Philosophy of Mind

Erscheinungsjahr 2003
ISBN: 978-0-19-925383-8
Verlag: Oxford University Press

Buch, Englisch, 936 Seiten, Format (B × H): 172 mm x 246 mm, Gewicht: 1561 g

Edited by a renowned scholar in the field, this anthology provides an extensive and varied collection of classical and contemporary readings in the philosophy of mind. Especially noteworthy are the substantial authoritative introductions to each section, which set extracts in context and guide the reader through them.

The volume is organised into 12 sections, providing instructors with flexibility in designing and teaching a variety of courses. It contains 50 important writings on the philosophy of mind, with introductions to each section, discussion questions and guides to further reading. Perfect for undergraduate courses, this book offers the ideal, self-contained introduction to the philosophy of mind.

Zielgruppe

Second and third year undergraduate students of the philosophy of mind. Psychology students studying philosophy of psychology.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Heil, John

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- General Introduction

- 1 Historical Background

- Introduction

- 1: Plato: Extract from Phaedo

- 2: Aristotle: Extract from De Anima

- 3: Descartes: Extract from Meditations II and VI

- 4: John Locke: Extract from An Essay Concerening Human Understanding

- 5: John Locke: Extract from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

- 2 Behaviorism and Mind-Brain Identity

- Introduction

- 6: Carl Hempel: The Logical Analysis of Psychology

- 7: Hilary Putnam: Brains and Behaviour

- 8: R. J. Hirst: Mind and Body

- 9: J. J. C. Smart: Sensations and Brain Processes

- 10: Saul Kripke: Naming and Necessity

- 3 Artificial Intelligence

- Introduction

- 11: Alan M. Turing: Computing Machinery and Intelligence

- 12: John Searle: Minds, Brains, and Programs

- 13: Margaret A. Boden: Escaping from the Chinese Room

- 14: Ned Block: The Mind as Software in the Brain

- 4 Functionalism

- Introduction

- 15: David Lewis: An Argument for the Identity Theory

- 16: Jerry Fodor: The Mind-Body Problem

- 17: Hilary Putnam: Psychological Predicates

- 18: Ned Block: What is Functionalism

- 5 Interpretationism

- Introduction

- 19: Donald Davidson: Radical Interpretation

- 20: Daniel Dennett: Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology

- 21: Donald Davidson: Thought and Talk

- 22: Jane Heal: Replication and Functionalism

- 23: Stephen Stich: Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis

- 24: Paul Churchland: Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes

- 25: Lynne Rudder Baker: The Threat of Cognitive Suicide

- 6 Externalism and Mental Content

- Introduction

- 26: Tyler Burge: Individualism and the Mental

- 27: Hilary Putnam: Brains in Vats

- 28: John Heil: Are We Brains in a Vat? Top Philosopher Says, "No"!

- 29: Jaegwon Kim: Mental Content

- 7 Subjectivity and Self-Knowledge

- Introduction

- 30: Thomas Nagel: What is it Like to be a Bat?

- 31: Janet Levin: Could Love be Like a Heatwave?

- 32: Donald Davidson: Knowing One's Own Mind

- 33: Tyler Burge: Individualism and Self-Knowledge

- 34: Michael McKinsey: Anti-Individualism and the Privileged Access

- 8 Consciousness

- Introduction

- 35: D. M. Armstrong: What is Consciousness?

- 36: David Chalmers: Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness

- 37: Gilbert Harman: The Intrinsic Quality of Experience

- 38: Michael Tye: Precis of Ten Problems of Consciousness

- 39: Ned Block: Is Experiencing Just Representing?

- 9 Reduction

- Introduction

- 40: Donald Davidson: Mental Events

- 41: John Searle: Extract from The Irreducibility of Consciousness

- 42: Derek Pereboom and Hilary Kornblith: The Metaphysics of Irreducibility

- 43: Jaegwon Kim: Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction

- 10 Is the Mind-Body Problem Solvable?

- Introduction

- 44: Frank Jackson: Epiphenomenal Qualia

- 45: Joseph Levine: Materialism and Qualia

- 46: Colin McGinn: Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?

- 11 Challenges to Contemporary Materialism

- Introduction

- 47: John Foster: The Succinct Case for Idealism

- 48: Peter Forrest: Difficulties with Physicalism and a Programme for Dualists

- 49: E. J. Lowe: Non-Cartesian Dualism

- 50: E. Wigner: Remarks on the Mind-Body Question

Über Autor(innen)

John Heil is Paul B. Freeland Professor of Philosophy at Davidson College and Professor of Philosophy at Monash University. He has taught or held research appointments at Brown University, the University of Rochester, Cornell University, the National Humanities Center, Virginia Commonwealth University and Randolph-Macon Woman's College.