Frey Safety of Computer Control Systems 1992 (SAFECOMP' 92)

Computer Systems in Safety-Critical Applications
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-9736-1
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 321 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: IFAC Symposia Series

SAFECOMP '92 advances the state-of-the-art, reviews experiences of the past years, considers the guidance now available and identifies the skills, methods, tools and techniques required for the safety of computer control systems.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Frey, H. H.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Safety of Computer Control Systems 1992 (SAFECOMP'92): Computer Systems in Safety-critical Applications;2
3;Copyright Page;3
4;Table of Contents;8
5;Preface;6
6;CHAPTER 1. A CASE STUDY IN THE ANALYSIS OF SAFETY REQUIREMENTS;12
6.1;INTRODUCTION;12
6.2;BACKGROUND;12
6.3;REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS;13
6.4;SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS;13
6.5;A MODEL OF SLOW-SCAN;15
6.6;CHECKING SAFETY PROPERTIES;16
6.7;CONCLUSIONS;17
6.8;REFERENCES;17
7;Chapter 2. Computer-Aided Specification and Verification of Process Control;18
7.1;Abstract;18
7.2;1 Formal Development Process;19
7.3;2 An Example and its FormalRequirements;20
7.4;3 Design Specification, Verification,and Testing;21
7.5;4 Program Verification;22
7.6;5 Conclusion;23
7.7;References;23
8;Chapter 3. The Redundancy Specification in Configuration Languages;24
8.1;INTRODUCTION;24
8.2;THE CONHGURATION LANGUAGES;25
8.3;SOFTWARE FAULT-TOLERANCE;26
8.4;THE SPECIFICATION OF REDUNDANT STRUCTURES;27
8.5;REDUNDANCY SPECIFICATION IN CONIC;28
8.6;CONCLUSION;29
8.7;REFERENCES;29
9;Chapter 4. Specifying, Designing and Rapid Prototyping Computer Systemswith Structured Petri Nets;30
9.1;1. The Development of Real-Time Systems;30
9.2;2. Using Petri Nets in Software Engineering;31
9.3;3. Structured Petri Nets;31
9.4;4. Summary;34
9.5;5. Acknowledgements;34
9.6;Bibliography;34
10;CHAPTER 5. A SAFETY SYSTEM FOR CLOSE INTERACTION BETWEEN MAN AND ROBOT;36
10.1;INTRODUCTION;36
10.2;THE HUMAN LOCALIZATIONSYSTEM;37
10.3;THE RUNAWAY PROTECTIONSYSTEM;38
10.4;CONCLUSION;40
10.5;ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS;40
10.6;REFERENCES;40
11;CHAPTER 6. A SIMPLE STRONGLY-FAIL-SAFE CIRCUITUSED AS BASIC CELLFOR DESIGNING SAFETY ARCHITECTURES;42
11.1;1- INTRODUCTION;42
11.2;2- FAIL-SAFE CIRCUITS;42
11.3;3 - DESIGN OF A "STRONGLY-FAIL SAFE"BASIC CELL;43
11.4;4- A STRONGLY-FAIL-SAFE "MAJORITY VOTED OUTPUT" CIRCUIT;45
11.5;5 - WHICH SOLUTION FOR WHICH PROBLEM ?;47
11.6;6 - CONCLUSION;47
11.7;7 - REFERENCES;47
12;CHAPTER 7. A SINGLE-CHIP COMPUTER FOR ROBUST VARIABLE-STRUCTURE CONTROL OF LARGE-SCALE SAFETY-CRITICAL SYSTEMS;50
12.1;INTRODUCTION;50
12.2;VARIABLE-STRUCTURE CONTROL;50
12.3;DECENTRALIZED CONTROL STRATEGY;51
12.4;TWO-LEVEL COORDINATING CONTROL;52
12.5;VARIABLE-STRUCTURE MICROCONTROLLER;52
