Dietrich Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons

Essays on the Intentionality of Machines
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-1765-9
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 376 Seiten, Web PDF

Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons: Essays on the Intentionality of Machines explains how computations are meaningful and how computers can be cognitive agents like humans. This book focuses on the concept that cognition is computation. Organized into four parts encompassing 13 chapters, this book begins with an overview of the analogy between intentionality and phlogiston, the 17th-century principle of burning. This text then examines the objection to computationalism that it cannot prevent arbitrary attributions of content to the various data structures and representations involved in a computational process. Other chapters consider that the notion of original intentionality is incoherent. This book argues as well that the only way to build an intelligent machine is to build a neural network. The final chapter claims that an entire theoretical framework in cognitive psychology is incompatible with the view that human brains are computers of some sort. This book is a valuable resource for cognitive scientists.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Dietrich, Eric

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons: Essays on the Intentionality of Machines;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;8
5;Dedication;6
6;Contributors;10
7;Preface;12
8;Part I: Introduction;14
8.1;Chapter 1. Thinking Computers and The Problem of Intentionality;16
8.1.1;1. THE IMPORTANCE OF PHILOSOPHY;16
8.1.2;2. DEFINING OUR TERMS;18
8.1.3;3. THE PROBLEM OF INTENTIONALITY AND THE CHINESE ROOM;33
8.1.4;4. SYSTEMS, ROBOTS, AND OTHER REPLIES;36
8.1.5;5. THE CHAPTERS;41
8.1.6;6. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;45
8.1.7;7. REFERENCES;45
9;Part II: Intentionality And Its Discontents;48
9.1;Chapter 2. Intentionality Is Phlogiston;50
9.1.1;1. INTENTIONALITY;51
9.1.2;2. PHLOGISTON;61
9.1.3;3. IS INTENTIONALITY PHLOGISTON?;69
9.1.4;4. CONCLUSIONS;75
9.1.5;5. POSTSCRIPT;77
9.1.6;6. NOTES;78
9.1.7;7. REFERENCES;80
9.2;Chapter 3. Real Machines and Virtual Intentionality;84
9.2.1;1. MECHANISTIC DESCRIPTIONS AND COMPUTATIONAL EXPLANATIONS;85
9.2.2;2. INTERPRETING INDIVIDUAL STATES;90
9.2.3;3. REAL SYSTEMS AND VIRTUAL MACHINES;95
9.2.4;4. WHAT KINDS OF SYSTEMS ARE INTENTIONAL?;97
9.2.5;5. METHODOLOGY;99
9.2.6;6. NOTES;100
9.2.7;7. REFERENCES;101
9.3;Chapter 4. The Myth of Original Intentionality;104
9.3.1;REFERENCES;119
9.4;Chapter 5. Computationalism;122
9.4.1;1. INTRODUCTION;122
9.4.2;2. THE NATURE OF COMPUTATIONALISM;124
9.4.3;3. INTENTIONALITY;132
9.4.4;4. MAKING DECISIONS;139
9.4.5;5. CONCLUSION;143
9.4.6;6. NOTES;144
9.4.7;7. REFERENCES;147
10;Part III: The Natural Intentionality of Machines;150
10.1;Chapter 6. The Causal Powers of CPUs;152
10.1.1;1. HU'S IN THERE!? WHAT THE CHINESE ROOM ARGUMENT DOESN'T SHOW;153
10.1.2;2. SYNTAX, SEMANTICS, AND CAUSAL POWERS;156
10.1.3;3. MEANING;159
10.1.4;4. CONSCIOUSNESS;163
10.1.5;5. SENSE AND SENTIENCE;165
10.1.6;6. CONCLUSION;168
10.1.7;7. REFERENCES;169
10.2;Chapter 7. Could a Machine Think?;170
10.2.1;FURTHER READING;184
10.3;Chapter 8. Intentionality and Computationalism;186
10.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;186
10.3.2;2. SEARLE' S ARGUMENTS AND REBUTTALS;188
10.3.3;3. HARNAD'S ARGUMENTS AND REBUTTALS;198
10.3.4;4. MIND, LIFE, MATTER, AND COMPUTATIONALISM;202
10.3.5;5. CONCLUSIONS;206
10.3.6;6. REFERENCES;207
10.4;Chapter 9. Putting One's Foot in One's Head—Part II: How?;210
10.4.1;1. INTRODUCTION;210
10.4.2;2. SOME RELATED IDEAS;213
10.4.3;3. BODY REFERENCE;218
10.4.4;4. BEYOND THE BODY;222
10.4.5;5. ERROR AND RECOVERY;226
10.4.6;6. FUNCTIONAL ROLE SEMANTICS VERSUS IREF;228
10.4.7;7. REFLECTION AND GEOMETRIC SEMANTICS: A SUMMARY;230
10.4.8;8. VIRTUAL REALITY MACHINES;232
10.4.9;9. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;233
10.4.10;10. NOTES;234
10.4.11;11. REFERENCES;236
10.5;Chapter 10. Syntactic Semantics;238
10.5.1;1. INTRODUCTION;239
10.5.2;2. CAN A COMPUTER UNDERSTAND NATURAL LANGUAGE?;239
10.5.3;3. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO "UNDERSTAND NATURAL LANGUAGE55?;241
10.5.4;4. WOULD A COMPUTER "REALLY" UNDERSTAND?;267
10.5.5;5. DOES THE COMPUTER UNDERSTAND THAT IT UNDERSTANDS?;270
10.5.6;6. CONCLUSION;272
10.5.7;7. APPENDIX 1: A "CONVERSATION" WITH CASSIE;273
10.5.8;8. APPENDIX 2: DESCRIBING A NODE VIA ITS NETWORK LOCUS;276
10.5.9;9. NOTES;277
10.5.10;10. REFERENCES;280
11;Part IV: Intentionality and Beyond;288
11.1;Chapter 11. Am I a Computer?;290
11.1.1;1. ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT ( 1 );293
11.1.2;2. ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT (2 A);300
11.1.3;3. ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT (2 B);304
11.1.4;4. ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT (2 C);312
11.1.5;5. ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT (3);313
11.1.6;6. CONCLUSION;316
11.1.7;7. REFERENCES;317
11.2;Chapter 12. Using Representation to Explain;320
11.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;320
11.2.2;2. WHAT DOES REPRESENTATION EXPLAIN?;321
11.2.3;3. HOW DOES REPRESENTATION EXPLAIN?;323
11.2.4;4. REPRESENTATION AND UNIQUENESS OF CONTENT;339
11.2.5;5. CONCLUSION;339
11.2.6;6. NOTES;340
11.2.7;7. REFERENCES;341
11.3;Chapter 13. Human Reasoning about Artificial Intelligence;344
11.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;344
11.3.2;2. OBJECTIONS ARISING FROM MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF THE NATURE OF COMPUTATION AND GÖDEL'S THEOREM;346
11.3.3;3. APPEALS TO INTUITION PUMPS: RYCHLAK's ROOM;350
11.3.4;4. ALLEGED INCOMPATIBILITY WITH A FAVORED PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF HUMAN COGNITION;352
11.3.5;5. DISCUSSION: AI AND PSYCHOLOGY;358
11.3.6;6. CODA;363
11.3.7;7. REFERENCES;364
12;Author Index;368
13;Subject Index;372