Gimpel / Ockenfels / Weinhardt Negotiation, Auctions, and Market Engineering

International Seminar, Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, November 12-17, 2006, Revised Selected Papers
1. Auflage 2008
ISBN: 978-3-540-77554-6
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 242 Seiten

This book contains a selection of papers presented at the International Seminar 'Negotiation and Market Engineering', held at Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, in November 2006. The 17 revised full papers presented in this volume were carefully selected and reviewed after the seminar. The papers deal with the complexity of negotiations, auctions, and markets as economic, social, and IT systems. The authors give a broad overview on the major issues to be addressed and the methodologies used to approach them, covering highly interdisciplinary research from computer science, economics, business administration, and mathematics.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Gimpel, Henner

Ockenfels, Axel

Weinhardt, Christof

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;5
2;Table of Contents;7
3;Market Engineering: A Research Agenda;9
3.1;Introduction – Design Matters;9
3.2;Interdisciplinary Research;12
3.3;An Engineering Framework;15
3.4;The Engineering Process;16
3.5;Outline of the Book;18
3.6;Conclusions;21
3.7;References;21
4;On Comparison of Mechanisms of Economic and Social Exchanges: The Times Model;24
4.1;Introduction;24
4.2;Auctions and Negotiations;27
4.2.1;Auctions;27
4.2.2;Negotiations;28
4.2.3;Hybrid Forms;29
4.3;Experimental and Field Studies;30
4.3.1;Auctions and Negotiations in Economics;30
4.3.2;Lessons Learned Form Economic Research;32
4.3.3;Information Systems Research;33
4.3.4;Lessons Learned from Information Systems Research;36
4.4;Mechanism and System Design;37
4.4.1;Basic Concepts and Theory Building;38
4.4.2;Design Research in IS;40
4.4.3;Convergence of IS and Economics Designs;41
4.5;TIMES Model;42
4.5.1;Basic Concepts and Dependencies of the TIMES Model;42
4.5.2;TIMES Constructs;44
4.6;Discussion and Future Work;46
4.7;References;47
5;A Decision Support System for Choosing Market Mechanisms in e-Procurement;52
5.1;Introduction;52
5.2;Computer Aided Market Engineering;53
5.3;Related Work;55
5.4;Knowledge Acquisition, Storage and Evaluation;57
5.5;System Design and Implementation;60
5.5.1;System Design;60
5.5.2;System Workflow for Recommendation Retrieval;61
5.6;Conclusion and Outlook;63
6;Applying Auction Theory to Procurement Auctions – An Empirical Study Among German Corporations;66
6.1;Introduction;66
6.2;Theoretical Background and Research Hypothesis;66
6.3;Empirical Research Approach;68
6.4;Results of the Empirical Study;69
6.5;Conclusions and Managerial Implications;71
6.6;References;74
7;On the Design of Simple Multi-unit Online Auctions;76
7.1;References;79
8;A Comparison Between Mechanisms for Sequential Compute Resource Auctions;80
8.1;Introduction;80
8.1.1;Buisness Scenarios;80
8.2;Related Work;81
8.3;Methods and Aparatus: A Render Utility Simulator;82
8.3.1;Infrastructure Model;82
8.3.2;Rendering Model;82
8.3.3;Auction Models;83
8.4;Bidding Strategies;85
8.4.1;Measuring Bidding Strategy Performance;85
8.4.2;Restricting the Space of Strategies Considered;85
8.4.3;PS Polynomial Family of Strategies;86
8.4.4;GV Polynomial Family of Strategies;86
8.5;Methods for Finding the Best Strategies;87
8.6;Results;87
8.6.1;Evolved Polynomial Bid Functions;88
8.6.2;Performance Data;88
8.7;Conclusion;90
9;MACE: A Multi-attribute Combinatorial Exchange;92
9.1;Introduction;92
9.2;Requirements Upon the Mechanism;93
9.2.1;Design Objectives;93
9.2.2;Domain-Specific Requirements;94
9.3;The MACE Mechanism;95
9.3.1;Bidding Language;96
9.3.2;Winner Determination;98
9.3.3;Pricing;101