12.6;IMPLEMENTATION;52
12.7;FORMAL CORRECTNESS PROOF;53
12.8;DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION;54
12.9;ACKNOWLEDGEMENT;55
12.10;REFERENCES;55
13;CHAPTER 8. A VIEW on COMPUTER SYSTEMS and their RELIABILITY in JAPAN;56
13.1;I . General view of computer systems in Japan;56
13.2;2. Dependability and system performance;57
13.3;3. Typical system configuration and maintenance supports;58
13.4;Reference;60
14;CHAPTER 9. A GENERIC FAILURE MODEL FOR DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS;62
14.1;INTRODUCTION;62
14.2;DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM STRUCTURE;62
14.3;THE MODEL;63
14.4;DISCUSSIONS;65
14.5;CONCLUSIONS;66
14.6;REFERENCES;66
15;CHAPTER 10. RECOVERY IN DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS FROM SOLID FAULTS;68
15.1;I. INTRODUCTION;68
15.2;II. DEFINITIONS;69
15.3;III. BASIC STRATEGIES;69
15.4;IV. COMBINED STRATEGIES;71
15.5;V. COMPARISON OF STRATEGIES;71
15.6;VI. IMPLEMENTATION;72
15.7;VII. CONCLUSION;72
15.8;VII. REFERENCES;72
16;CHAPTER 11. FAULT TOLERANCE BY A DISTRIBUTED SOFTWARE CONTROL FOR A HIGH RELIABILITY;74
16.1;INTRODUCTION;74
16.2;HARDWARE CONFIGURATION;74
16.3;SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTED CONTROL;75
16.4;TIME AND COMMUNICATION CONSTRAINTS;76
16.5;IMPLEMENTATION AND VALIDATION;77
16.6;CONCLUSION;78
16.7;REFERENCES;78
17;CHAPTER 12. THE VERIFICATION SUPPORT ENVIRONMENT VSE;80
17.1;INTRODUCTION;80
17.2;GOALS OF THE VSE;80
17.3;WHY USING FORMAL METHODS ?;80
17.4;FORMAL DEVELOPMENT METHODS AND TOOLS IN THE VSE;81
17.5;VSE SYSTEM STRUCTURE;82
17.6;EPOS;82
17.7;REFERENCES;85
18;CHAPTER 13. DESIGN AND PLANNING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SAFETY-CRITICAL SOFTWARE WITH ADA;86
18.1;INTRODUCTION;86
18.2;ERROR AVOIDANCE;86
18.3;SOFTWARE TESTING;89
18.4;FAULT TOLERANCE;90
18.5;CONCLUSIONS;91
18.6;REFERENCES;91
19;CHAPTER 14. THE MYTHICAL MEAN TIME TO FAILURE;92
19.1;INTRODUCTION;92
19.2;AN INAPPROPRIATE TRANSFER;92
19.3;THE RELIABILITY GROWTH APPROACH;93
19.4;CRITIQUE OF RELIABILITY GROWTH APPROACH;94
19.5;CRAFT vs. SCIENCE vs.ENGINEERING;95
19.6;MTTF REVISITED;96
19.7;CONCLUSION;96
19.8;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;97
19.9;REFERENCES;97
20;CHAPTER 15. PRACTICAL FORMAL METHODS FOR PROCESS CONTROL ENGINEERING;98
20.1;Introduction;98
20.2;Overview;99
20.3;Ladder Logic;99
20.4;Test-engine;100
20.5;Bottle Labeller;101
20.6;System Evaluation;102
20.7;Current Work;102
20.8;Conclusions;103
20.9;References;103
21;CHAPTER 16. FORMAL METHODS AND SOFTWARE SAFETY;104
21.1;INTRODUCTION;104
21.2;INCREASING DEPENDABILITY WITH FORMAL METHODS;104
21.3;AREAS OF APPLICATION OF FORMAL METHODS;105
21.4;EXAMPLES OF USE;106
21.5;SAFETY STANDARDS;107
21.6;THE COST OF SAFETY;107
21.7;ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS;109
21.8;REFERENCES;109
22;CHAPTER 17. OBJECT REPRESENTATION OF THE OPERATIVE ENVIRONMENT;110
22.1;ABSTRACT;110
22.2;1 INTRODUCTION;110
