Garfinkel Income-Tested Transfer Programs

The Case for and Against
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-6049-5
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 576 Seiten, Web PDF

Income Tested Transfer Programs: The Case for and Against covers the proceedings of the 1979 conference of leading scientists, sponsored by the Institute for Research on Poverty. The contributors consider the contribution of social science knowledge and analysis in settling the arguments in the debate about the merits of income testing in transfer programs. This text is divided into 13 chapters and begins with an overview of the history, stigmatization processes, and social cohesion of the program. The succeeding chapters define the terms 'income-tested and 'non-income-tested, as well as the historical importance of the income-testing issue. The discussion then shifts to the development of both income-tested and non-income tested programs in the United States. These topics are followed by surveys of the income support system and the issues in the income-testing debate. The remaining chapters provide evidence that most Americans have too much income testing in the overall income maintenance system. These chapters also present a reform agenda designed to reduce the role of income testing. This book will be of value to social scientists, social welfare workers, and researchers.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Garfinkel, Irwin

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Income-Tested Transfer Programs: The Case for and Against;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;6
5;List of Figures and Tables;12
6;Contributors;16
7;Foreword;20
8;Chapter 1. Introduction;22
8.1;Terms and Concepts;24
8.2;Historical Importance of the Income-Testing Issue;26
8.3;Our Current Income Support System;32
8.4;The Issues and the Papers;35
9;Chapter 2. Stigma in Income-Tested Programs;40
9.1;Stigmatization Processes;42
9.2;The Stigma of Poverty;43
9.3;The Intensified Stigma of Charity;48
9.4;Responses to Stigmatization;58
9.5;Stigma in Other Income-Tested Programs;61
9.6;Conclusion: Income Testing as an Intensifier of the Poverty Stigma;62
9.7;Discussion;68
9.8;Discussion;76
9.9;Discussion: Modeling the Decision to Apply for Welfare;80
10;Chapter 3. Income Testing and Social Cohesion;88
10.1;What Is Social Cohesion?;89
10.2;Argument 1: Universal Programs Are Less Likely to Reduce Social Cohesion Than Are Income-Tested Programs;89
10.3;Argument 2: Universal Programs Are No Less Likely, Perhaps Even More Likely, to Reduce Social Cohesion Than Income-Tested Programs;92
10.4;Conclusion;109
10.5;Discussion;110
11;Chapter 4. Income Testing and Politics: A Theoretical Model;118
11.1;A Political Model;120
11.2;The Politics of Income Testing;135
11.3;Conclusion;136
11.4;Discussion;138
11.5;Discussion;150
11.6;Discussion;157
12;Chapter 5. Social Policy Development in Europe and America: A Longer View on Selectivity and Income Testing;162
12.1;When and Why Social Insurance Benefits and Educational Opportunities Became More Widely Extended;164
12.2;Trends toward Universality of Coverage in Social Insurance and Education;173
12.3;Universality and Selectivity in Contemporary American Policies;177
12.4;Epilogue;183
12.5;Discussion;185
12.6;Chapter Discussion: Ideology, Education, and Social Security;187
13;6. A Simulation Analysis of the Economic Efficiency and Distributional Effects of Alternative Program Structures: The Negative Income Tax versus the Credit Income Tax;196
13.1;Introduction and Major Findings;196
13.2;Methodology;198
13.3;Results from the Simulations;210
13.4;Conclusion;222
13.5;Discussion;225
13.6;Discussion;233
14;Chapter 7. Taxpayer Behavior and the Design of a Credit Income Tax;236
14.1;Introduction;236
14.2;Antecedents of the CIT;239
14.3;Definition of the Tax-Transfer Unit;241
14.4;Accounting Period and Procedures;245
14.5;Definition of Taxable Income;250
14.6;Administrative Arrangements;254
14.7;Surtax Considerations;259
14.8;Categorization for Benefits;264
14.9;Costs of Administration and Compliance;269
14.10;The Role of the CIT in Public Finance;278
14.11;Political Economy and CIT Implementation;281
14.12;Appendix 7.A: Elements of Taxable Income for CIT;286
14.13;Appendix 7.B: CIT Administrative Design and Marginal Tax Rates;295
14.14;Discussion;303
14.15;Discussion;306
15;Chapter 8. Income Testing and Social Welfare: An Optimal Tax-Transfer Model;312
15.1;The Model;314
15.2;Calculations;319
15.3;Results;323
15.4;Summary, Qualifications, and Policy Implications;330
15.5;Appendix: Nonfully Integrated Tax-Transfer Systems;332
15.6;Discussion;335
15.7;Discussion;340
16;Chapter 9. Income Testing of In-Kind Transfers;346
16.1;Introduction;346
16.2;The Case for Income Testing;348
16.3;The Case for Universal Services;351
16.4;Conclusion: Income Testing as a Scarce Resource;361
16.5;Discussion;365
16.6;Discussion;372
17;Chapter 10. Financing Health Care;388
17.1;Current Arrangements for Financing American Health Care and Their Problems;389
17.2;Major Goals and Other Considerations of NHI;392
17.3;The Universal and Income-Tested Concepts as Applied to NHI;395
17.4;Alternative Approaches to NHI;398
17.5;Assessment of NHI Alternatives;404
17.6;Summary and Conclusions;418
17.7;Discussion;421
18;Chapter 11. Single-Parent Households under Alternative Transfer and Tax Systems;426
18.1;Why Single-Parent Households Present a Special Problem for Society;428
18.2;The History of Public Policy toward Support of Children in One-Parent Households;430
18.3;The Distributional Consequences of the Status Quo;434
18.4;The Consequences of Credit and Negative Income Tax Schemes, with Categorical Modifications for One-Parent Households;439
18.5;The Remaining Dilemma and a Possible Solution;443
18.6;Conclusion;451
18.7;Discussion;453
18.8;Discussion;465
19;Chapter 12. Income Testing in Income Support Programs for the Aged;470
19.1;Should Social Adequacy be a Concern of OASI?;472
19.2;Models of the Three Systems;477
19.3;The Problem of What to Hold Constant;480
19.4;Data and Methodology;481
19.5;Major Results;485
19.6;Some Qualifications;492
19.7;Isolating the Effects of the Welfare Features of OASI;497
19.8;Conclusion;499
19.9;Appendix: Basic Provisions of the Supplemental Security Income Program;501
19.10;Discussion;502
19.11;Discussion;508
20;Chapter 13. Conclusion;516
20.1;The Major Issues Reviewed;516
20.2;Income-Testing Particular Programs;530
20.3;Implications for Policy;540
21;References;546
22;Author Index;562
23;Subject Index;567