASUREMENT OF MISSION CRITICAL SYSTEMS;84
9.2.1;INTRODUCTION;84
9.2.2;NOTIONS OF SOFTWARE QUALITY;85
9.2.3;DEFINITION OF A QUALITY MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK;85
9.2.4;INSTALLATION AND OPERATION OF THE MODEL;86
9.2.5;CONCLUSIONS;88
9.2.6;REFERENCES;89
10;Part 5: RELIABILITY AND DEPENDABILITY;90
10.1;Chapter 14. SOFTWARE RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT „ THE NEED FOR PROCESS VISIBILITY;90
10.1.1;INTRODUCTION;90
10.1.2;ACHIEVABILITY OF TARGETS;91
10.1.3;CREDIBILITY OF PLAN;92
10.1.4;QUALITY OF DEVELOPMENT;92
10.1.5;PRODUCT QUALITY;93
10.1.6;PRODUCT RELIABILITY;94
10.1.7;CONCLUSIONS;94
10.1.8;REFERENCES;95
10.2;Chapter 15. ASSESSING SOFTWARE RELIABILITY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT;96
10.2.1;THE BASIC MODEL;96
10.2.2;EXTENSIONS OF THE SIMPLE MODELS;96
10.2.3;INCLUSION OF THE SYSTEM HISTORY;96
10.2.4;HOW CAN WE USE THE RESULTS;98
10.2.5;MANAGEMENT CONCERNS;100
10.2.6;CONCLUSION;100
10.2.7;REFERENCES;101
10.3;Chapter 16. DEPENDABILITY EVALUATION OF WATCHDOG PROCESSORS;102
10.3.1;INTRODUCTION;102
10.3.2;WATCHDOG PROCESSORS OVERVIEW;102
10.3.3;SYSTEMS FOR COMPARISON;102
10.3.4;WATCHDOG PROCESOR SYSTEM MODEL;104
10.3.5;COMPARISONS AND RESULTS;105
10.3.6;CONCLUSIONS;106
10.3.7;REFERENCES;107
11;Part 6: ASSESSMENT AND VALIDATION;108
11.1;Chapter 17. PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN THE ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING SAFETY CRITICAL COMPUTER BASED SYSTEMS;108
11.1.1;INTRODUCTION;108
11.1.2;ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS;108
11.1.3;TECHNIQUES USED FOR ASSESSMENT;109
11.1.4;TYPICAL ASSESSMENT FINDINGS;110
11.1.5;PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES FROM ASSESSMENTS;110
11.1.6;DESIGN FOR ASSESSMENT;111
11.1.7;THE MEANING OF "PASS";111
11.1.8;CONCLUSIONS;111
11.1.9;REFERENCES;111
11.2;Chapter 18. METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CRITICS DURING SAFETY VALIDATION;112
11.2.1;INTRODUCTION;112
11.2.2;THE SAFETY VALIDATION REPORT;112
11.2.3;HARDWARE SAFETY VALIDATION;113
11.2.4;SOFTWARE SAFETY VALIDATION;114
11.2.5;VALIDATION OF CHANGED SYSTEMS AND MAINTAINANCE;115
11.2.6;STANDARIZATION AND TERMS;115
11.2.7;CONCLUSION;116
11.2.8;REFERENCES;116
12;Part 7: STATIC ANALYSIS AND SYMBOLIC EXECUTION;118
12.1;Chapter 19. SYMBAD: A SYMBOLIC EXECUTOR OF SEQUENTIAL ADA PROGRAMS;118
12.1.1;1. Introduction;118
12.1.2;2. SYMBAD;119
12.1.3;3. Description o f SYMBAD environment;121
12.1.4;4. Conclusion;123
12.1.5;5. References;124
12.2;Chapter 20. TOOLS AND METHODOLOGIES FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE;126
12.2.1;INTRODUCTION;126
12.2.2;REQUIREMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS;127
12.2.3;RESULTS OF TOOLS;128
12.2.4;EXPERIENCES IN THE APPLICATION OF THE TOOLS;129
12.2.5;CONCLUSION;130
12.2.6;REFERENCES;130
12.3;Chapter 21. A COMPARISON OF STATIC AND DYNAMIC CONFORMANCE ANALYSES;132
12.3.1;Introduction;132
12.3.2;Benefits of Conformance Analysis;132
12.3.3;Static Conformance Analysis;133
12.3.4;Dynamic Conformance Analysis;134
12.3.5;Theoretical Comparison;135
12.3.6;Experimental Comparison;136
