Buch, Englisch, 328 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 582 g
Buch, Englisch, 328 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 582 g
ISBN: 978-0-521-49342-0
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
Over the last decade, economists have been making much greater use of experimental methods in their research. The award of the Nobel Prize in 2002 to Vernon Smith confirmed that the use of such methods is now seen as an important and credible part of the economist's toolkit. In Experiments and Competition Policy, leading scholars in the field of experimental economics survey the use of experimental methods and show how they can help us to understand firm behaviour in relation to various forms of competition policy. Chapters are organised in terms of the main fields of competition policy - collusion, abusive practices and mergers - and there is also a separate section dealing with auctions and procurement. Written in a clear and nontechnical style, this volume is an excellent introduction to what the increasingly important field of experimental economics can bring to the theory and practice of competition policy.
Fachgebiete
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Regierungspolitik Sozialpolitik
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Industrielle Organisation
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Wirtschaftssysteme, Wirtschaftsstrukturen
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Management Geschäftswettbewerb
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Wirtschaftspolitik, politische Ökonomie
Weitere Infos & Material
1. Introduction J. Hinloopen and H. T. Normann; Part I. Collusion: 2. Experimental results on collusion: the role of information and communication M. Haan, L. Schoonbeek and B. M. Winkel; 3. Transparency about past, present and future conduct: experimental evidence on the impact on competitiveness J. Potters; 4. Collusion in growing and shrinking markets: experimental evidence from experimental duopolies K. Abbink and J. Brandts; 5. The effect of price ceilings in experimental posted-offer markets H. T. Normann and D. Engelmann; Part II. Dominance: 6. Experiments on abuse of a dominant position E. van Damme, L. Hancher, P. Larouche and W. Müller; 7. Buyer power B. Ruffle; Part III. Merger Control: 8. Experiments on changes in market structure and their effect on performance L. Götte and A. Schmutzler; 9. Mergers in Stackelberg markets: an experimental study S. Huck; Part IV. Auctions: 10. Making uncompetitive auctions competitive: a survey of experiments T. Offerman and S. Onderstal; Part V. Concluding Remarks: 11. Experiments and the practice of competition policy J. Hinloopen and H.T. Normann; Index.




