Cuts and Clouds

Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic
1. Auflage 2010
ISBN: 978-0-19-957038-6
Verlag: Oxford University Press

Buch, Englisch, 600 Seiten, Format (B × H): 163 mm x 241 mm, Gewicht: 1039 g

Original essays by some of the world's leading experts
Vagueness is among the hottest topics in philosophy today
This will be the prime reference point for the state of the art in this area of philosophy

Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is - a feature of the way we represent reality in language, or rather a feature of reality itself? May even relations like identity or parthood be affected by vagueness? Sorites arguments suggest that vague terms are either inconsistent or have a sharp boundary. The account we give of such paradoxes plays a pivotal role for our understanding of natural languages. If our reasoning involves any vague concepts, is it safe from contradiction? Do vague concepts really lack any sharp boundary? If not, why are we reluctant to accept the existence of any sharp boundary for them? And what rules of inference can we validly apply, if we reason in vague terms? Cuts and Clouds presents the latest work towards a clearer understanding of these old puzzles about the nature and logic of vagueness. The collection offers a stimulating series of original essays on these and related issues by some of the world's leading experts.

Zielgruppe

Advanced students and scholars of philosophy

Autoren/Hrsg.

Dietz, Richard

Moruzzi, Sebastiano

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften Sprachphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sprachphilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi: Introduction
I. The Nature of Vagueness
Part 1. What is Vagueness?
1: Agustin Rayo: A Metasemantic Account of Vagueness
2: Scott Soames: The Possibility of Partial Definition
3: Matti Eklund: Vagueness and Second-Level Indeterminacy
4: Brian Weatherson: Vagueness as Indeterminacy
5: Dorothy Edgington: Sorensen on Vagueness and Contradiction
Part 2. Vagueness in Reality
6: Stephen Schiffer: Vague Properties
7: Nathan Salmon: Vagaries about Vagueness
8: Stewart Shapiro: Vagueness, Metaphysics, and Objectivity
Part 3. Tolerance and Paradox
9: Sven Rosenkranz: Agnosticism and Vagueness
10: Jc Beall: Vague Intensions: A Modest Marriage Proposal
11: Hartry Field: This Magic Moment: Horwich on the Boundary of Vague Terms
12: Leon Horsten: Perceptual Indiscriminability and the Concept of a Color Shade
13: Mario Gómez-Torrente: The Sorites, Linguistic Preconceptions, and the Dual Picture of Vagueness
14: Peter Pagin: Vagueness and Central Gaps
Part 4. Vagueness in Context
15: Jonas Åkerman & Patrick Greenough: Hold the Context Fixed - Vagueness Still Remains
16: Andrea Iacona: Saying More (or Less) Than One Thing
17: Max Kölbel: Vagueness as Semantic
18: Dan López De Sa: How to Respond to Borderline Cases
II. The Logic of Vagueness
Part 5. Supervaluationism
19: Manuel García-Carpintero: Supervaluationism and the Report of Vague Contents
20: Rosanna Keefe: Supervaluationism, Indirect Speech Reports, and Demonstratives
21: Delia Graff Fara: Scope Confusions and Unsatisfiable Disjuncts: Two Problems for Supervaluationism
Part 6. Paraconsistent logics
22: Dominic Hyde: The Prospects of a Paraconsistent Response to Vagueness
23: Graham Priest: Non-Transitive Identity
Part 7. Many-Valued Logics
24: Graeme Forbes: Identity and the Facts of the Matter
25: John MacFarlane: Fuzzy Epistemicism
26: Mark Richard: Indeterminacy and Truth Value Gaps
27: Peter Simons: Supernumeration: Vagueness and Numbers
28: Nicholas J. J. Smith: Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value
Part 8. Higher-Order Vagueness
29: Diana Raffman: Demoting Higher-Order Vagueness
30: Crispin Wright: The Illusion of Higher-Order Vagueness
31: Cian Dorr: Iterating Definiteness

Über Autor(innen)

Edited by Richard Dietz, University of Leuven and University of St Andrews, and Sebastiano Moruzzi, University of Bologna and University of St Andrews

Contributors:
Jonas Åkerman: Stockholm University,
Jc Beall: University of Connecticut,
Richard Dietz: University of Leuven and University of St Andrews,
Cian Dorr: University of Oxford,
Dorothy Edgington: University of Oxford and Birkbeck College,
Matti Eklund: Cornell University,
Delia Graff Fara: Princeton University,
Hartry Field: New York University,
Graeme Forbes: University of Colorado at Boulder,
Manuel García-Carpintero: University of Barcelona
Mario Gómez-Torrente: Institute of Philosophical Research, UNAM,
Patrick Greenough: University of St Andrews,
Leon Horsten: University of Bristol and University of Leuven,
Dominic Hyde: University of Queensland,
Andrea Iacona: L'Aquila University,
Rosanna Keefe: University of Sheffield,
Max Kölbel: University of Birmingham and University of Barcelona,
Dan López De Sa: University of Barcelona and University of St Andrews,
John MacFarlane: University of California, Berkeley,
Sebastiano Moruzzi: University of Bologna and University of St Andrews,
Peter Pagin: Stockholm University,
Graham Priest: CUNY, University of Wellington, and University of St Andrews,
Diana Raffman: University of Toronto,
Agustín Rayo: Massachusetts Institute of Technology and University of St Andrews,
Mark Richard: Tufts University,
Sven Rosenkranz: University of Barcelona and University of St Andrews,
Nathan Salmon: University of California, Santa Barbara,
Stephen Schiffer: New York University,
Stewart Shapiro: Ohio State University and University of St Andrews,
Peter Simons: Trinity College Dublin,
Nicholas J. J. Smith: University of Sydney,
Scott Soames: University of Southern California,
Brian Weatherson: Rutgers University and University of St Andrews,
Crispin Wright: New York University and University of St Andrews