9.4;Evaluation;103
9.4.1;Data Basis;104
9.4.2;Implementation;104
9.4.3;Results;105
9.5;Conclusion;106
10;Engineering Grid Markets;109
10.1;Introduction;109
10.2;Market Engineering;110
10.3;Environmental Analysis;112
10.3.1;Motivating Scenario;112
10.3.2;Requirement Analysis;113
10.3.3;Related Work;114
10.4;Tailoring a Market for Grid Services^{1};116
10.4.1;Winner Determination Problem;118
10.4.2;Pricing Schemes;119
10.5;Concluding Remarks;122
10.6;References;122
11;Shaman: Software and Human Agents in Multiattribute Auctions and Negotiations;124
11.1;Introduction;124
11.2;Foundations;129
11.2.1;Decision Support Systems;129
11.2.2;Software Agents and MAS;130
11.2.3;Auction and Negotiation Protocols and Taxonomy;132
11.2.4;E-Markets and Other Meeting Places;134
11.3;Four Platforms;134
11.3.1;Invite e-Negotiation Platform;134
11.3.2;eNAs e-Negotiation Agency;138
11.3.3;meet2trade Auction Platform;141
11.3.4;GoGo Group-Buying Platform;145
11.4;Shaman Framework and Functions;150
11.4.1;Framework;150
11.4.2;The Use of Shaman;152
11.4.3;Local DSS;153
11.5;Conclusions;153
11.6;References;154
12;An Experiment on Investor Behavior in Markets with Nonlinear Transaction Fees;158
12.1;Introduction;158
12.2;Nonlinear Price Schedule Design;159
12.2.1;Types of Nonlinear Price Schedules;159
12.2.2;Caps and Floors;160
12.2.3;Design Parameters;161
12.3;Field Experiment;162
12.3.1;Motivation;162
12.3.2;Experimental Design;163
12.3.3;Hypotheses;165
12.4;Experimental Results;165
12.4.1;Number of Orders per Trader;165
12.4.2;Average Order Volume per Trader;166
12.4.3;Sensitivity to Transaction Fee Changes;167
12.4.4;Discussion;168
12.5;Conclusion and Outlook;169
12.6;References;170
13;Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets;172
13.1;Introduction;172
13.2;Model of Competing Sellers;173
13.3;Analysis;173
13.3.1;Buyer Equilibrium Behaviour;174
13.3.2;Seller Equilibrium Behaviour;174
13.4;Auction Fees;176
13.5;Conclusion;178
14;A Bayesian Reputation System for Virtual Organizations;179
14.1;Introduction;179
14.2;Trust and Reputation Model;181
14.2.1;Taxonomy of TIs;181
14.2.2;Stochastic Model;183
14.2.3;Feedback;184
14.3;Conclusion and Future Work;185
15;Situated Decision Support Approach for Managing Multiple Negotiations;187
15.1;Introduction;187
15.2;Background;188
15.2.1;Agent-Based Negotiations;188
15.2.2;Multi-bilateral Negotiations;189
15.3;Situated Decision Support Framework for Managing Multiple Negotiations;189
15.4;Simulations;191
15.5;Conclusions;195
15.6;References;196
16;Optimal Financially Constrained Bidding in Multiple Simultaneous Auctions;198
16.1;Introduction;198
16.2;Related Work;199
16.3;Bidding in Multiple Auctions;199
16.3.1;The Auctions;200
16.3.2;Global and Local Bidders;200
16.4;Best Response Strategies with Budget Constraints;200
16.5;Conclusion;206
17;Bidding Strategies for Multi-object Auctions;208
17.1;Introduction;208
17.2;The Auction Setting;209
17.2.1;Single Object;209
17.2.2;Multiple Objects;210
17.3;Equilibrium Bidding Strategies;211
17.3.1;Single Object;211
17.3.2;Multiple Sequential Auctions;213
17.3.3;Multiple Simultaneous Auctions;217
17.4;Related Work;218
17.5;Conclusions and Future Work;219
18;Cognitive Biases in Negotiation Processes;221
18.1;Introduction;221
18.2;Negotiation Process Model;222
18.2.1;Negotiation as a Communication Process;222
18.2.2;Refined Process Model;223
18.2.3;Agent Decision-Making Model;225
18.3;Cognitive Biases in Negotiations;226
18.4;Summary;230
19;On the Forecast Accuracy of Sports Prediction Markets;235
19.1;Introduction;235
19.2;Related Work;236
19.3;STOCCER – A 2006 FIFA World Cup Prediction Market;237
19.3.1;The FIFA World Cup 2006;237
19.3.2;The STOCCER Exchange;237
19.4;Evaluation of the Forecast Accuracy;240
19.5;Summary;241
19.6;References;242
20;Author Index;243