12.3.7;Conclusions;136
12.3.8;References;137
13;Part 8: SAFE OPERATION;138
13.1;Chapter 22. COMPUTER BASED TRAINING FOR CONTINGENCY DECISIONS;138
13.1.1;INTRODUCTION;138
13.1.2;THE SIMLAB COMPUTER PROGRAMS;139
13.1.3;OFFICIAL REQUIREMENTS, RULES AND REGULATIONS;139
13.1.4;ESTIMATION OF EVACUATION PERIOD;139
13.1.5;BASIC MODEL PARAMETERS;140
13.1.6;SELECTION OF BASIC PARAMETER VALUES;140
13.1.7;PERSONNEL TRACKING;140
13.1.8;LIFEBOAT EVACUATION;141
13.1.9;HELICOPTER EVACUATION;141
13.1.10;OFFSHORE RESCUE;141
13.1.11;SIMLAB APPLICATION;141
13.1.12;THE RESCUE SIMULATION;142
13.1.13;CONCLUSIONS;142
13.1.14;REFERENCES;143
13.2;Chapter 23. QUALITATIVE KNOWLEDGE IN A DIAGNOSTIC EXPERT SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY;144
13.2.1;INTRODUCTION;144
13.2.2;THE REAL - WORLD PROBLEM : OVERVIEW OF THE EFWS;144
13.2.3;THE EXPERTSYSTEM;145
13.2.4;KNOWLEDGE BASE INFORMATION;146
13.2.5;CONCLUSIONS;147
13.2.6;REFERENCES;147
14;Part 9: CASE STUDIES IN INDUSTRY PRACTICE;148
14.1;Chapter 24. MANAGEMENT OF COMPUTER-AIDED CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN FROM CONCEPT TO FLIGHT TEST;148
14.1.1;INTRODUCTION;148
14.1.2;OUTLINE OF THE LIFE CYCLE;149
14.1.3;TOOLS AND FACILITIES FOR THE LIFE CYCLE;151
14.1.4;CONCLUSIONS;152
14.1.5;REFERENCES;153
14.2;Chapter 25. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF COMPUTER BASED SAFETY SYSTEMS FOR OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION PLATFORMS FROM THE SIXTIES TO THE PRESENT DAY;158
14.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;158
14.2.2;2. SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS FOR OFFSHORE PLATFORMS;158
14.2.3;3. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION;159
14.2.4;4. OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES;159
14.2.5;5. EARLY MICRO SYSTEM;160
14.2.6;6. EARLY TRIPLE REDUNDANT MICRO SYSTEM;160
14.2.7;7. DUAL REDUNDANT PLC;160
14.2.8;8. SAFETY PLUS AVAILABILITY;161
14.2.9;9. CONCLUSION;161
14.3;Chapter 26. CONTROLLING SOFTWARE PRODUCTION, FROM A CUSTOMER POINT OF VIEW;164
14.3.1;A CONTEXT TO PRODUCE AND TO CONTROL SOFTWARE.;164
14.3.2;THE STATE OF THE INDUSTRY.;164
14.3.3;BEFORE CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT;165
14.3.4;CONTROLLING THE REQUIREMENTS: THE SPECIFICATION PHASE;166
14.3.5;GOING ON THE PROJECT;167
14.3.6;CONCLUSION;168
14.4;Chapter 27. THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL FACTORS ON ACCEPTABLE LEVELS OF SAFETY INTEGRITY;170
14.4.1;INTRODUCTION;170
14.4.2;SUBJECTIVITY;170
14.4.3;SOFTWARE SAFETY;171
14.4.4;COMBINATION OF RISK, CONSEQUENCE AND BENEFIT;171
14.4.5;POSSIBLE APPROACH;171
14.4.6;THE EFFECT OF CONSIDERING BENEFIT;172
14.4.7;SOCIAL FACTORS;172
14.4.8;CONCLUSION;173
14.4.9;WORST CATASTROPHES;173
14.4.10;REFERENCES;173
15;Part 10: KEYNOTE ADDRESS;176
15.1;Chapter 28. SKILLS AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF SAFETY CRITICAL SYSTEMS;176
15.1.1;1. Introduction;176
15.1.2;2. Technologies;178
15.1.3;3. Skills;182
15.1.4;4. Conclusions;184
15.1.5;5. References;184
16;AUTHOR INDEX;186
17;KEYWORD INDEX;188
18;SYMPOSIA VOLUMES;190
19;WORKSHOP VOLUMES;191