Epistemic Value

Erscheinungsjahr 2009
ISBN: 978-0-19-923118-8
Verlag: OUP Oxford

Buch, Englisch, 370 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 719 g

Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be taken by the theory of knowledge. The contributors are Jason Baehr, Michael Brady, Berit Brogaard, Michael DePaul, Pascal Engel, Catherine Elgin, Alvin Goldman, John Greco, Stephen Grimm, Ward Jones, Martin Kusch, Jonathan Kvanvig, Michael Lynch, Erik Olsson, Wayne Riggs and Matthew Weiner.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Haddock, Adrian

Millar, Alan

Pritchard, Duncan

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Introduction

- Part One: The Value of Knowledge

- 1: Alvin I. Goldman and Erik J. Olsson: Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge

- 2: Jason Baehr: Is There a Value Problem?

- 3: Martin Kusch: Testimony and the Value of Knowledge

- 4: Jonathan Kvanvig: The Value of Understanding

- 5: Michael R. DePaul: Ugly Analyses and Value

- 6: Ward E. Jones: The Goods and the Motivation of Believing

- 7: Matthew Weiner: Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge

- 8: Pascal Engel: Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value

- 9: Wayne Riggs: Luck, Knowledge, and Control

- Part Two: Truth and Epistemic Appraisal

- 10: Michael P. Lynch: The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values

- 11: Stephen R. Grimm: Epistemic Normativity

- 12: Michael S. Brady: Curiosity and the Value of Truth

- 13: Berit Brogaard: Epistemic Value Monism, or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth

- Appendix: Symposium on Jonathan Kvanvig's The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding

- 14: Jonathan Kvanvig: Precis of The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding

- 15: John Greco: The Value Problem

- 16: Catherine Z. Elgin: Is Understanding Factive?

- 17: Wayne D. Riggs: Understanding, Knowledge and the Meno Requirement

- 18: Jonathan Kvanvig: Responses to Critics

Über Autor(innen)

Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action. He recently edited (with Fiona Macpherson) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008).

Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. His book Understanding People (Oxford University Press) was published in 2004. He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005.

Since 2007, Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.