22.3;2 PROPOSED MODEL;111
22.4;3 CONCLUSION;115
22.5;REFERENCES;115
23;CHAPTER 18. MARKOVIAN MODELS FOR CLASSIFICATION OF FAULTSIN MANUFACTURING SYSTEMS;116
23.1;I- INTRODUCTION;116
23.2;II-MARKOVIAN MODEL FOR THEFAULT-FREE SYSTEM;117
23.3;III- MARKOVIAN MODEL FOR THE FAILED SYSTEM;119
23.4;CONCLUSION;120
23.5;References;121
24;CHAPTER 19. LOGIC MODELLING OF DEPENDABLE SYSTEMS;122
24.1;INTRODUCTION;122
24.2;PHYSICAL SYSTEMS OF INTEREST;122
24.3;DEPENDABILITY;123
24.4;SYSTEM MODELLING;123
24.5;LOGIC MODELLING;124
24.6;FMS SPECIFICATION;124
24.7;OPERATIONS SPECIFICATION;125
24.8;A LOGIC MODELLING TOOL;125
24.9;ASSESSMENT OF LOGIC MODELLING;125
24.10;CONCLUSIONS;126
24.11;ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS;126
24.12;REFERENCES;126
25;CHAPTER 20. INTEGRATION OF SOFTWARE RELIABILITY PREDICTIONSTO ACHIEVE MODELLING FAULT TOLERANCE;128
25.1;DIVERSITY CONCEPTFOR SOFTWARE RELIABILITY PREDICTIONS;128
25.2;BAYESIAN INFERENTIAL APPROACH;129
25.3;LIKELIHOOD MAXIMIZATION APPROACH;129
25.4;COMPARISON OF BOTH APPROACHES;130
25.5;CONCLUSIONS;132
25.6;REFERENCES;132
26;CHAPTER 21. FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION OF VITAL COMPUTER SOFTWARE FOR HIHG-SPEED MAGLEV SYSTEMS;134
26.1;INTRODUCTION;134
26.2;SPECIFICATION METHOD;135
26.3;EVALUATION;137
26.4;REFERENCES;137
27;CHAPTER 22. PROVING SAFETY OF A RAILWAY SIGNALLING SYSTEM INCORPORATING GEOGRAPHIC DATA;140
27.1;INTRODUCTION;140
27.2;THE MODEL AND ITS SAFETY INVARIANTS;142
27.3;SAFETY TRANSITIVE EVOLUTION;143
27.4;SAFETY CONCEPTS AND GALOIS THEORY;144
27.5;REFERENCES;145
28;CHAPTER 23. USING PETRI NETS FOR SAFETY ANALYSIS OF UNMANNED METRO SYSTEM;146
28.1;Introduction;146
28.2;Safety analysis approach;147
28.3;Adding failures in the model;149
28.4;Model operation;149
28.5;Validation approach;150
28.6;Conclusion;150
28.7;References;150
29;CHAPTER 24. VITAL CODED PROCESSOR AND SAFETY RELATED SOFTWARE DESIGN;152
29.1;INTRODUCTION;152
29.2;THE SPECIFICATION OF SAFETY CRITICAL SOFTWARE;152
29.3;THE MODEL ORIENTEDB METHO;153
29.4;THE SOFTWARE FOR THE VITAL CODED PROCESSOR;155
29.5;CONCLUSION;156
29.6;REFERENCES;156
30;CHAPTER 25. VITAL PROCESSING BY SINGLECODED UNIT;158
30.1;ABSTRACT;158
30.2;1 VITAL SINGLE PROCESSOR UNIT;158
30.3;2 PROTECTION AGAINST OPERATION ERRORS;158
30.4;3 PROTECTION AGAINST OPERAND, OPERATORAND REFRESHING ERRORS;159
30.5;4 VERIFICATION PRINCIPLE;160
30.6;5 HARDWARE ORGANISATION OF VITAL CODED PROCESSOR;160
30.7;6 SOFTWARE GENERATION PROCESS;161
30.8;7 APPLICATIONS OF THIS TECHNOLOGY;161
30.9;8 CONCLUSION;162
30.10;GLOSSARY;163
31;CHAPTER 26. ASTREE - ODOMETRIC SAFETY CONTROL UNIT;164
31.1;PRESENTATION OF THE ASTREE PROJECT;164
31.2;EXPECTED PERFORMANCE;164
31.3;DEVELOPMENT PROCEDURE;165
31.4;MEASUREMENT PRINCIPLES ADOPTED;165
31.5;NOMINAL AND DEGRADED OPERATING MODES;166
31.6;SAFETY-ORIENTED COMPUTERS - GENERAL DESIGN PRINCIPLES;166
31.7;SOFTWARE ENVIRONMENT;167
31.8;PARTICULARIZATION OF THE PROCESSING UNITS;167
