Joyce / Kirchin A World Without Values

Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory
1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-90-481-3339-0
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 238 Seiten

For centuries, certain moral philosophers have maintained that morality is an illusion, comparable to talking of ghosts or unicorns. These moral skeptics claim that the world simply doesn’t contain the sort of properties (such as moral badness, moral obligation, etc.) necessary to render moral statements true. Even seemingly obvious moral claims, such as "killing innocents is morally wrong" fail to be true. What would lead someone to adopt such a radical viewpoint? Are the arguments in its favor defensible or plausible? What impact would embracing such a view have on one’s practical life?

Taking as its point of departure the work of moral philosopher John Mackie (1917-1981), A World Without Values is a collection of essays on moral skepticism by leading contemporary philosophers, some of whom are sympathetic to Mackie’s views, some of whom are opposed. Rather than treating moral skepticism as something to dismiss as quickly as possible, this anthology is a comprehensive exploration of the topic, and as such will be a valuable resource for students of moral philosophy at all levels, as well as professionals in the field of meta-ethics. A World Without Values presents state-of-the-art arguments that advance the ongoing philosophical debate on several fronts, and will enjoy an important place on any meta-ethicist’s bookshelf for some years to come.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Joyce, Richard

Kirchin, Simon

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Contents;5
2;Contributors;6
3;Introduction;7
3.1;0 Understanding the Moral Error Theory;9
3.2;0 Arguing for a Moral Error Theory;13
3.3;0 Preview of This Book;17
3.4;References;22
4;Against Ethics;23
4.1;1 ;23
4.2;2 ;26
4.3;3 ;29
4.4;4 ;33
4.5;5 Postscript (2007);35
4.6;References;37
5;Nihilism, Nietzsche, and the Doppelganger Problem;38
5.1;1 Introduction;38
5.2;2 Metaethical Nihilism;38
5.3;3 Nietzsche and Nihilism;40
5.4;4 Schacht's Objections ;42
5.5;5 Wright, Blackburn, and the Hoi Polloi;43
5.6;6 Nihilism and its Consequences;45
5.7;7 The Doppelganger Problem;48
5.8;8 Solutions to the Doppelganger;49
5.9;9 The Reinforced Doppelganger;50
5.10;10 Unfinished Business;53
5.11;11 Conclusion;54
5.12;References;54
6;Patterns of Objectification;56
6.1;References;73
7;Mackies Internalisms;75
7.1;1 Mackies Basic Argument;75
7.2;2 Which Special Force? Motivation vs. Reason;76
7.3;3 How Much Motivation? Some vs. Overriding Motivation;79
7.4;4 What has Special Force? Facts vs. Judgments;80
7.5;5 Which Judgments? Normative vs. Moral;84
7.6;6 What is it to be Built in?;87
7.7;7 Conclusions;89
7.8;References;90
8;Mackies Realism: Queer Pigs and the Web of Belief;91
8.1;1 Metametaethics;92
8.1.1;1.1 The Problem of the Boundary;92
8.1.2;1.2 Drawing the Boundary by Type of Explanation;94
8.2;2 Mackie Exegesis;96
8.3;3 Queerness;99
8.4;4 Queer Pigs;102
8.5;5 Conclusion: The Web of Belief;104
8.6;References;106
9;Mackie on Practical Reason;107
9.1;1 Mackie and Williams on Practical Reason;107
9.2;2 Why Mackie's Treatment is Better ;110
9.3;3 How to Argue for Moral Skepticism;115
9.4;4 Objections;116
9.5;5 Conclusions;119
9.6;References;119
10;The Argument from Moral Experience;120
10.1;1 Introduction: The Pervasiveness of the Argument;120
10.2;2 Do We Experience Morality as a Realm of Fact?;123
10.3;3 Is the Presumption Justified?;125
10.3.1;3.1 The Best Explanation;126
10.3.2;3.2 Epistemic Conservatism;128
10.3.3;3.3 The Principle of Credulity;129
10.3.4;3.4 Wide Reflective Equilibrium;131
10.4;4 Conclusion;135
10.5;References;135
11;Beyond the Error Theory;138
11.1;1 An Outline of Mackies Argument;138
11.2;2 Value or Obligation?;140
11.3;3 The Instrumental Approach;143
11.4;4 The Universalization Approach;146
11.5;5 The Reasons Approach;149
11.6;6 The Constitutivist Approach;153
11.7;References;157
12;Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness;159
12.1;1 Mackies Challenge;161
12.2;2 Joyce and Authoritative Reasons;165
12.3;3 The Authoritative Reasons Proposal;170
12.3.1;3.1 The Argument from Inescapability;171
12.3.2;3.2 The Argument from the Idea of a Deliberative Consideration;173
12.3.3;3.3 The Argument from the Concept of a Rational Person;173
12.3.4;3.4 The Argument from Blame;174
12.3.5;3.5 The Argument from ''Ought Implies Can'';175
12.4;4 Realism, Naturalism, and the Authoritative Reasons Proposal;177
12.5;5 Conclusion Genuine Normativity;181
12.6;References;183
13;A Tension in the Moral Error Theory;184
13.1;1 The Error Theory and Everyday Moral Thought and Language;184
13.1.1;1.1 The Error Theory;185
13.1.2;1.2 Everyday Moral Thought and Language;187
13.2;2 Mackie and Joyce;192
13.2.1;2.1 Mackie;192
13.2.2;2.2 Joyce;195
13.3;3 A Quick Objection and a Conclusion;198
13.4;References;199
14;Business as Usual? The Error Theory, Internalism, and the Function of Morality;200
14.1;1 Introduction;200
14.2;2 Why Internalism?;202
14.2.1;2.1 Counteracting Limited Sympathies (or ''Crowd Control'');204
14.2.2;2.2 Oppression;207
14.2.3;2.3 Emancipation;209
14.2.4;2.4 Overcoming Weakness of Will;209
14.2.5;2.5 Persuasion;210
14.3;3 No Business as Usual;211
14.4;4 Four Options Left Standing;211
14.4.1;4.1 Belief in Theory vs. Belief in Practice;212
14.4.2;4.2 Non-revisionary Moral Realism;212
14.4.3;4.3 Revolutionary Noncognitivist Fictionalism;213
14.4.4;4.4 Revisionary Moral Realism;213
14.5;5 Conclusion;214
14.6;References;215
15;The Fictionalists Attitude Problem;216
15.1;References;232
16;Abolishing Morality;233
16.1;1 Inventing Morality;234
16.2;2 Assertive Moral Fictionalism;238
16.3;3 Assertive Moral Abolitionism;240
16.4;4 Practical Rationality;242
16.5;5 Non-assertive Moral Fictionalism;243
16.6;6 A Group of Moral Fictionalists;245
16.7;7 Problems for Non-assertive Fictionalism: Beliefs vs. Thoughts and Assertion vs. Expression;245
16.8;8 A Personal Choice;247
16.9;References;249
17;Index;250