Harming Future Persons

Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem
1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-1-4020-5697-0
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 335 Seiten

Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman 1 Purpose of this Collection What are our obligations with respect to persons who have not yet, and may not ever, come into existence? Few of us believe that we can wrong those whom we leave out of existence altogether—that is, merely possible persons. We may think as well that the directive to be “fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth” 1 does not hold up to close scrutiny. How can it be wrong to decline to bring ever more people into existence? At the same time, we think we are clearly ob- gated to treat future persons—persons who don’t yet but will exist—in accordance with certain stringent standards. Bringing a person into an existence that is truly awful—not worth having—can be wrong, and so can bringing a person into an existence that is worth having when we had the alternative of bringing that same person into an existence that is substantially better. We may think as well that our obligations with respect to future persons are triggered well before the point at which those persons commence their existence. We think it would be wrong, for example, to choose today to turn the Earth of the future into a miserable place even if the victims of that choice do not yet exist.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Acknowledgements;6
2;Contents;7
3;Contributors;10
4;Harming Future Persons: Introduction;12
4.1;1 Purpose of this Collection;12
4.2;2 The Person-Affecting Intuition and the Nonidentity Problem;13
4.3;3 The Nonidentity Cases;14
4.4;4 Three Strategies for Addressing the Nonidentity Problem;19
4.5;5 Contributions to this Collection;22
4.6;6 Conclusion;34
4.7;Notes;34
4.8;References;36
5;Part I;38
5.1;The Intractability of the Nonidentity Problem;39
5.1.1;1.1 The Logical and Metaphysical Dimensions of the Problem;39
5.1.2;1.2 Four Strategies for Responding to the Nonidentity Problem;41
5.1.3;1.3 Numerical, Biographical and Autobiographical Identity;53
5.1.4;1.4 Conclusion;57
5.1.5;Notes;57
5.1.6;References;60
6;Part II;62
6.1;Rights and the Asymmetry Between Creating Good and Bad Lives;63
6.1.1;2.1 The Asymmetry, Common Sense Morality and Rights;63
6.1.2;2.2 How the Doctrine of Negative Rights Explains the Asymmetry;64
6.1.3;2.3 The Grounds and Groundlessness of Rights;67
6.1.4;2.4 The Symmetry of Reasons of Beneficence;71
6.1.5;Notes;79
6.1.6;References;81
6.2;Asymmetries in the Morality of Causing People to Exist;82
6.2.1;3.1 Introduction;82
6.2.2;3.2 Definitions and Distinctions;83
6.2.3;3.3 Reasons and Values Presupposed by the Asymmetry;85
6.2.4;3.4 The Distinction Between Harming and Benefiting;87
6.2.5;3.5 The Individual-Affecting Symmetry View;91
6.2.6;3.6 The Antinatalist Symmetry View;94
6.2.7;3.7 The Impersonal Symmetry View;97
6.2.8;3.8 Conclusion;99
6.2.9;Notes;100
6.2.10;References;101
7;Part III;102
7.1;Who Cares About Identity?;103
7.1.1;4.1 Introduction;103
7.1.2;4.2 The Moral Insignificance of Transworld Identity;106
7.1.3;4.3 The Prudential Insignificance of Transworld Identity;112
7.1.4;4.4 Genes and Identity;116
7.1.5;Notes;120
7.1.6;References;122
7.2;Do Future Persons Presently Have Alternate Possible Identities?;125
7.2.1;5.1 The Erewhon Hypothesis;125
7.2.2;5.2 Variations on a Theme by Parfit;126
7.2.3;5.3 The No-Difference Thesis;130
7.2.4;5.4 Identity-Determining Choices and Identity-Determining Characteristics;131
7.2.5;5.5 Ambiguous “Identities”;133
7.2.6;5.6 Vague “Identities”;134
7.2.7;5.7 Alternative Conceptions of “Identity”;136
7.2.8;5.8 Future Persons as Vague but Identifiable Objects of Present Obligations;137
7.2.9;5.9 Parfit and “The Descriptive View”;142
7.2.10;5.10 Return to Erewhon;144
7.2.11;Notes;145
7.2.12;References;146
7.3;Rule Consequentialism and Non-identity;147
7.3.1;6.1 Introduction;147
7.3.2;6.2 Two Decisive Intuitions;148
7.3.3;6.3 How Simple Consequentialism Fails;151
7.3.4;6.4 Why Simple Consequentialism Fails;154