31.9;PROCESSING UNIT SAFETY DEMONSTRATION;168
31.10;DEVELOPMENT OFSAFETY-ORIENTED COMPUTERS HISTORY;168
31.11;CONCLUSION;168
32;CHAPTER 27. TESTING OF A COMPUTER BASED INTERLOCKING SOFTWARE: METHODOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT;170
32.1;INTRODUCTION;170
32.2;THE METHODOLOGY OF VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION;171
32.3;THE ACTIVITIES OF V&V;172
32.4;VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION ENVIRONMENT;174
32.5;REFERENCES;176
33;Chapter 28. Practical Experience with Safety Assessment of a System for Automatic Train Control;178
33.1;INTRODUCTION;178
33.2;SYSTEM DESCRIPTION;178
33.3;TESTING STRATEGY;179
33.4;RELIABILITY VS. SAFETY;179
33.5;MODELS FOR RELIABILITY AND SAFETYPREDICTIONS;180
33.6;RELIABILITY AND SAFETY ESTIMATES;181
33.7;CONCLUSIONS;183
33.8;REFERENCES.;183
34;CHAPTER 29. FAULT-TOLERANT MULTIPROCESSOR FOR EMBEDDED PROCESS CONTROL;184
34.1;1. INTRODUCTION;184
34.2;2. GOALS AND REQUIREMENTS;184
34.3;3. APPROACH;185
34.4;4. SYSTEM MODEL;186
34.5;5. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION;187
34.6;6. CONCLUSIONS;189
34.7;7. REFERENCES;189
35;CHAPTER 30. CERTIFICATION OF DIGITAL SYSTEMS IN COMMERCIAL AVIONICS APPLICATIONS;190
35.1;TYPE CERTIFICATION;190
35.2;REGULATIONS AND AUTHORITIES;190
35.3;SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS;191
35.4;SAFETY ANALYSIS;191
35.5;FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ASSESSMENT;191
35.6;QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT;191
35.7;ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES;192
35.8;INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY;192
35.9;DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND SOFTWARE;192
35.10;FUTURE SYSTEMS;193
35.11;CONCLUSIONS;195
35.12;REFERENCES;195
36;CHAPTER 31. THE CODED MICROPROCESSOR CERTIFICATION;196
36.1;1. INTRODUCTION;196
36.2;2. CERTIFICATION APPROACH BY THE DULY AUTHORISED BODY;197
36.3;3.SUMMING UP OF THE CODED MONOPROCESSOR PRINCIPLE;197
36.4;4. MAIN STEPS IN THE SAFETY DEMONSTRATION OF THE CODED MONOPROCESSOR;199
36.5;5 CONCLUSION;200
36.6;REFERENCES;201
37;CHAPTER 32. SAFETY CASE STRUCTURE: ISSUES RELATED TO CERTIFICATIONOF AVIONICS SYSTEMS;202
37.1;INTRODUCTION;202
37.2;LIMITATIONS OFCURRENT APPROACHES;203
37.3;OBJECTIVES AND HIGHLEVEL REQUIREMENTS;203
37.4;PRIMARY CONCEPTS OF SAM;204
37.5;AN AIRCRAFT SAFETY CASE;205
37.6;GOAL DESCRIPTION;206
37.7;ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY;206
37.8;STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE STRUCTURE;207
37.9;CONCLUSIONS;207
37.10;REFERENCES;207
38;CHAPTER 33. FAULT DIAGNOSIS OF A BATCH OF MICROPROCESSORS;208
38.1;1 INTRODUCTION;208
38.2;2 BASIC DATA;209
38.3;3 DIAGNOSIS;209
38.4;4 CONCLUDING REMARKS;211
38.5;Acknowledgement;212
38.6;Bibliography;212
39;CHAPTER 34. A VERSATILE MONITORING SYSTEM FORDISTRIBUTED REAL-TIME SYSTEMS;214
39.1;1. INTRODUCTION;214
39.2;2. AIMS AND SCOPE OF THE VTA;214
