E-Book, Englisch, 682 Seiten
Fischer Rent-Seeking, Institutions and Reforms in Africa
1. Auflage 2007
ISBN: 978-0-387-33773-9
Verlag: Springer
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
Theory and Empirical Evidence for Tanzania
E-Book, Englisch, 682 Seiten
ISBN: 978-0-387-33773-9
Verlag: Springer
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
This volume identifies rent-seeking behavior as a primary cause of poor economic performance in many places, particulary Africa. The book presents a detailed empirical study of rent-seeking within the civil service, parastatal sector, and business community in Tanzania. It quantifies and evaluates the rent-seeking behavior of more than 300 parastatal companies and the resulting impact on society. The conclusions on reform strategies are applicable to counties within and outside Africa.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Contents;5
2;List of Figures;9
3;List of Tables;10
4;Foreword;14
5;Preface;15
6;Acknowledgements;16
7;Abbreviations and Acronyms;18
8;Guide for the Quick Reader;19
9;1 Introduction;20
9.1;1.1 Background, Objectives and Scope of the Study;20
9.2;1.2 Comments to the Reader and Overview of Chapters;30
10;Part I Why Is Rent-Seeking Relevant for Developing Countries and Their Reforms?;37
10.1;2 What Is Rent-Seeking?;38
10.1.1;2.1 Defining Rent-Seeking — A Matter of Opinion?;38
10.1.2;2.2 Rent-Seeking in LDCs;51
10.2;3 Evaluating Rents, Rent-Seeking Investments and Rent-Seeking Costs;77
10.2.1;3.1 Rents, Competition, Non-Rival Settings and the Concept of Dissipation;78
10.2.2;3.2 Factors that Determine Dissipation;91
10.2.3;3.3 Rent-Seeking and the Costs for Society;139
10.3;4 Addressing Fundamentals: Explaining the Motivation for and Success of Rent- Seeking Behaviour and Policies;163
10.3.1;4.1 Individual Decision-Making: Utility-Maximising, Incomplete Markets and Informal Constraints;164
10.3.2;4.2 Interest Groups, Collective Action and Rent-Seeking;197
10.3.3;4.3 Rent-Seeking and Political Markets;212
10.4;5 Reforms, Rent-Seeking and Rent- Seeking Opposition;260
10.4.1;5.1 Rent-Seeking in the Run-up to Reforms;261
10.4.2;5.2 Adopting and Implementing Reforms;280
11;Part II Rent-Seeking: Empirical Evidence for Tanzania;305
11.1;6 From Socialist Ideology to Rent-Seeking Reality;306
11.1.1;6.1 Preliminary Comments on How to Define and Observe Rents in Tanzania;306
11.1.2;6.2 Economic Policies Prior to 1986 and the Country's Development up to 2000;309
11.2;7 Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment in Tanzania: A Rent-Seeking Approach to Explain Reform Records;327
11.2.1;7.1 Repeated Failures in Eliminating Macro Imbalances;329
11.2.2;7.2 Systematic Delays in Reducing Protectionism and Other State Interventions in Markets;364
11.2.3;7.3 Slow Progress in Institutional Reforms: Poor Public Service Delivery;400
11.3;8 Where Rent-Seekers Seek Rents: Parastatals—Hardliners in a Rent- Seeking Economy;434
11.3.1;8.1 Methodology, Problems and Indicative Rent-Seeking Evidence;436
11.3.2;8.2 Soft Budget Constraints: Parastatal Support and Overt Inefficiency;482
11.4;9 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations;542
11.4.1;9.1 Understanding Rents and Rent-Seeking Resistance;546
11.4.2;9.2 Rent-Seeking and the Role of Donors;570
11.4.3;9.3 Outlook;584
12;Appendix A: Extract of Warioba Report;585
13;Appendix B: Data on Parastatal Characteristics;591
14;Appendix C: Data on Parastatal Support;626
15;References;640
16;Author Index;664
17;Subject Index;670
