Krieger / Neumärker / Panke Europe's Crisis

The Conflict-Theoretical Perspective
1. Auflage 2015
ISBN: 978-3-8452-6248-2
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, Band 88, 227 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm

Reihe: Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises Europäische Integration e.V.

It is striking that since 2008 the European economic, employment and financial crisis has been repeatedly in the limelight of German and European media. Up to date the topic has not lost any of its importance. This is not the least due to the fact that the crisis has led to several conflicts in the political, economic and societal sphere.
This volume offers an interdisciplinary approach on the conflicts related to the European crisis. The economic, political scientist, sociological and legal perspectives provide a novel analysis on the emergence of the crisis and its dynamics on member state and European level. In addition, the contributions provide insights into the various implications of the crisis for the future of European integration and shed light on potential remedies.
The book draws on a broad variety of economic, social scientist and legal methods, which allows for a comprehensive analysis. It will be of great value to scientists, practitioners and the interested public.
With contributions by:

Christian Joerges, Robert Kappius, Martha Kontodaimon, Tim Krieger, Karsten Mause, Bernhard Neumärker, Francesco Nicoli, Stefan Oeter, Dimitris Papanikolopoulos, Diana Panke, Jochen Roose, Bernd Schlipphak, Franziska Scholl, Moritz Sommer, Maximilian Stephan, Rafal Ulatowski

Autoren/Hrsg.

Krieger, Tim

Neumärker, Bernhard

Panke, Diana

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Internationale Beziehungen Konflikt- und Friedensforschung, Rüstungskontrolle, Abrüstung
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Finanzsektor & Finanzdienstleistungen Finanzkrisen
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Internationale Beziehungen Europäische Union, Europapolitik
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Finanzkrisen, Wirtschaftskrisen
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Europäische Union, Europa: Wirtschaft
• Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften Interdisziplinär Friedens- und Konfliktforschung

