Social Epistemology

Erscheinungsjahr 2010
ISBN: 978-0-19-957747-7
Verlag: OUP Oxford

Buch, Englisch, 370 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 719 g

The idea of approaching epistemological concerns from a social perspective is relatively new. For much of its history the epistemological enterprise -- and arguably philosophy more generally -- has been cast along egocentric lines. Where a non-egocentric approach has been taken, as in the recent work of naturalist epistemologists, the focus has been on individuals interacting with their environment rather than on the significance of social interaction for an understanding of the nature and value of knowledge.

The fifteen new essays presented in this volume aim to show the fertility and variety of social epistemology and to set the agenda for future research. They examine not only the well-established topic of testimony, but also newer topics such as disagreement, comprehension, the norm of trust, epistemic value, and the epistemology of silence. Several contributors discuss metaphilosophical issues to do with the nature of social epistemology and what it can contribute to epistemology more generally. Social Epistemology will be essential reading for anyone interested in this fast-growing area of philosophy.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Haddock, Adrian

Millar, Alan

Pritchard, Duncan

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Theorie, Politische Philosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sozialphilosophie, Politische Philosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Introduction

- Analytical Table of Contents

- 1: Alvin Goldman: Why Social Epistemology is Real Epistemology

- 2: Lorraine Code: Testimony, Advocacy, Ignorance: Thinking Ecologically About Social Knowledge

- 3: Miranda Fricker: Scepticism and the Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in Time

- 4: Klemens Kappel: On Saying that Someone Knows: Themes from Craig

- 5: Jonathan Kvanvig: The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist

- 6: Matthew Chrisman: From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism

- 7: Paul Faulkner: Norms of Trust

- 8: Peter J. Graham: Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension

- 9: Alan Millar: Knowing From Being Told

- 10: Ram Neta: Can A Priori Entitlement Be Preserved By Testimony?

- 11: Frederick F. Schmitt: The Assurance View of Testimony

- 12: Sanford C. Goldberg: The Epistemology of Silence

- 13: Michael P. Lynch: Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Disagreement

- 14: Ernest Sosa: The Epistemology of Disagreement

- 15: Jennifer Lackey: A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance

Über Autor(innen)

Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action. He is the author (with Alan Millar and Duncan Pritchard) of The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (Oxford University Press, 2010), and he recently edited (with Fiona Macpherson) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008).

Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. He is the author (with Adrian Haddock and Duncan Pritchard) of The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (Oxford University Press, 2010) and Understanding People (Oxford University Press, 2004). He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005.

Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh since 2007. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.