39.3;3. CONCEPTUAL AND DESIGN ISSUES OF THE VTA;215
39.4;4. ARCHITECTURE OF THE PROTOTYPE OF THE VTA;219
39.5;References;219
40;CHAPTER 35. ON STATIC ANALYSIS OF DEADLOCKSIN TRANSPUTER NETWORKS;220
40.1;INTRODUCTION;220
40.2;OCCAM LANGUAGE AND DEADLOCKS FEATURES;221
40.3;THE EXAMPLE OF SMALLDSC IN OCCAM;221
40.4;MODEL OF VIRTUAL DISTRIBUTED SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION WITH INFORMATION-TRANSPORTPORTS;222
40.5;SCHEME OF USINGOCCAM-ORIENTED TOOLS;222
40.6;CONCLUSIONS;224
40.7;ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS;225
40.8;REFERENCES;225
41;CHAPTER 36. AN ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO DESIGNING ANTIVIRUS SYSTEMS;226
41.1;l.State of the Art;226
41.2;2. New Contribution;226
41.3;3. Simulation;231
41.4;4. Conclusion;231
42;CHAPTER 37. OPERATING MSDOS IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT;232
42.1;INTRODUCTION;232
42.2;ENSURING RELIABLE BOOT;233
42.3;A FAT ENCRYPTION MECHANISM;233
42.4;SECURITY ISSUES;234
42.5;CONCLUSION;235
42.6;REFERENCES;235
43;CHAPTER 38. ARE WIDELY USED SECURITY SYSTEMS INADEQUATE?;236
43.1;INTRODUCTION;236
43.2;UNRESTRICTED VIRUS PROPAGATION;237
43.3;USE OF A PERFECT PROTECTION SYSTEM;238
43.4;NOT PERFECT PROTECTION SYSTEMS;238
43.5;DIFFERENT PROTECTION SYSTEMS;239
43.6;CONCLUSION;240
43.7;REFERENCES;240
44;Chapter 39. Propagating Temporal Demands into the Software Design toSupport the Evaluation of Safety Critical Hard Real-Time Systems;242
44.1;1. Introduction;242
44.2;2. Basic Idea and Strategy of the Approach;242
44.3;3. Specifying the aim of the propagation technique more precisely at an example;243
44.4;4. The Specification Method, its Time Model and the Formal Model of the Application;244
44.5;5. The Propagation Technique;246
44.6;6. Summary: Results and Benefits;248
45;Chapter 40. Integrity Prediction during Software Development;250
45.1;1 Introduction;250
45.2;2 Modelling the software development process;250
45.3;3 Probability models for the composition of integritymeasures;251
45.4;4 On-going work within the FASGEP project;253
45.5;5 Conclusions;254
45.6;Appendix A;254
45.7;References;255
46;CHAPTER 41. CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT AN AXIOMATIC BASIS FOR SOFTWARE CONTROL FLOW MEASURES;256
46.1;I. INTRODUCTION;256
46.2;II. BASIC DEFINITIONS: CONTROL FLOW LANGUAGE AND CONTROL FLOW MAPPINGS;257
46.3;III. AXIOMATIC BASE FOR CONTROL FLOWMEASURES;258
46.4;IV. THE "INTEGRAL MEASURE;261
46.5;V. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK;261
46.6;VI. REFERENCES;262
47;CHAPTER 42. A FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT DECISIONS ON APPROPRIATE SECURITY MEASURES;264
47.1;INTRODUCTION;264
47.2;DEVELOPMENT OF A FRAMEWORK FOR SELECTING APPROPRIATE SECURITY SERVICES;265
47.3;SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN OPEN COMMUNICATION NETWORKS;267
48;CHAPTER 43. SECURITY POLICIES FOR DATABASES;270
48.1;INTRODUCTION;270
