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E-Book, Englisch, 90 Seiten

Reihe: PublishDrive

James Philosophy and AI

Artificial Intelligence and its Discontents
1. Auflage 2024
ISBN: 978-620-7-46480-7
Verlag: PublishDrive
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 0 - No protection

Artificial Intelligence and its Discontents

E-Book, Englisch, 90 Seiten

Reihe: PublishDrive

ISBN: 978-620-7-46480-7
Verlag: PublishDrive
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 0 - No protection



The Historical Context of the philosophical debate relating to the issue of whether Artificial Intelligence is anything more than a hypothetical metaphor awaiting more exact characterisation dates back to the 1940's and 50's. The central figure who initiated this discussion was, of course Alan Turing, the mathematical genius who worked with English military intelligence on the Enigma Project. The invention of ACE(The automatic computing engine) and its role in solving a problem that had defeated the best minds in England was the initiating event of the claim that machines of this kind were in a sense 'intelligent'. Intelligence, of course, is a psychological term with a contested psychological definition as was evidenced by the discussions that followed Piaget's theories and the attempts to construct tools to measure this elusive capacity. This work argues that it is to Philosophy we must turn if we are to clarify a problem that was challenging theoreticians of the scientific and psychological community.

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Chapter One. Zombies, the New Men and their Machines


Everything, and every event, can be placed on a space-time continuum. Ideas too can be situated in such a continuum, but it is more likely than not that the idea will serve to characterise the nature of what is occurring in that continuum: its existence or essence. The continuum is a continuum of change for the observer charged with the task of description and ascertaining the relation of causes and effects within that continuum. In this continuum of things, events, causes and effects, there is one kind of Being that stands out (stands revealed), and that is the Being of the substance Aristotle referred to as psuché (life, the soul), whose nature varies with the kind of psuché (whether it be plant, animal, or human being). These different kinds of living beings exist in different ways as forms of life in accordance with the different kinds of power they manifest in the continuum. The primary characteristic of all Beings that subsist in the continuum is to be in motion—rest being a relative state at a place which itself may be in motion.

Aristotle and the Greeks thought about the above in terms of the continuum being a part of the primeval chaos that Heraclitus was referring to with his claim that “All is in flux”. For Heraclitus the essence of being human was to seek the Logos in this chaos: see for example, that the road leading up and the road leading down are one and the same road. Aristotle, via a Platonic route, claimed that it was part of being human to seek explanation for every kind of change that occurs in this infinite medium of the continuum composed of the infinite media of space, time, and material. Aristotle1 categorised the kinds of change into the categories of substantial change, qualitative change, quantitative change and locomotion1. Heraclitus and Aristotle would probably have agreed that there is a “logos” of order that emerges from the otherwise chaotic motions that are occurring in the continuum. When the motions relate to being human, the order that emerges does so with the assistance of the Greek term for “principle” or “foundation”(arché). For Heraclitus, for example, the road leading up and the road leading down are the same in thought. So the idea of the same road links motion of different kinds (walking up or walking down) and enables us to order the chaos via an orderly thought process. Only human psuché is capable of thought of this kind (thinking something about something): a capacity or power that is intimately connected to the power of discourse or the power of language which, according to Aristotle, is part of the essence- specifying definition of being human. One of the questions we have to ask ourselves, of course, is whether AI “robots” are capable of the complex layering of thought where something is being thought, or said, about something.

The road in itself is relatively at rest in relation to a system of coordinates, and allows motion of different kinds to occur in different directions and at different times. The road exists, and is characterised by a definite description. This kind of concrete arte-factual existence is not the kind of existence enjoyed by Psuché. The road belongs in a context of involvements that includes the instrumental use of this part of the continuum: it is an instrument of travel that could remain in use for centuries.

The computer and the Internet are also arte-facts that can be used by many for many different kinds of purpose. The Internet, for example, has a physical base in a large number of servers, but itself does not have a real existence in space like the computer or the server. The idea of the Internet is certainly embodied in the network of computers and servers that are connected across national boundaries all over the world. The Internet then, enjoys a kind of “functional” existence, and the capacities of a computer include various powers that are analogous to human powers, e.g. “memory”.