7.3.5;6.5 Rule Consequentialism;155
7.3.6;6.6 A Contingent Morality;159
7.3.7;6.7 Rule Consequentialism and Moral Philosophy;162
7.3.8;Notes;164
7.3.9;References;165
8;Part IV;167
8.1;Harming as Causing Harm;168
8.1.1;7.1 Introduction;168
8.1.2;7.2 Harming as Causing Harm;170
8.1.3;7.3 Solving the Non-identity Problem;171
8.1.4;7.4 Harming and Benefiting Those Who Independently Exist;176
8.1.5;7.5 Is Causing Harm Sufficient for Harming?;179
8.1.6;7.6 Conclusion;181
8.1.7;Notes;182
8.1.8;References;185
8.2;Wrongful Life and Procreative Decisions;186
8.2.1;8.1 Introduction;186
8.2.2;8.2 How Bad Is It?;188
8.2.3;8.3 The Philosophical Problem;188
8.2.4;8.4 Preventing Births to Protect Children;189
8.2.5;8.5 The Nonexistence Condition;192
8.2.6;8.6 The Human Rights Approach;197
8.2.7;8.7 The Non-Identity Problem;198
8.2.8;8.8 Conclusion;205
8.2.9;Notes;205
8.2.10;References;208
8.2.11;Other References;209
8.3;Harming and Procreating;210
8.3.1;9.1;210
8.3.2;9.2;212
8.3.3;9.3;213
8.3.4;9.4;215
8.3.5;9.5;217
8.3.6;9.6;221
8.3.7;9.7;223
8.3.8;9.8;225
8.3.9;9.9;225
8.3.10;9.10;226
8.3.11;Notes;227
8.3.12;References;230
8.4;The Nonidentity Problem and the Two Envelope Problem: When is One Act Better for a Person than Another?;231
8.4.1;10.1 Parallel Problems;231
8.4.2;10.2 A Person-Based Approach to Procreative Choice;235
8.4.3;10.3 The Nonidentity Problem;239
8.4.4;10.4 The Two-Envelope Problem;247
8.4.5;10.5 Conclusion;252
8.4.6;Notes;253
8.4.7;References;257
9;Part V;259
9.1;Reproduction, Partiality, and the Non-identity Problem;260
9.1.1;11.1 The Liberal View of Reproduction;260
9.1.2;11.2 Reproduction and Non-identity;261
9.1.3;11.3 Reproduction and Partiality;263
9.1.4;11.4 The Case Against Impartiality;266
9.1.5;11.5 The Case Against Partiality;269
9.1.6;11.6 A Pessimistic Conclusion?;274
9.1.7;Notes;276
9.1.8;References;276
9.2;Two Varieties of “Better-For” Judgements;278
9.2.1;12.1 The Principle of Procreative Beneficence;278
9.2.2;12.2 PPB and the Non-Identity Problem;281
9.2.3;12.3 Internal and External Perspective “Better-For” Judgements;282
9.2.4;12.4 Prospective Parenthood and the Internal Perspective;285
9.2.5;12.5 Principled Procreation;287
9.2.6;12.6 Summary;291
9.2.7;Notes;291
9.2.8;References;291
9.3;Harms to Future People and Procreative Intentions;293
9.3.1;13.1 Introduction;293
9.3.2;13.2 Must We Create the Best? Partiality Toward Future Imperfect People;294
9.3.3;13.3 Justifying Harm in Different-Number Cases: The Generation-Adding Policy;297
9.3.4;13.4 Justifying Harm in Same-Number Cases: The Chauvinist Policy;298
9.3.5;13.5 An Impersonal Explanation of the Chauvinist Policy;299
9.3.6;13.6 Limits on the Role of Procreative Intentions in Justifying Harm;301
9.3.7;13.7 An Alterative? Asymmetrical Responsibility for Harms and Benefits;303
9.3.8;13.8 The Limitations of Asymmetrical Responsibility;306
9.3.9;13.9 Selectivity, Partiality, and Procreative Intentions;307
9.3.10;13.10 Conclusion;308
9.3.11;Notes;309
9.3.12;References;312
10;Part VI;314
10.1;Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?;315
10.1.1;14.1 Introduction;315
10.1.2;14.2 Comparativism;316
10.1.3;14.3 The Person Affecting Restriction;317
10.1.4;14.4 Strict Comparativism;319
10.1.5;14.5 Asymmetrical Comparativism;320
10.1.6;14.6 Inconsistency;321
10.1.7;14.7 Personal Good Restriction Regained;323
10.1.8;14.8 A Normative Version of the Restriction;324
10.1.9;14.9 Soft Comparativism;327
10.1.10;14.10 Dominated Outcomes;329
10.1.11;14.11 Future Populations and Trade Offs;332
10.1.12;14.11 Summary;334
10.1.13;Notes;335
10.1.14;References;339
11;Part VII;341
11.1;Implications of the Nonidentity Problem for State Regulation of Reproductive Liberty;342
11.1.1;15.1 Fundamental Liberties;343
11.1.2;15.2 Types of Harm to Future Children;344
11.1.3;15.3 Compelling State Interests;345
11.1.4;15.4 Two Different Distinctions;347
11.1.5;15.5 Future Children, Whoever They May Be;348
11.1.6;15.6 Will the Courts Agree?;352
11.1.7;Notes;354
11.1.8;References;355
11.2;Reparations for U.S. Slavery and Justice Over Time;357
11.2.1;Notes;363
11.2.2;References;363
12;Name Index;364
13;Subject Index;368