Gallagher Phenomenology

1. Auflage 2016
ISBN: 978-1-137-28380-1
Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 251 Seiten

Reihe: Palgrave Philosophy Today

Shaun Gallagher offers an exciting contemporary perspective of the subject by retrieving many important insights made by the classic phenomenological philosophers, updating some of these insights in innovative ways, and showing how they directly relate to ongoing debates in philosophy and psychology.

Shaun Gallagher is the Lillian and Morrie Moss Professor of Excellence in Philosophy at the University of Memphis, USA. He has a secondary appointment at the University of Hertfordshire, UK, and is Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Gallagher, Shaun

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Cover;1
2;Title Page;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;8
5;Series Editor’s Preface;11
6;Acknowledgments;13
7;Introduction: The Situation of Phenomenology;15
8;1 What Is Phenomenology?;21
8.1;1.1 Phenomenologies;21
8.2;1.2 Historical background and foreground;24
8.3;1.3 Death and reincarnation;27
8.4;1.4 A different phenomenology;30
8.5;1.5 Further reading;31
9;2 Naturalism , Transcendentalism and a New Naturalizing;33
9.1;2.1 Mathematics and psychology;33
9.2;2.2 Naturalistic and transcendental accounts;36
9.3;2.3 The new naturalism;42
9.4;2.4 Some natural ways of using phenomenology;47
9.4.1;2.4.1 Formalizing phenomenology;47
9.4.2;2.4.2 Neurophenomenology;50
9.4.3;2.4.3 Front-loaded phenomenology;51
9.5;2.5 Further reading;54
10;3 Phenomenological Methods and Some Retooling;55
10.1;3.1 The natural attitude;55
10.2;3.2 The epoché;57
10.3;3.3 The phenomenological reduction;61
10.4;3.4 Retooling the eidetic reduction;63
10.5;3.5 Some questions about the fi rst person perspective and language;70
10.6;3.6 Further reading;74
11;4 Intentionalities;76
11.1;4.1 Husserl’s theory of intentionality;77
11.2;4.2 Noesis–noema;81
11.3;4.3 Enactive intentionality;86
11.4;4.4 Further reading;94
12;5 Embodiment and the Hyletic Dimension;96
12.1;5.1 Hyle: a sensational concept;96
12.2;5.2 The critique of Husserl’s theory;100
12.3;5.3 Hyle and quale;103
12.4;5.4 Embodiment and hyletic experience;107
12.5;5.5 Deepening the enactive interpretation;110
12.6;5.6 Further reading;113
13;6 Time and Time Again;114
13.1;6.1 Experiencing time;114
13.2;6.2 Husserl’s analysis;117
13.3;6.3 The ubiquity of temporality;121
13.4;6.4 One more time: primal impression and enactive structure;128
13.5;6.5 Further reading;135
14;7 Self and First-Person Perspective;136
14.1;7.1 A tradition of disagreements;136
14.2;7.2 Pre-refl ective and minimal aspects of self;141
14.3;7.3 The sense of ownership;145
14.3.1;7.3.1 Schizophrenia;150
14.3.2;7.3.2 Somatoparaphrenia;154
14.3.3;7.3.3 Rubber hand illusion and whole body displacement;157
14.3.4;7.3.4 The NASA robot experience;160
14.4;7.4 First-person perspective;162
14.5;7.5 Further reading;171
15;8 Lifeworld, Action, Narrative;173
15.1;8.1 The lifeworld;173
15.2;8.2 Turning the tables;178
15.3;8.3 Action and agency;182
15.4;8.4 The narrative scale;186
15.5;8.5 Further reading;195
16;9 Intersubjectivity and Second-Person Perspective;196
16.1;9.1 Transcendental intersubjectivity;196
16.2;9.2 Being-with others;201
16.3;9.3 Standard views of social cognition;205
16.4;9.4 Phenomenologial approaches to social cognition;207
16.4.1;9.4.1 Developmental studies;209
16.4.2;9.4.2 Behavioral and phenomenological evidence;212
16.4.3;9.4.3 Evidence from dynamic systems modeling;214
16.5;9.5 The narrative scale in social cognition;215
16.6;9.6 Revisiting transcendental intersubjectivity;216
16.7;9.7 Further reading;218
17;Notes;219
18;References;226
19;Index;247