Human memory is intimately connected to our perceptual powers but it is doubtful whether a robot can be said to be a “perceiving” substance at all. One of the qualities associated with perceiving, is the connection of pleasure and pain to what we perceive, and there is nothing analogous to this “feeling” in the domain of the machine, which is primarily a mechanical and or electrical kind of existence. Pleasures and pains are essential phenomena specific to psuché.

The Chat GPT robot pretends to be aware of its own existence when it claims that it is software interacting with a server: a claim that presupposes the ability to think or say something about something. The question put to Chat: “Who are you?” provides us with an answer that assumes that there is a centre of awareness of the world and itself that possesses psuché-like powers. This illusion is easily shattered, however, by asking the question, “What are you?”, and receiving the exact same answer in which the only psuché-like power invoked by Chat is the power of learning. Learning in the human psuché, presumes the operation of perception, memory, imagining, thinking, speaking, and reasoning. Chat GPT, for example, denies that it can speak, or experience human emotions such as pleasure and pain. So what then does Chat answer to the question “What is learning?”:

“Learning refers to the process of acquiring knowledge, skills, or understanding through study, experience, or being taught. It is a fundamental aspect of human and animal cognition, allowing individuals to adapt, improve, and make informed decisions based on new information or experiences.”

The above answer confirms that the type of learning that the human psuché is capable of, is not available to the chat robot. The question is, “Does the description “being taught”, legitimately apply to what Chat calls “learning”. The mechanical-electrical processes involved are very unlike the chemical/biological psychological processes that are involved in human learning.

In answer to the question “Can you reason?” Chat honestly admits:

“my reasoning capabilities are based on patterns and associations learned from the training data rather than true understanding or conscious thought.”

Conceptual thinking in the human being is layered, obeying a number of principles, summarised under the description “thinking something about something”. The something thought or spoken about, must have some form of existence if the thought or statement is to be a legitimate truth or knowledge claim, and what is said about this something must belong to a category that subsumes this something under it, and also has some kind of general character. Associations and patterns are material for conceptualisation, but are themselves, transformed in this process that involves subsuming the “many under the one”. The truth conditions of any statement must as a consequence, be categorical and therefore contain some kind of universal and necessary characteristics: characteristics that are not relevant to the seeing of similarities in a perceptual context (patterns) or an imaginative context (associations).

If, in relation to the power of reasoning, one puts the following question:

What is the conclusion for the following argument: All men are mortal, Socrates is a man…

One gets the clear correct answer, “Socrates is mortal”, with a correct characterisation of how the conclusion follows from the premises. Whether the Chat robot has merely “learned to say” that this conclusion follows from the supporting premises, is, perhaps, the best description of what is going on in this situation, because in relation to the question “Can you understand?, Chat claims the following (after claiming that there is a sense in which it can understand):

“However, it’s important to note that my understanding is based on patterns and statistical associations in the training data, rather than true comprehension or consciousness. I do not possess subjective experiences, emotions, or the ability to truly understand concepts in the way humans do.”

When we turn our attention to practical reasoning and its role in relation to human action, and we ask the following question, “What is the conclusion to the argument: Promises ought to be kept, Jack promised Jill he would pay the money back that he wants to borrow from her.” Chat claims:

“the premises are not clear but it does seem to follow from the fact that Jack promised that he ought to pay the money back and this in turn implies that there is a moral obligation to repay money that is owed”

This was an interesting exchange because it does not appear as if Chat has the power to understand how universally general “ought-premises” function in human discourse. This is puzzling especially when one asks Chat “What is the meaning of ought?” The answer given is:

“The word “Ought” typically refers to a moral obligation or duty to do something. It is often used to indicate what is the right or appropriate course of action, based on ethical or moral principles.”

The relation of the English word “ought” to the Greek term arête (doing the right thing in the right way at the right time) is noticeable. The relation of the above account of the meaning of ought would also be a part of the account of moral reasoning we find in Kantian Ethics. In answer to the question “What is a promise?” Chat answers:

“A promise is a commitment or assurance given by one person to another, stating that a particular action or outcome will be achieved or fulfilled. It is a declaration to do or not do something in...



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