Elbra Governing African Gold Mining

Private Governance and the Resource Curse
1. Auflage 2016
ISBN: 978-1-137-56354-5
Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 244 Seiten

Reihe: International Political Economy Series

This book takes a fresh approach to the puzzle of sub-Saharan Africa's resource curse. Moving beyond current scholarship's state-centric approach, it presents cutting-edge evidence gathered through interviews with mining company executives and industry representatives to demonstrate that firms are actively controlling the regulation of the gold mining sector. It shows how large mining firms with significant private authority in South Africa, Ghana and Tanzania are able to engender rules and regulations that are acknowledged by other actors, and in some cases even adopted by the state. In doing so, it establishes that firms are co-governing Africa's gold mining sector. By exploring the implications for resource-cursed states, this significant work argues that firm-led regulation can improve governance, but that many of these initiatives fail to address country/mine specific issues where there remains a role for the state in ensuring the benefits of mining flow to local communities. It will appeal to economists, political scientists, and policy-makers and practitioners working in the field of mining and extractives.


Ainsley Elbra is a Sessional Academic at the University of Sydney, Australia. Prior to commencing her academic career she was a corporate banker with one of Australia's largest financial institutions.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Elbra, Ainsley

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface and Acknowledgements;7
2;Contents;9
3;List of Abbreviations;10
4;List of Figures;12
5;List of Tables;13
6;Chapter 1: Introduction;14
6.1;The Resource Curse Theory;17
6.2;SSA’s Gold Curse;18
6.2.1;The Choice of Countries;20
6.2.1.1; Ghana;21
6.2.1.2; South Africa;23
6.2.1.3; Tanzania;26
6.3;A Growing Role for the Private Sector;28
6.4;Research Questions and Approach;33
6.4.1;Institutionalist Perspectives;34
6.5;Book Outline;39
6.6;Conclusion;41
6.7;Notes;42
6.8;References;42
7;Chapter 2: Theoretical Explanations for Firm-Led Governance;47
7.1;Introduction;47
7.2;Defining the Resource Curse;49
7.2.1;Dutch Disease;50
7.2.2;The Impacts of Volatility;51
7.2.3;The Rentier State;52
7.2.4;Is the Resource Curse a Deterministic Phenomenon?;56
7.3;Globalisation: Towards a New Understanding of Governance;58
7.4;Private Authority and Private Governance;63
7.5;The Role of Firms in Emerging Norms;66
7.6;A New Framework for Analysis;67
7.7; Conclusion;70
7.8;Notes;71
7.9;References;72
8;Chapter 3: A History of Gold Mining in South Africa, Ghana and Tanzania;78
8.1;Introduction;78
8.2;The Relevance of Gold Mining;80
8.3;Ghana;83
8.3.1;Ghanaian Gold Mining in the Twenty-First Century;88
8.4;South Africa;92
8.4.1;The Contemporary Structure of South Africa’s Mining Industry;96
8.5;Tanzania;99
8.5.1;Growing Dissatisfaction with Contemporary Tanzanian Mining;103
8.6;Conclusion;107
8.7;Notes;110
8.8;References;110
9;Chapter 4: Private Governance in the Gold Mining Sector;115
9.1;Introduction;115
9.2;Why Do Firms Develop Private Governance Initiatives?;116
9.3;The Emergence of Mining Private Governance Initiatives;120
9.4;Three Tiers of Private Governance;123
9.4.1;Self-Regulation by Firms;126
9.4.2;Cross-Industry Bodies;127
9.4.2.1; World Gold Council;127
9.4.2.2; International Council on Mining and Metals;128
9.4.2.3; Chamber of Mines;130
9.4.3;Public Private Partnerships/Multistakeholder Initiatives;131
9.4.3.1; Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative;132
9.4.3.2; United Nations Global Compact;135
9.4.3.3; Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights;138
9.4.3.4; Global Reporting Initiative;139
9.4.3.5; International Organisation for Standardisation—14000 Family of Standards;140
9.5; Conclusion;142
9.6;Note;143
9.7;References;143
10;Chapter 5: Firms’ Rationales: Public Reporting;148
10.1;Profitability;169
10.2;Response to Tougher Regulatory Environment;170
10.3;Minimise Risk;171
10.4;Obtaining/Maintaining a Social License to Operate;172
10.5;Normative Factors in Detail;173
10.5.1;Obligation to Mining Community;174
10.5.2;Desire for Enhanced Transparency;175
10.5.3;Commitment to Best Practice;176
10.5.4;Meeting Stakeholder Expectations;176
10.6;Conclusions;178
10.7;Notes;179
10.8;References;180
11;Chapter 6: The Discursive Power of Firms;184
11.1;Introduction;184
11.2;Three Faces of Power;186
11.3;Interviews;189
11.3.1;Instrumental Power;191
11.3.2;Structural Power;194
11.3.3;Discursive Power;198
11.4; Conclusion;206
11.5;Notes;208
11.6;References;208
12;Chapter 7: Private Governance as a Solution to the Resource Curse;210
12.1;Empirical Findings;211
12.1.1;Ghana;211
12.1.2;South Africa;213
12.1.3;Tanzania;214
12.1.4;Findings in Respect of Firms;216
12.2;What Does This Tell Us About Private Governance as a Solution to the Resource Curse?;221
12.3;Future Research Questions;224
12.4;Conclusion;227
12.5;References;228
13;Appendix A: Millennium Development Goals;229
14; Appendix B: Coding Rules;232
14.1;Strategic Codes;233
14.2;Normative Codes;233
15; Appendix C: Interview Questions;235
15.1;Version 1;235
15.2;Version 2;237
16;Index;240