48.2;DATABASE SECURITY MODELS;271
48.3;THE DISCRETIONARY MODEL;271
48.4;THE MANDATORY MODEL;272
48.5;THE ADAPTED MANDATORY SECURITY MODEL;273
48.6;THE CLARK AND WILSONMODEL;274
48.7;THE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE APPROACH;274
48.8;CONCLUSION;275
48.9;REFERENCES;276
49;CHAPTER 44. CONCEPT OF A SECURITY CONTROL CENTER;278
49.1;I. INTRODUCTION;278
49.2;II. ARCHITECTURE;279
49.3;ACKNOWLEDGEMENT;281
49.4;REFERENCES;281
50;CHAPTER 45. MODELING USERS' BEHAVIOR AND THREATS FOR SECURITY;284
50.1;INTRODUCTION;284
50.2;SYSTEM ACTIVITIES;285
50.3;ACQUISITION AND FORMALIZATION;285
50.4;ANOMALY DETECTION;286
50.5;THREAT DETECTION AND REPORTING;287
50.6;SUBJECT PROFILES UPDATE;289
50.7;REFERENCES;289
51;CHAPTER 46. RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF COMMUNICATION NETWORKS;290
51.1;INTRODUCTION;290
51.2;FACTORING ALGORITHMS;291
51.3;MONTE CARLO TECHNIQUES;292
51.4;CONCLUSIONS;294
51.5;REFERENCES;294
52;CHAPTER 47. SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS USING HAZOP AND AUDIT TECHNIQUES;296
52.1;INTRODUCTION;296
52.2;OVERALL SYSTEM-WIDE APPROACH;297
52.3;MANAGEMENT AUDIT;297
52.4;HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY(HAZOP);298
52.5;CONCLUSION;300
52.6;REFERENCES;301
53;CHAPTER 48. RISK PERCEPTIONS AND ACCEPTANCE OF COMPUTERS IN CRITICAL APPLICATIONS;304
53.1;INTRODUCTION;304
53.2;RISK PERCEPTIONS AND ACCEPTANCE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES;304
53.3;COMPUTERS IN CRITICAL APPLICATIONS;306
53.4;COMPUTER ACCEPTANCE IN CRITICALAPPLICATIONS;306
53.5;CONCLUSIONS;307
53.6;REFERENCES;308
54;CHAPTER 49. COMBINING PROBABILISTIC AND DETERMINISTIC VERIFICATION EFFORTS;310
54.1;INTRODUCTION;310
54.2;VERIFICATION METHODS;310
54.3;THE CONCEPT OF RISK;311
54.4;COMBINATION OF THE DIFFERENT VERIFICATION METHODS;313
54.5;STRATEGY;314
54.6;SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS AND OUTLOOK;314
54.7;ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS;315
54.8;REFERENCES;315
55;CHAPTER 50. TESTING KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS: A CASE STUDY AND IMPLICATIONS;316
55.1;INTRODUCTION;316
55.2;THE CASE STUDY: A SYSTEM FOR THE INTELLIGENT USE AND COLLECTION OFSAFETY INFORMATION;317
55.3;THE IMPACT OF SPECIFIC FEATURESOF KBS ON TESTING;318
55.4;A TEST DESIGN AND IDENTIFICATION SCHEME FOR PROTOTYPING;319
55.5;DOCUMENTATION, STANDARDS, ANDQUALITY MANAGEMENT;320
55.6;QUALITY OF SAFETY ANALYSISSOFTWARE;320
55.7;CONCLUSIONS;321
55.8;ACKNOWLEDGEMENT;321
55.9;REFERENCES;321
56;CHAPTER 51. AN EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF FORMAL TESTING ANDSTATISTICAL TESTING;322
56.1;INTRODUCTION;322
56.2;COMPARISON OF FORMALAND STATISTICAL TESTING;323
56.3;EXPERIMENTAL FRAMEWORK;325
56.4;EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS;326
56.5;CONCLUSION, FUTURE WORK;327
56.6;ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS;327
56.7;REFERENCES;327
57;AUTHOR INDEX;328
58;KEYWORD INDEX;330