Art and IR Theory

Visual Semiotic Games
1. Auflage 2023
ISBN: 978-3-031-32341-6
Verlag: Springer

Buch, Englisch, 164 Seiten, Format (B × H): 160 mm x 241 mm, Gewicht: 436 g

Reihe: Mathematics in Mind

This book examines the correspondence between international relations (IR) theories of structural realism and constructivism and paintings, notably the artwork of Mark Rothko and Jackson Pollock, in a game theory setting. This interdisciplinary approach, through the lens of game theory and semiotics, permits different, enriched interpretations of structural realism and constructivism. These theories constitute an axis of debate between social and systemic approaches to international politics, as well as an axis of differentiation between scientific realism and positivism as philosophies of science. As such, the interpretations explored in this book contribute to what we know about international relations, how semiotics intersect with strategic uncertainty, and explains these interactions in the proposed games model.

The book’s use of game theory and semiotics generate ‘visual semiotic games’ (VSGs) that shed light on the debate axes through strategic uncertainty, interactions, and players’ interactive belief systems. VSGs will contribute to literature on experimental semiotics in the sense of players’ coordination behavior, beliefs, and artistic evaluations. The equilibria, interpreted through branches of philosophy of mind and theories of explanation, will reveal possibilities of agreement among players about which artwork representing the theory at hand is the best, opening innovative research perspectives for the discipline of IR theory.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Güner, Serdar ¿.

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Semiotik
• Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften Semiotik
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Operations Research

Inhaltsverzeichnis

PrefaceChapter 1 Scope and Method 1.1 Hybrid Method 1.1.1 Visual Semiotics 1.1.2 Visual Semiotic GamesChapter 2 Structural Constraints and Non-Unique Dynamic Anarchies 2.1 The Discipline is a Ghetto of War 2.2 Game Theory in Visual Turn 2.3 Structural Constraints 2.4 Scientific Realism, Phlogiston 2.5 Criticisms of Structural Realism 2.6 Dynamic Non-Unique Anarchies 2.6.1 Categorization of Anarchies 2.6.2 Changing Anarchies 2.6.3 Evolutionary Games and the Continuum of Anarchies 2.7 Criticisms of ConstructivismChapter 3 Art Versus IR Theory 3.1 Abstraction in Art and IR Theory 3.2 Rothko-Waltz 3.3 Pollock-Wendt 3.4 Why Pollock and Rothko?Chapter 4 Preferences and Equilibrium 4.1 Preferences over Outcomes 4.1.1 Preferences and Minds 4.2 Preferences over Actions: Nash Equilibrium 4.2.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma 4.2.2 Dress-Color Game 4.2.2.1 Nash Equilibrium in Dress Color Game 4.2.2.2 Dress-Color Game by Backward Induction 4.3 Coordination 4.3.1 Pure Coordination 4.3.2 Stag Hunt 4.3.3 Battle of SexesChapter 5 Saussurean Games 5.1 Nash Equilibrium 5.2 Saussurean Stag Hunt Game 5.3 Saussurean Battle of Sexes Game 5.4 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 5.5 Correlated Equilibrium 5.6 Commitments 5.7 Bayes-Nash Equilibrium: Saussurean Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information 5.8 Bayes-Nash Equilibrium: Saussurean Games of Two-Sided Incomplete Information 5.9 Repeated Interactions 5.10 Evolutionary Equilibrium in Saussurean GamesChapter 6 Peircian Games 6.1 Peircian Games in Strategic Form 6.1.1 Icon 6.1.2 Index 6.1.3 Symbol 6.2 Equilibrium 6.2.1 Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium 6.2.2 One-Sided Bayes-Nash equilibrium 6.2.3 Evolutionary Equilibrium 6.2.4 Peircian Game in Extensive FormChapter 7 Hybrid Games 7.1 Hybrid Game in Extensive Form 7.2 Hybrid Game under Imperfect Information 7.3 Two-Stage Hybrid Game 7.4 Hybrid Game of One-Sided Incomplete InformationChapter 8 Interpretations 8.1 The Place of Mind in IR 8.1.1 Dualism and Materialism 8.1.2 IR Theories as Mental Pictures 8.2 Dualism 8.3 Monism 8.3.1 Behaviorism 8.3.2 Identity Theory 8.3.3 Functionalism 8.4 Explanations Versus Nash Equilibrium 8.4.1 Explanations Why 8.4.2 Explanations How PossibleSumming UpReferences

Über Autor(innen)

Serdar S. Güner obtained his PhD degree from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, the University of Geneva in 1990. His thesis is titled: A Game Theoretical Analysis of Alliance Formation and Dissolution: The Case Study of the Relationship Among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China, 1949-1972. He spent the next two years as a postdoctoral research fellow at the Department of Government, the University of Texas at Austin before joining the Department of International Relations, Bilkent University. He won Bilkent University Distinguished Teacher Award in 2002. Serdar S. Güner gave seminars and lectures on game theory and negotiation problems at various government agencies and universities, participated to international conventions, served as a referee for scientific journals. He is an amateur trumpet player and painter.