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Cover;1
2; A. Introduction;12
2.1; Introduction;14
2.1.1; The economic contributions;16
2.1.2; The social scientific contributions;18
2.1.3; The legal contributions;20
2.1.4; Bibliography;23
3; B. Economics;26
3.1; First chapter Any Solution in Sight to Europe’s Crisis? Some General Thoughts from a Conflict Theoretical Perspective;28
3.1.1; I. Introduction;28
3.1.2; II. The Origins and Progression of the Financial Crisis;29
3.1.3; III. A Conflict Theoretical Interpretation of Government Actions in the Current Crisis;30
3.1.4; IV. Outlining the Conditions for Structural Reforms: Rule-Based vs. Power-Based Decision-Making;32
3.1.5; V. Conclusion;34
3.2; Second chapter Could Exit Rules be Self-Enforcing in the EU? The Cases of France and Germany;36
3.2.1; I. Introduction;36
3.2.2; II. Exit Rules in Self-Enforcing International Agreements;38
3.2.3; III. Modeling the Exit Decision;39
3.2.3.1; High ai shock and the ‘downward’ exit (France);44
3.2.3.2; Low ai shock and an ‘upward’ exit (Germany);44
3.2.4; IV. Discussion and Implications;45
3.2.5; Bibliography;46
3.3; Third chapter Debt Restructuring in Times of Crisis: A European Perspective;48
3.3.1; I. Introduction;48
3.3.2; II. The Distinctiveness of Sovereign Debt;50
3.3.3; III. Economic Problems of Sovereign Debt;53
3.3.3.1; Asymmetric information;53
3.3.3.2; Willingness-to-pay problem;54
3.3.3.3; Uncertainty during debt restructuring;57
3.3.3.4; The run-for-the-exit problem;58
3.3.3.5; Holdout;59
3.3.4; IV. The Economic Debt Crisis in Europe;61
3.3.5; V. Conclusion;65
3.3.6; Bibliography;65
3.4; Fourth chapter Two Level Reform Game Problems of Greece;68
3.4.1; I. Introduction;68
3.4.2; II. The Theoretical Background;70
3.4.2.1; Delayed reforms: The Alesina/Drazen model of the “war of attrition”.;71
3.4.2.2; Entangled domestic and international policies: Putnam’s two level game model;72
3.4.3; III. Reform Delay in the Two Level Game;74
3.4.4; IV. International Aid before Stabilization Policies;77
3.4.5; V. When International Aid is Provided upon Stabilization;79
3.4.6; VI. Stabilizing the Greek S.O.E.s;80
3.4.7; VII. Policy Implications and Conclusions;83
3.4.8; Bibliography;84
4; C. Political Science and Sociology;86
4.1; Fifth chapter The Eurozone Crisis and Party Conflicts in Greece and Germany – Discursive Struggles about Responsibility;88
4.1.1; I. Introduction;88
4.1.2; II. The Attribution of Responsibility – Conceptual Considerations;90
4.1.3; III. Method and Data: Discursive Actor Attribution Analysis;93
4.1.4; IV. Party Involvement in Greek and German Crisis Debates;94
4.1.5; V. Attribution Types in the Party Conflicts;99
4.1.6; VI. Attribution Addressees in the Party Conflicts;102
4.1.7; VII. Discussion and Conclusion;107
4.1.8; Bibliography;110
4.2; Sixth chapter Increasing Winners-Losers Gap? Increasing Euroscepticism? Exploring the Economic Crisis’ Conflict Potential;112
4.2.1; I. Introduction;112
4.2.2; II. Hypotheses: The Winners-Losers Divide and Europe’s Economic Crisis;114
4.2.3; III. Data and Research Design;117
4.2.4; IV. Empirical Findings;120
4.2.5; V. Robustness Checks;124
4.2.6; VI. Conclusion;127
4.2.7; Bibliography;129
4.3; Seventh chapter Euro Crisis, German Hegemony and the New Geography of the European Union;134
4.3.1; I. Introduction;134
4.3.2; II. Hegemony in the European Union – What Hegemony?;135
4.3.3; III. European Integration before the Outbreak of the Eurozone Crisis;137
4.3.4; IV. Political Implications of the Euro Crisis;139
4.3.5; V. Toward Hegemony in the EU?;142
4.3.6; VI. Conclusions;148
4.3.7; Bibliography;149
5; D. Law;154
5.1; Eighth chapter The Overburdening of European Law through Economic and Monetary Union;156
5.1.1; I. Introductory Remarks;156
5.1.2; II. The Disintegrative Effects of Economic Integration through Law;157
5.1.3; III. The Alternative of Conflicts-Law Constitutionalism;159
5.1.4; IV. EMU as an Irresolvable Diagonal Conflict Constellation;162
5.1.5; V. Conflict ‘Resolution’ through Authoritarian Managerialism;165
5.1.6; VI. ‘Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende auch’ or Does It? An Epilogue;169
5.1.7; Bibliography;171
5.2; Ninth chapter Legitimacy, Democracy and the Future of the Monetary Union;176
5.2.1; I. Legitimacy in Good and in Bad Times;176
5.2.1.1; Before the crisis: A legitimized European Union;176
5.2.1.2; The impact of the crisis: Rise of the democratic deficit;179
5.2.1.3; Fiscal integration during the crisis;180
5.2.1.4; Fiscal integration and legitimacy;181
5.2.1.5; The no demos thesis and its implications;183
5.2.1.6; A legitimacy trilemma?;185
5.2.2; II. Democratic Legitimacy after the Crisis: A Legitimacy Trilemma;186
5.2.2.1; Democratic principle, no demos thesis;188
5.2.2.2; Monetary union, no demos thesis;189
5.2.2.3; Monetary union, democratic principle.;192
5.2.3; III. Conclusions;193
5.2.4; Bibliography;195
5.3; Tenth chapter Conflict at the Interface of Economic Policy and Law – Cognitive Dissonance in the German Constitutional Court’s OMT Case Reasoning;198
5.3.1; I. Starting Point;198
5.3.2; II. The OMT Decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht;200
5.3.2.1; Procedural issues;200
5.3.2.2; Referral to the European Court of Justice;203
5.3.2.3; Interpretation of Art. 119 (3) and 127 (1) TFEU;205
5.3.2.4; The OMT measures of the ECB as an act of general economic policy?;206
5.3.2.5; The OMT measures of the ECB and political conditionality;209
5.3.2.6; The OMT measures of the ECB as a monetary financing of state budgets?;210
5.3.2.7; Proposed restrictive reading of OMT measure of the ECB;213
5.3.2.8; Implications of the path taken by the Bundesverfassungsgericht;213
5.3.3; III. Cognitive Dissonance as a Driver of Crisis?;214
5.3.4; IV. Conclusions;217
5.3.5; Bibliography;219
6; About the authors;222